support all this expence, with a course of exchange which has fallen 33 per cent. gives to France, already, all the advantages she could desire from the present contest. It is part of the Continental system, which diminishes on one side your revenues by reducing your commerce," although I fear I shall not be able to and on the other increases your expense by compelling you to maintain armies in Sicily and at Lisbon. It is, in vulgar language, to burn the candle at both ends. In the mean time, the French army, according to its fundamental law, subsists on the country upon which it makes war, and only costs us its pay, which we should be obliged to supply wherever it was.-In short, if Massena, having received his reinforcements and his heavy artillery, should be inclined to advance upon, after having silenced, your batteries; or if you yourselves, rendered impatient by this ruinous contest, march against him, what will be the consequence? If you are victorious, you will derive no advantage from it, for you will have scarcely made two marches before you are met by new armies. If you are conquered, you are lost. The loss of 60,000 men to England, is as great as that of 500,000 to France. The two countries are in the proportion of one to three to each other with respect to population; the same proportion prevails with respect to the extent of the countries where you are obliged to have troops, which on the whole produces a proportion of one to nine.-We are ignorant of the intentions of the cabinet of the Thuilleries; but we wish with all our heart, that the Prince of Essling may manoeuvre instead of attacking you, and by so doing keep you some years where you are. The consequences would be, you would add 100 millions more to your debt, and we should be certain of the more complete submission of the Peninsula. When the question is about a great extent of Continent, what are a few years? Ail the nations who have been subjugated, have defended themselves for several years; you alone have exhibited the solitary instance in history, of a nation conquered in one battle, and so subjugated by the Normans your conquerors, that your laws, your customs, every thing was torn from you by a single victory.

accuracy there might be in the accounts on either side, did it answer the object of the French or of the English general?The object of the English general, as he tells us himself in his dispatch of the 30th September, in the following words,

(8) SPEECH." And particularly by the brilliant part which they bore in the repulse of the enemy at Busaco."

Note in the Moniteur.-The affair at Busaco, whatever was its nature, or whatever

obtain the object I had in passing the Mondego, and in occupying the Sierra of Busaco, yet I do not regret to have done so," was to defend the position of the Mondego, the right of which rested on that river, and on the inaccessible mountains of the right bank of the Zezere, which empties itself into the Tagus 30 leagues from thence, and whose left extended on the mountains which rest on the Douro. By this central position, the English General did not obtain the glory of defending Portugal, since he had already abandoned 30 leagues of the country to the enemy. To defend Portugal he should have raised the siege of Almeida, or at least have occupied the fine positions of Guarda. However, having thought proper to occupy the position of Busaco, he covered 3-4ths of Portugal: he protected the fine vallies of the Tagus and the Mondego; he kept the French army at 40 leagues from the capital; he kept up his communications with Oporto, and with all the provinces on the other side of the Douro, of which he remained master. The French army of Portugal remained separated for upwards of eighty leagues from the army of the south, and derived all its subsistence from a country which Wellington had intentionally laid waste, employing all the time that was necessary to make the devastation complete. It was thus reduced to the necessity of drawing its provisions from Spain by impassible roads; and when the rains began, the communication would be cut off with Spain, and the army would have been obliged to return to Almeida. The English army occupying the position of Busaco, all Portugal would have supplied it with provisions, and furnished nothing to the French army. If the English General, then, had maintained his position at Busaco only for 15 days, he, could have boasted of having won the campaign, and saved Portugal. He would, in truth, have exposed himself to the imputation of having laid waste thirty leagues of country, but he could have found an answer to that imputation, if he had obliged the French to evacuate the country; and proved by the event that these ravages

is always the language, without paying any greater attention now than on former occasions, that it is not sufficient to justify a great undertaking, to shew the advantages arising from war followed by vic tory; but that it is necessary to calculate the probability of such victory. By this mode of reasoning, it would be much the plainer way to land at Havre and march to Paris; for certainly upon the supposition of victory, the advantages and the glory would be incontestible. Is it probable that England can maintain a contest with France in Spain? This is the whole of the question. She was not able to do so when considerable Spanish armies occupied Sarragossa, Saint Andero, Bilboa and Burgos. The fine army of Moore was even then forced to a shameful flight, in which it lost a great many men, horses, a part of its baggage, and even its treasure. She could not do so upon the fifth coalition. Wellington advanced as far as Talavera; he gained some advantages, and almost immediately was compelled to abandon his hospitals, his sick, and to escape into Portugal. The presence of Moore was unable to prevent the defeat of Blake at Espinosa, of the army of Estremadura at Burgos, of Castanos at Tudela, and the capture of Saragossa and Madrid. Wellington, victorious at Talavera, was unable to prevent the passage of the Sierra Morena, the occupation of Jaen, of Seville, of Grenada, the blockade of Cadiz, and the capture of the camp at St. Roch. Wellington has not defended Portugal; he has suffer ed the fortresses to be taken; he has abondoned the country; he has retired to inaccessible heights, where he holds himself in readiness to embark with the first favourable wind. Such are the consequences of the pretended victory of Bu

contributed to the success of the campaign., necessary to England, that he did so. Such -All these combinations and considerations were not unknown to the English General. He wished to defend his position, and he gave battle at Busaco; the result of the engagement was the passage of the Mondego, the evacuation of Coimbra, and a retreat by forced marches to Lisbon. In his flight Wellington could only lay waste to the extent of a league on the right and left of his line of march; and the French army arriving almost at the same moment that he did, in sight of his ships, found immense quantities of provisions in the fine vallies of the Tagus. The French General did every thing he wished; the English General effected nothing that he intended. The battle of Busaco rendered all the ravages he committed, and for which he will ever be execrated by the Portuguese, useless. When they wish to explain to their children the English manner of defending a country, they will point to the ruins of their villages, their castles, and their towns-That several brigades, hurried on by the noble impetuosity of French troops, should wish to bound over inaccessible heights-that they should not find on the crest of these mountains sufficient space to extend themselves—all this is very possible; but this does not give the enemy a right to claim the victory. All that occurred on that day tends to prove, that the composition and the spirit of the French troops were so far superior to those of the English army, that the latter neither could nor would defend a position upon which the fate of Portugal depended!-The English, then, were defeated at Busaco: whether it was the fault of the general, the officers, or the soldiers, is of no consequence. An army is composed of all these. The French general did every thing he wished; the English general did nothing, protected nothing, executed none of his plans; the battle of Busaco frustrated them all.

SPEECH (9)" On which the liberties and independence of the Spanish and Portuguese nations entirely depend."

Note of the Moniteur.—It would be curious to read the speeches in Parliament during the last twenty years. When the expedition of the Duke of York to Belgium was to be defended, it was said that the war was carried on for the independence and liberty of Belgium. When the Duke of York landed in Holland, it was for the liberty and independence of Holland, so

saco.

If the English lose 80 leagues of a country after victory, what events are they in expectation of to enable them to drive the French out of the Peninsula ? And if it be admitted, as no man of sense.can doubt, and as the English Generals themselves have declared, since Moore's expe dition, that it is impossible for them to defend the Peninsula, why do they run such risks without the hope of success? It will be said-" all this is allowed, but still the English prolong the contest; they prevent the country from settling; is that nothing?" No man with the least sensibility, or possessing the common feelings of humanity, can contain his indignation in seeing

Note of the Moniteur.This is a remark. able passage. Last year you said, that the Orders in Council had all the success you expected, that your trade was augmented by that of America and neutral powers; now you recant all this: you admit that your trade has laboured under difficulties, that your revenues are dimi

a nation so immoral as to excite every species of disorder among fourteen millions of people, without any other object than that of retarding for some moments the progress of a social organization. But the consequences of the conduct of England, on this occasion as on many others, will be to consolidate the power of France. In fact, if after Moore's retreat the English Admi-nished, and yet the Continental system has nistration had listened to the advice of all their Generals, and recognising the impossibility of withdrawing Spain from the influence of France, had renounced the Spanish war, the Spanish war would have been ended; all the Provinces, united in their integrity and their energy, having experienced some checks balanced by some successes, would have formed a happy and powerful nation under the government of a Prince allied to the family of France; and the integrity and independence of Spain would have been more confirmed thereby. France and Spain, governed by members of the same family, would have been in fact a revival of the relations which existed since the time of Phillip V. The only advantage that France would have derived from this arrangment would have been the security that Spain would never take part against her in any civil war. Spain, regenerated by the constitutions of Bayonne, and deriving fresh vigour from them, would have become more independent than she had been for 100 years before; and the wish expressed in the speech from the throne would have been accomplished. England, though she knew to a certainty that she could not defend Spain, has indeed found employment for 300,000 French; but Spain, conquered foot by foot, becomes wholly subjugated; and it is England herself who has endangered the independence and integrity of Spain by engaging in a contest in which it is proved by experience that all the chances are against her. The conquest of Spain will produce effects quite different from those of a simple change of dynasty, which would have turned to the advantage of the nation, the plans of reform, and the liberal ideas introduced by a government young, firm, and vigorous. Posterity, to whom years are only as a moment, will attribute the great results which have so conspicuously combined to the advantage of France, to the short-sighted policy of England alone.

SPEECH. (10) Have in some degree affected a part of his Majesty's revenue, particularly in Ireland,"

been only three months in force. What will it be, then, in three years? The accounts of the French finances prove that it has had quite a contrary effect upon them. It is true, that in France, as well as in other places, numerous instances of private misfortune have occurred; but these have no effect upon the national revenues. Bankruptcies have taken place, because speculators, seduced by lucre, become the discounters of your credit. The canals by which you drew to yourselves the substance of the whole Continent of Europe, have been all blocked up by the shocks that you have received. It is for and by England that this circulation of paper has been created; but the crisis is past, and new channels are disclosing themselves for the real trade of the Continent.-The English Government can have no credit when that of its trade declines. It feels every private bankruptcy. The French Government, on the contrary, has a credit independent of that of bankers or merchants. Nine hundred millions of revenue collected in specie constitute the proper revenue of the empire, represent the riches of its soil, and are more than sufficient for all its expences; while 17 or 1,800 millions, necessary for the expences of England, can only be collected through the medium of a paper circulation, which only supporting itself by that immense currency which, through Amsterdam and Hamburgh, embraced the whole Continent of Europe; while 17 or 1,800 millions are not the consequence of the riches of the soil or the revenues of the country, but of industry and of a system of credit, which is not sufficient to provide for the wants that it has to satisfy, the moment it is prevented from extending to the Continent. A three months check has already made the city of London turn pale; and there is not an English speculator who can coolly contemplate the perspective of 10 years of a similar system. The French Exchange for the last four years has been constantly improving, and that in all the commercial towns of the world, at the rate of from three to ten per

Published by R. BAGSHAW, Brydges-Street, Covent Garden :-Sold also by J. BUDD, Pall-Ma!'. LONDON :-Printed by T. C. Hansard, Peterborough-Court, Fleet-Street.

COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

VOL. XIX. No. 23.] LONDON, WEDNESDAY, MARCH 20, 1811.