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the cause and effect-A and B-as points connected by a single line; whereas we ought to represent the causation by numerous points, one of which may perhaps be more prominent than the rest-connected with the effect by converging lines.

A

The nature of the prevailing misconception as to the simplicity of political causes may be illustrated by the following verses, taken from a collection of old French proverbs:

Paix engendre prospérité,
De prospérité vient richesse,
De richesse orgueil et volupté,
D'orgueil contention sans cesse,
Contention la guerre adresse (16)
La guerre engendre pauvreté,
Pauvreté humilité,

D'humilité revient la paix,

Aussi retournent les humains. (17)

Now, in real history, events never follow one another according to so simple a law of causation, and in a constant cycle. The effect may be one, but the conditioning circumstances are many. The result may be simple, but the antecedents are complex. There is always a composition of forces; some collateral

(16) Adresser seems to be here used in the sense of drizzare, or dresser, erigere.-See Ducange, Gloss. in 'drizare.'

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(17) See Gruteri Florilegium Ethico-politicum, vol. i. (1610, Francofurti). The following passage from Ramsay's Voyages de Cyrus contains a similar view with respect to the succession of causes and effects in the affairs of nations:- Pendant l'espace de trois cens ans la valeur des rois de Médie avoit augmenté leurs conquêtes. Les conquêtes avoient engendré le luxe, et le luxe est toujours l'avant-coureur de la chûte des empires. Valeur, conquêtes, luxe, anarchie, voilà le cercle fatal, et les différens periodes de la vie politique de presque tous les états.'-liv. i. p. 4.

influence is added, and the simple action of the cause is modified, so that the next stage in the series of effects varies from the formula, and the imaginary chain of causation is deserted by the real course of events.

§ 3 Having exemplified the treatment of the problem of causation by historical writers, we will proceed to inquire into the methods of determining political causes; and in so doing, we shall have occasion to consider how far the methods laid down for the investigation of causes in physics are applicable to this purpose.

The investigation of political causes, even in the simplest cases of past events, is carried on partly by an inductive, and partly by a deductive process. The circumstances of the case are observed and noted, as in an induction of physical facts; but for determining the causation, some extraneous principles, derived from a wider observation of mankind,' must be applied, and in order to apply them, a deductive process of reasoning must be gone through.

The four processes of reasoning in which Mr. Mill has summed up the methods of the inductive logic, when applied in cases of experiment, (1) are all applicable, with certain corrections and safeguards, to the investigation of causes in politics, as we shall proceed to show. These four processes are denominated by him-the Method of Agreement, the Method of Difference, the Method of Residues, and the Method of Concomitant Variations. The two last, however, are in strictness only particular forms of

(18) Vol. i. p. 450, b. 3, c. 8. Concerning the nature of induction, in addition to Mr. Mill's treatment of the subject, see Dr. Whewell's tract on Induction (1849), and Mr. Thomson's Laws of Thought, § 76, 86, 93.

Dr. Whewell (Of Induction, § 43) remarks that Mr. Mill's methods bear a great resemblance to Bacon's Prerogatives of Instances: for example, the method of agreement to the instantiæ ostensivæ; the method of difference to the instantiæ absentiæ in proximo, and the instantiæ crucis ; the method of concomitant variations to the instantiæ migrantes. The instantiæ ostensivæ, however, are merely remarkable and prominent manifestations of the object under investigation, Nov. Org. ii. 24; and the instantiæ migrantes are applications of the method of difference to several objects, but they are not supposed to vary as one another, ib. 23. Qu. as to the instantiæ absentiæ in proximo: see the list in ii. 52.

the second, and therefore we shall, for the present, confine our attention to the two first.

Of these two-the Method of Agreement, and the Method of Difference the former infers that if, while the accompanying phenomena vary, two phenomena occur together, they are related as cause and effect: the latter infers that, if two phenomena occur in company with a certain set of phenomena, but are wanting where the same set of phenomena occur elsewhere, they are related in the same manner. Thus, adopting Mr. Mill's notation, and representing the antecedents by a large, and the consequents by a small letter, if we are in search of the cause of a, and we have ABC with abc, and ADE with ade, we infer, by the Method of Agreement, that A is the cause of a. Again, if we have B C with bc, and ABC with abc, we infer, by the Method of Difference, that A is the cause of a.

In the present chapter, we are principally considering the determination of causes, the political effect being given; but as the methods now in question are general, we shall, in examining their application to politics, sometimes include the determination of effects likewise.

§ 4 The Method of Agreement, accordingly, consists in inferring causation where two circumstances are combined with different elements, where they continue unchanged in dissimilar media. As their connexion remains, while all other circumstances vary, it is inferred that the element which is alone constant is due to causation. Now in the experimental sciences, where the phenomena can be stripped of all accessories, and their operation laid bare to the student, such a simple mode of inferring can be used with advantage; but in politics, the possible antecedents of each fact are too numerous, and the causation too complex, for this method to be safely adopted, without a subsidiary process of reasoning. For example, we might find, in a given country, a prosperous condition of the labouring classes, combined with the existence of a poor-law, coincident, in different districts, with a great variety of other circumstances. Calling A the poor-law, and a the prosperous state of the labouring

classes, we might, in different parts of the country, have A B C and abc, ADE and ade, AFG and afg, AHI and ahi, and so on; yet it would be dangerous, from this coincidence alone, to infer causation. There are so many other circumstances, besides a poor-law, which might produce a prosperous state of the labouring classes, that some argument beyond the mere frequent concurrence of the two phenomena, even in different combinations, is needed in order to establish the conclusion. Again: suppose it were sought to prove, by a similar mode of reasoning, that the diffusion of education promotes crime-it might be argued that, because diffusion of education co-exists with a large amount of crime in many districts, in combination with a great variety of other circumstances, therefore the former is the cause of the latter. But this mode of arguing would be open

to the same objection. There are so many other causes, besides a diffusion of education, which might multiply crimes, that the mere coincidence of a prevalence of crime with extensive education, even under a variety of circumstances, does not alone entitle us to infer causation. There may be some other circumstance, or set of circumstances, constantly accompanying a prevalence of crime-or, what is equally probable, when so complex a subject as crime is in question, the prevalence of crime in different districts may be owing to different causes.

Nevertheless, the Method of Agreement, though not conclusive in politics, and always requiring a further process of negative comparison and verification, is useful as an indication of the truth, and as guiding the steps of the inquirer. Where, indeed, the number of cases examined is small and complex, this method is absolutely worthless; but in proportion as the number of cases is increased, and the concomitant circumstances are diversified, it acquires increased value. Wherever there is a plurality of causes, the Method of Agreement, unassisted by ulterior arguments, is necessarily inconclusive: it may be useful as affording suggestions, and pointing out the right path, but it can never by itself lead to a decisive result. Now in politics, there is always a plurality of possible causes: and as the field of

inquiry cannot be narrowed by the experimental method, a merely affirmative process, such as the Method of Agreement, provides no means for the abscissio infiniti. Whereas in the physical sciences, where the Method of Agreement is applicable, other causes can be excluded, so that it in fact involves a negative element, which is always wanting in politics. Thus, to take Mr. Mill's example of this method: Let the effect be crystallization. We compare instances in which bodies are known to assume crystalline structure, but which have no other point of agreement; and we find them to have one, and, as far as we can observe, only one, antecedent in common-the deposition of a solid matter from a liquid state, either a state of fusion or of solution. We conclude, therefore, that the solidification of a substance from a liquid state is an invariable antecedent of its crystallization.'(") If we could observe two political phenomena in constant or frequent connexion, amidst numerous varieties of circumstances, and if we could, as in the case of crystallization, ascertain that there was no other point of agreement-then we might draw the same inference as in the physical case. But although, in politics, we may find A B C and abc, ADE and ade, and so on, in many other cases, yet it may happen that some unobserved fact or combination of facts-X or Y-may be present in each of these cases, and may be the true cause of a. The canon of this method is stated by Mr. Mill in the following terms: 'If two or more instances of the phenomenon under investigation have only one circumstance in common, the circumstance in which alone all the instances agree is the cause of the given phenomenon.'(") The conclusiveness of this method, therefore, depends on the determination of the negative fact, that the circumstance in which the phenomena all agree, is the only circumstance in which they all agree. Now, in the experimental sciences, this negative fact can, for reasons above stated, be determined; but in politics it cannot be determined; and therefore, in politics, this method cannot be relied upon without some correction or verification.

(19) Logic, vol. i. p. 452.

(20) Ib. p. 454.

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