left wing of the vanquished. Manchester's charge with his foot was equally successful against the infantry, amongst which was Newcastle's own regiment, who, disdaining to fly, were cut down in the order that they had been first formed in: the remainder fled towards York. In the other wing, the fortune of the first shock was reversed. Sir Thomas Fairfax, and Colonel Lambert, at the head of five or six troops, charged the horse opposite, and breaking through, went to their own left wing; but Hurry then charging with his reserve, so furiously assail. ed Lord Fairfax's brigade, which was annoyed by raw levies that were put to flight and thrown back upon their body, that the right wing was routed with part of the main body, including the Scots, and fled towards Tadcaster, giving out that all was lost as however the conquerors were ready to seize the carriages, Cromwell with his horse, and Manchester with his foot, having returned from the pursuit of the prince's right, and perceived the condition of their friends, advanced to a second charge. Both sides were surprised to find that they must fight the battle over again, for a victory of which each thought himself assured. The face of the field was now counterchanged, the royalists occupying exactly the ground which their adversaries had done, and the parliamentary party that of the royalists. The second encounter was desperate, but short. Before ten o'clock the parliamentary forces had cleared the field, and not only secured their own artillery, but taken the whole train of Rupert. The victors followed up the pursuit till within a mile of York. In killed, the king lost between three and four thousand, and in prisoners four generals, and nearly a hundred other officers, with fifteen hundred common soldiers. The opposite party would not acknowledge the loss of more than three hundred. Twentyfive pieces of ordnance, a hundred and twenty barrels of powder, and ten thousand stand of arms, with a hundred pairs of colours, and Newcastle's cabinet, fell into the hands of the conquerors*. Rush. vol. v. p. 631, et seq. Whitelocke, p. 93, 94. Clar. vol. iv. p. 503. This writer pretends, as if he could have the means of knowing, that the parliamentary generals were in such a state of dissension, that the Scots talked of marching home, and all had agreed to separate. But this is just the way he ever talks on any disaster. The parliamentary writers, and the private correspondence, &c. do not warrant us in reposing the slightest faith in the statement, which is refuted by the dispositions which had been determined on. Clarendon, too, assumes that the parliamentary army was more numerous, which is a mistake. The author of the memoirs of the Somervilles says, that the united army would have been obliged to separate for want of provisions, whereas the case was just reversed, vol. ii. p. 345, et seq. Bailie's Letters, vol. ii. p. 23, 33, 35, 36. "There were three generals on each side," says this writer, "Lesley," (Earl of Leven), "Fairfax and Manchester; Rupert, Newcastle, and King. Within half an hour and less they all took to their heels." But this is a mistake as to Manchester. The following picture of the battle by Mr Trevor to Ormonde, is, in my opinion, though artless, admirable. Carte's Letters, vol. i. p. 56, et seq. "To give your Excellence the short account I shall at present make to you, I could not meet the prince until after the battle was joined, and in the fire, smoke, and confusion of that day, I knew not for my soul whether to incline. The runaways, on both sides, were so many, so breathless, so speechless, so full of fears, that I should not have taken them for men, but by their Great as was the loss on the royal side at Marston-moor, it is possible that had the issue just been reversed, Fairfax and Cromwell would not have permitted Rupert to derive all the advantages which redounded to them, and which he expected, and would doubtless have obtained, against inferior leaders. They would have instantly rallied their broken troops, and retreating upon their resources in the associated counties, if they did not even renew the contest on the same ground, would have been soon prepared, in conjunction with the Lancashire forces, to try the fortune of another battle, after they had straitened Rupert's army, and thus perhaps deeply injured it by desertion. At all events, they would have effectually opposed his march to the south. But the other, though he expected a reinforcement, was not even, motion, which still served them very well; not a man of them being able to give me the least hope where the prince was to be found, both armies being mingled, both horse and foot, no side keeping their own posts.-In this terrible distraction did I scour the country; here meeting with a shoal of Scots, crying out, Wae's us, we're a' undone; and so full of lamentation and mourning, as if their day of doom had overtaken them, and from which they knew not whither to fly: and anon I met with a ragged troop reduced to four and the cornet; by and by with a little foot officer without a hat, band, or indeed any thing but feet, and so much tongue as would serve to inquire the way to the next garrisons, which, to say truth, were well filled with stragglers on both sides within a few hours, though they lay distant from the place of fight twenty or thirty miles."-Clarendon himself informs us that Sir Thomas Fairfax and Cromwell could always rally their troops though broken; but the generalship of the other commanders on both sides must have been very bad. Character of the Marquis of supposing that he had had the mental aptitude, in a condition to keep the field. His army, suddenly raised, was dispirited by such a reverse. It had hitherto depended upon the sword for subsistence; and as supplies were cut off in consequence of the posts occupied by the parliamentary troops, it must have soon been reduced to extremities, which a great portion would not have remained to meet. Newcastle's troops in York too, who were in a raging mutiny for want of pay, could never be expected to take the field after the difficulty with which part of them had been drawn out to Marston-moor. It was therefore prudently resolved upon by Rupert to retreat, so long as it was practicable; and, from the approach of the Lancashire forces, we must conclude that he evinced good generalship in carrying off so great a portion of his army. But the unfortunate must bear reproach; and such writers as Clarendon, who measured events by their own presumptuous hopes, undervaluing every difficulty in the way of their own aggrandizement, as if conquest were as easy as words, have severely visited upon the memory of Rupert the contempt with which he treated them as counsellors, while their successors have rung changes upon the same dull tale *. The conduct of the Marquis of Newcastle is not so defensible. Instead of endeavouring to lessen Newcastle. the misfortune to his master, nay to surmount it, he instantly left the kingdom. It is said that he * See last references. was disgusted with the rashness of Rupert in per sisting to fight; but it would be a poor apology for a subordinate commander's abandoning his master, that he had differed in opinion with his superior in regard to an action which had proved disastrous; and this nobleman is confessed to have been utterly unqualified for the substantial duties of a general. Full of the distinguished place he held in society," he loved monarchy, as it was the foundation of his own greatness; and the church, as it was well constituted for the splendour and security of the crown; and religion, as it cherished and maintained that order and obedience that were necessary to both, without any other passion for the particular opinions which were grown up in it, and distinguished it into parties, than as he detested whatsoever was like to disturb the public peace." His estate and influence in the district enabled him to collect an army; but though "he liked," to borrow the language of Clarendon, "the pomp and absolute authority of a general well, and preserved the dignity of it to the full, and for the discharge of the outward state and circumstances of it, in acts of courtesy, affability, bounty, and generosity, he abounded, which in the infancy of a war became him, and made him for some time very acceptable to men of all conditions, the substantial part and fatigue of a general he did not in any degree understand, being utterly unacquainted with war, nor would submit to it, but referred all matters of that nature to the discretion of his lieutenant-general, King." His |