they might be opposed, it was no less true that there might be certain points of similarity between them, and that this country may be in danger of suffering from the same calamity which befel France, from Law. Mr. Law looked to security, and the Bank looked, in 1797, to security. Law did not issue paper for more than two-thirds of the value of the land. The rate of interest fell to 3 per cent. Many good things resulted at first from this; but he got at last more than all the circulating medium of the rest of Europe. He thought he could not issue too much, while he lent at low interest on good security. In the same manner-let the Bank look that they do not lend too much at low interest. Another case applicable to the present was the Bank of Paris. The Bank of Paris was not the Government Bank. It lent out money on moderate interest, and was founded on good security. In 1785, the Government, wishing for money, contrived to borrow from the Bank, and to interfere with the paper currency. The Bank having furnished loans to Government, augmented their paper. This again produced a run on the Bank: at last the Bank stopt. But the Bank immediately limited their paper; and though the exchange had fallen 10 per cent. the Bank felt no difficulty. This example was made for the instruction of this country. A Committee was appointed to inquire into the business, and they stated three things as particularly to be attended to. The first was, that Government should not borrow from the Bank, very different from the practice this country. They next stated that the Bank Funds should only be laid out on short securities, that they might always have it in their power to restrict their issues; and in the third place they stated that the Bank should draw in their discounts in case of a drain, for the meaning of a drain was, that more notes had been issued than were required. This could not be difficult if attention were paid to the first symptoms of superabundance. Gentlemen would perhaps say that this case was not similar to ours. But he would maintain that drain was a proof of superabundance. The paper of the Paris Bank amounted only to ninety millions when it stopped, while 100 millions at another period was not found too much; but then there arose circumstances,

such as war, which totally altered the relation of the sum wanted. He protested, therefore, against the laying down a par ticular maximum: The only rule of guidance was necessarily the drain. They were exactly like the Bank of Paris. There were a variety of other circumstances to the same point, and he believed Sweden was one. The Swedish Bank, like the Bank of Paris, lent at interest. It had been said that the difference between this country and the Continent made all these foreign instances inapplicable; but were there no limits to this proposition; were there no countries on the Continent situate like ourselves? The Swedish Bank, he was persuaded, was of that descriptionthey lent at interest; but they lent somewhat too largely, and stopt at a depreciation of 70 per cent. They also say a great difference in the price of commodities is highly inconvenient, that trade would suffer, they wish to temporize, and are indisposed to reduce their issues of paper. The excess of America was also in point. Their paper was also issued on very good security. Demerara and Surinam were also in point. It was very natural for us to think that we were the centre of our own system; in the same way as was supposed that the sun kept running round the earth, and not the earth round the sun, we always imagine that the bullion keeps on rising, and not that our currency goes on depreciating. He said he understood that in Sweden also bullion was said to rise. He remembered when he was in a Russian countinghouse, he had no ideas how the exchange, now down to 11, and now up, was continually against that country, in the same manner as a leading tide, though it ap pears for a little to go back, keeps gra dually gaining more and more ground. The general unfavourable exchange was to be attributed to the paper money issued by several successive rulers of Russia, and these variations had their origin in causes that might somewhat reduce, but could never substantially effect that unfavourable exchange. Will it be said, that the same measure may be fa vourable here and unfavourable there? It appears from Marshall's Life of Washington, how unwilling the Americans were in 1791 and 1792, to own the depreciated state of their currency. (To be continued.)

We have now to discuss the question of Depreciation. We have now to inquire, whether the Bank of England Notes have, or have not, depreciated; that is to say, fallen in value. After what we have seen in the former Letters, and particularly in that immediately preceding, it is, indeed, nearly useless to put this question to any man of sense, and much more so to make it a subject of serious discussion. Nevertheless, it will be right so to do; seeing that these Letters are intended to treat of every part of this great subject, and to put upon record all the material facts and arguments appertaining to it.

In the House of Commons, during the Debate on the Bullion Report and on the Resolutions thereon proposed, by Mr. FRANCIS HORNER on the one side, and Mr. NICHOLAS VANSITTART on the other, it was contended, by those who were for Mr. VANSITTART, that is to say, by the MINISTRY, and their adherents; by this part of the House it was contended, that the Bank paper had not depreciated, or fallen in value; and, being asked, how they then accounted for the fact, that a

[121S

guinea was worth 26s. or 27s. they answered, that it was very true, that Gold and Silver had risen; but, that the Bank paper had not fallen.

They were then asked, how, since they would insist upon it that it was a rise of Gold and Silver, it had come to pass at this time above all others. Allowing, for argument's sake, that it was a rise in the. value of the guinea, they were asked how the value of the guinea came to rise. Their answer to this was, that it was owing chiefly to the injury done to our commerce by the extraordinary, the cruel, the savage measures of the inexorable tyrant Buonaparté, whom they designated by every appellation characteristic of a despot, and even a

fiend.

Gentlemen, we will stop here and make a few observations upon these charges against the Emperor of France; for, it would be very foolish in us, who call ourselves "the most thinking people in the

world," to suffer ourselves to be amused with charges against Napoleon, when we should be considering of the real cause of the mischief that is now come upon us, and of the greater mischief that is still coming, and will come with most dreadful effect, unless we take timely measures for preventing that effect; this would be selling ourselves to laughter indeed, making ourselves an object for the contempt of Europe, not excepting the Dutch and those other nations, whom, with empty insolence, our hireling writers and others affect to pity.

We call upon the Bank for Gold and Silver in payment of their promissory notes. They have no Gold or Silver to give us; or, at least, none do they give. They are protected by law against our demands. Some persons propose to remove this impediment to our demands. The men in power and a great majority of the House of Commons say, no; and, they, in objecting to the proposition, say, that the Bank have not the gold and silver;

What should we think, Gentlemen; what should we "thinking people" think of a General, who was to write home word, that he had been beaten and routed and lost half his army; but, that the fault was none of his, and that it was wholly the fault of the enemy's General, who had adopted against him a series of extraordinary, cruel, and savage measures? What should we thinking people say to such a general? What would MR. QUIN, the editor of the Traveller news-paper, in his sublime orations, in the Common Council, say to such a general? Would he vote him thanks and a sword? I do not say that he would not; but, I think, that you will agree with me, that such a general would, amongst most men, meet with but a cold reception; and, that he would be told, that it was the business of the enemy to beat him, to route him, to break him up, to ruin him; and that it was his business to prevent the enemy from so doing, and also to beat and break up and ruin the

enemy.

Just such, must, if we have a grain of sense left, be our answer to the ministers and their adherents, when they blame Buonaparté for having deprived us of our Gold and Silver. It was their business to prevent him from doing us this mischief. It was their business to protect the country against the fatal effects of the enemy's measures; and, if they found themselves unequal to the task, they should have said so; and, I warrant them, there would not have been wanting others to take the labour off their hands. These ministers and their predecessors, for the last twenty years, have had the complete command of all the means, all the resources, of this kingdom, of every sort. They have carried all the measures that they proposed. They have found out the way of putting down all opposition, or, at least, of rendering all opposition quite inefficient; and, therefore, to them, and to them alone, the mation is to look for responsibility for

existence of which we have cause to lament, to whom are we to look, for responsibility, but to them?

But, to take another view of the matter, what, let me ask, has Napoleon done against our commerce and our currency, for which he will not easily find a justification in our example? Have we neglected any means in our power to injure the commerce and the finances of France? Did not Pitt, from the very outset of the war against the French Jacobins and Levellers, call it a war of finance? And, were not all our efforts bent down towards the beating of France through her finances? This is notoriously the fact; and, as to her commerce, it must be well known to every one, that we risked a war with the American States for the purpose of intercepting provisions in their way to the people of France, when they were menaced with famine. Was this fair and honourable warfare? I shall be told that it was. I will not discuss the point. But, if it was so, what reason have we to complain now, when France prevents us, not from receiving corn from her dominions; but, merely from sending our products to those dominions. This is the utmost that Napoleon does, or that he can do; and, I put it, then, to any reasonable man, whether we have real cause of complaint. We may be sorry for what Napoleon is doing; and we must be sorry for the individuals who suffer from his measures; but, can we complain of him for not receiving our goods now, when we recollect, that we would not suffer the people of France to receive flour from Ame rica when we thought them in the midst of famine, and when we further recollect, that we openly avowed the wish and the endeavour to prevent their receiving Jesuit ́s Bark, a drug so necessary, in many cases, to the preservation of life? This was fair in us, I shall be told. Very well. That I am not questioning; but, if this was fair ; if a state of war tolerated this, have we, I ask again, any reason to complain of him, any reason to call him tyrant (as GEORGE ROSE did) because he will not now permit any part of his people to receive goods which are our produce or our preperty?