ing that members of parliament could, as having the deepest stake in the community, be most surely depended on for its defence: That military commanders selected from their own body, were, as most directly subject to the controul of either house, most likely to be obedient: That their rank necessarily obtained for them a submission from the subordinate officers, that could not be expected from such as more nearly approximated to the station of those whom they commanded; and that, as by this new arrangement the eminent individuals who had already so signally served their country must lay down their commissions, it would

well as from the speeches which we have given from Rushworth, and the facts stated by that collector and Whitelocke, &c. that this account was a most impudent fabrication; and I have no doubt that Clarendon, who takes such credit to himself for his dexterity in forging speeches, was himself the author of the whole. But one feels more inclined to excuse him, who, having embarked all his hopes and fortunes in the struggle, and been engaged in all the transactions, could not fail to be imbued with the passions incident to them, for such a statement, than for the adoption of it by Mr. Hume, who sat down coolly with the avowed object of writing the truth. The apology for him is that he followed Clarendon; but it cannot be admitted— because he himself refers to Rushworth, as if he had been warranted by his authority; and it is utterly impossible that, as Rushworth gives a most particular account of the whole business, with dates and speeches, and mentions that the fast was held to implore a blessing upon the new model, which had already drawn a congratulatory address from many in London, Hume could be deceived. His misrepresentation then, I must speak out, was as wilful as it is gross. If truth be necessary to history, I cannot conceive that Mr. Hume's work will come under the denomination. He elsewhere, by way of ridicule, quotes the very words of the ordinance, for the national fast on Christmas day. As for Clarendon, he tells us he often wished to make a collection of all the speeches and letters he had forged. Life, vol. i. p. 137. The principle on which Clarendon wrote, too, was inconsistent with a regard to truth. "I first undertook," says he, "this

not only offend them, but devolve the public safety upon men without experience. He concluded with referring to the conduct of the Greeks and Romans in support of his argument, alleging that they always bestowed the great civil and military offices upon their senators, as on persons the best qualified, both from the deep interest they had in the state, and from their opportunities of acquiring in the senate that intimate knowledge of the counsels of their country, which was necessary for promoting them *.

As this has been presented by Mr. Hume as an irrefragable argument, and the conduct of the ancient republics referred to by him with particular satisfaction, it may be proper to give the matter a little examination. Without an intimate acquaintance with the institutions of any state, it is always dangerous to draw an inference from any particular branch of its policy, because what may be wise and beneficial under one system, may be absolutely pernicious under another. But, in this instance, neither Whitelocke nor Hume seems to have understood the nature of the political machine in those ancient republics; and in regard to Greece they had remarkably mistaken the fact, since neither in Athens nor Sparta, the two most considerable Grecian states, were senators eligible to other

difficult work with his majesty's approbation, and by his encouragement, and for his vindication." Hist. vol. iv. p. 627.

Rush. vol. vi. p. 3, et seq. Whitelocke, p. 118, 119. This author tells us, that "some said" the preachers wished the church to be attended only by members, that they might speak the more freely to them, especially upon the point of the self-denying ordinance.

* Whitelocke, p. 119, 120.

offices*. In Rome, indeed, the senators were eligible to, and most frequently filled, some of the highest places; but, in order to ascertain how this operated, we must attend to the constitution of that commonwealth. The senate did not, as in England now, elect the public officers, and neither possessed the legislative power, nor any right even to impose taxes. It was a select committee, into which they were chiefly chosen who had already filled some offices, and performed something me. morable in the public service; and its powers were limited to those only of superintending the gene. ral current business of the state. All laws were enacted, and public officers elected, by the people in their comitia; and, had the power wisely entrusted to the senate been perverted, it could have been modified by a new law. The senate had thus no power to augment the number of offices; and whenever it was suspected that a war was protracted, in order to afford an advantage to members of their body, new men were brought forward. The consuls were invested with large powers; but they

• In Athens, the senators, and all the great civil and military officers, were annually elected by the people; but the first were chosen by lot out of the respective tribes, from individuals qualified by rank, age, &c. while all the latter were elected by voices in the annual assemblies called for the purpose. From the nature of the senate it does not appear that candidates for other offices could be put in nomination for the lot. Gillies's Aristotle's Politics, p. 80, et seq. The powers of the senate were soon virtually withdrawn by the popular assemblies. In Sparta, the senate was composed only of twenty-eight, and none was eligible till he had completed his sixtieth year. Their age precluded the idea of their acting in a military capacity; and the duties of their office as senators required all their powers. Plut. Life of Lycurgus.

could not so modify an army, as to turn it against the community; for, as their office expired at the end of one year, they had neither time to corrupt the army, nor undue influence over officers, who depended upon the popular vote for their own advancement. As few, too, of the senate could ever expect to enjoy the consular dignity, they could feel little disposition to promote its power at the expense of their own influence in the national council, while the people could ever, by new laws, curb any thing dangerous in the authority of its commanders. As the senate had not the nomination to places, it was never disgraced by factious cabals and broils to obtain them; and hence we do not ever read of the existence of ministerial, or ruling, and opposition, factions in that august body. What we have said relates exclusively to the pure days of the republic. It is not our province to inquire into the causes that, in the progress of centuries, suspended the operation, as they ultimately destroyed the peculiar fabric, of that celebrated government *. But in England, at the period we are treating of, the two houses of parliament were invested with unlimited power, determinable only at their own pleasure; and, in short, were, in their aggregate capacity, clothed with all the authority of absolute monarchs. Invested with the whole legislative power, and entitled to appoint all public officers, they had a natural tendency to advance their own greatness to the

* See Brodie's History of the Roman Government for an account

of that constitution.

prejudice of the people, as well as to multiply jobs and places, that they might enrich and exalt themselves at the public expense. Such a system tended also to inflame the members with the desire of securing the chief influence in this assembly of joint absolute princes, and likewise of procuring the great offices, which all could not equally obtain-till they were rent into factions for supremacy, and each fixed his hope upon the military, as on an engine by which it might render its ascendency complete. Such was the natural tendency of this state of affairs; and it is no answer to the objections, that the English parliament at that time contained a number of patriots, who were prepared to make great personal sacrifices for the public benefit, since an institution must not be appreciated by the integrity of particular men, and, with all their virtue, they had neither escaped the imputation of selfishness, nor the consequences of the system. In proposing the self-denying ordinance, they acted upon the immutable basis of sound policy in the ordinary transactions of life, such as has been recognised by the law of every country; that no trustee shall, in any transaction regarding the subject of the trust, act for his own behoof. The human heart is assuredly not changed by an appointment to a place in the national council. As for the argument, that a member of parliament was best qualified to discharge the duty of a great office, from his knowledge of the councils of his country, it is doubtless strangely erroneous, since no person in such a situation ought to act without the express orders of the assembly he obeys, which can be as