lish parliament opposed this transaction, and, to a certain extent, Charles was obliged to acquiesce : the warrants to colonels were withdrawn; and it is singular that some of these colonels were the most active rebels, and had engaged in the business merely to promote the projected insurrection. Still the king granted licences to four of these colonels to engage four thousand for Spain; and it is remarkable, that even of these four, one was amongst the most forward in the rebellion, while the other three, instead of returning to the foreign service they had left, remained to join the king against the parliament. The royal object was opposed even in regard to these four thousand; but Charles alleged that he stood pledged to the Spanish ambassador, and, while some of the troops were shipt, they were artfully detained by the conspirators to join their countrymen in arms *. The English parliament has been deeply censured for opposing the negociation with France and Spain, to transfer the Irish popish army to those countries: But as Charles had so unaccountably kept up this army, and had himself plotted with the officers of the English army to prevent its dissolution, men were justified in presuming that this might be used as a mere pretext to preserve it till the Scottish army were disbanded. * Carte's Ormonde, vol. i. p. 133, 134, 135. Colonel R. Plunket was one of the colonels who originally obtained a licence; and there was not a more active rebel. Gart. Barry was one of the four mentioned in the text, See p. 157. Borlace, p. 9. It is singular that Carte, while he states the facts given in the text, inconsistently condemns the English parliament for opposing the transaction. Temple, p. 123, Even the transportation of those troops afforded no security, since they might be brought back at any seasonable juncture after they had, by foreign discipline, together with the habits of war, become more calculated for the royal purposes. The intrigues with France and Spain in the preceding year, for both military and pecuniary aid, could not be unknown, and it is ever safe to conclude that what a man has been detected in he may repeat. But the objection to France becomes infinitely stronger when we consider that she was at this moment accused, on apparently just grounds, of a design to send forces into England to co-operate with the king against the parliament. The dangers from Spain were likewise imminent; and it should not be forgotten that she had always been deemed a hostile power; that the late revolt of Portugal from her had been regarded by the British as an auspicious event; and that she was condemned at this very moment for concurring with the other branches of the house of Austria in withholding the palatinate from the English king's nephew, in whose behalf Charles was at the time applying to the parliament, having sent with their approbation a threatening manifesto to the diet at Ratisbon. Surely, therefore, as at the best any supply of military must have enabled Spain to carry through her designs, which equally involved the recovery of Portugal and the detention of the Palatinate, it would have been the most inconsistent policy to have accommodated her, though no dark measures from the cabinet at home had been apprehended. In addition to this, it may be observed, that, in the event of hostilities between the respective king, doms, Spain could give the utmost annoyance to the British empire by pouring into Ireland a body of men whose acquaintance with every creek and haven, and correspondence with their discontented countrymen at home, encouraged by their clergy, rendered them incalculably the most dangerous of all invading enemies *. Independently of all these obvious motives, it is evident that foreign service was just a seminary for Irishmen to accomplish themselves for rebellion; and that part of the mass of this army must at some period or other have returned upon their country. On the other hand, the army had not been so long embodied, though much longer than any colour could be given for, but that they might be restored to the mass of society, and the approach of harvest promised them employment in the first instance t. But the most conclusive argument for the dissolution of that army, is the actual fact, that the officers who pretended to engage the troops for foreign service, undertook the business with the view of detaining them in the country to act in the projected rebellion. The popish army was in a great measure disbanded in June, and completely by August, See Journals, 8th September, 1641. Diurnal Occurrences, p. 357. Speech on the 28th August. King's Manifesto, with speeches relative to the parliament. Id. p. 269, et seq. Cob. Parl. Hist. p. 856, et seq. + Rudyard's Speech, &c. when the arms were piled up in Dublin castle *: But it was imagined that the castle might be surprised, and the troops re-armed, as well as plentifully supplied with ammunition, while arms would farther be procured for several thousands more. No plan could have been better laid. The Protestant army, which was always necessarily kept on foot, scarcely exceeded 3000, and were distributed in small bodies through various and remote parts of the island. The officers of the nine thousand of the disbanded troops were equally disaffected with the men, and therefore an organized army, that more than trebled the protestant army, which again was too much scattered to have been of essential service, would at once have been in arms independently of the irregular thousands that were to be summoned into action, and were to surprise the other forts on the same day with the capture of Dublin Castle; while the British forces must be again embodied, a work *Carte, in his Life of Ormonde, vol. i. p. 134. that the army was all dissolved by the middle of June: But he gives no authority for the statement at the foot of the page: there are, however, letters from Ormonde to Vane, and from Vane to Ormonde, published by him in the third volume, which import that the disbanding had been effected in June; but I suspect that a part only had then been disbanded, and arrangements made for the rest, and that the matter had on that account, been considered as done; for the idea of the complete dissolution of the army in June is contradicted not only by other authorities, (see Borlace, p. 10.) but by the nature of things, since it was in September that the Commons of England passed votes against allowing them to be sent to Spain-a clear proof that though disarmed, they were still kept together. See Correspondence between Charles I. and Secretary Nicholas, p. 4. et seq. Roger of time, in order to be sent against them. But the season was well selected on another ground. The Irish Exchequer was empty, and the money levied by the collectors was, at the breaking out of the rebellion, in their hands ready to be paid in, while the rents throughout the kingdom were now in the hands of the tenants, to be paid at the approaching term, whence the rebels flattered themselves with the hope of making the whole their own, which would abundantly supply them with the means of supporting the war in the outset. But they also expected assistance from Spain, the Pope, and even France; and the Irish officers in foreign service, concerted to return with as many of their men as possible, together with arms for more, on the commencement of the insurrection. On the other hand, they were sufficiently aware of the defenceless state of the protestant part of the community, owing to the policy of Strafforde in regard to gun-powder*, One of the most active conspirators was Roger Moore, a man of narrow fortune, but high descent, and who valued himself exceedingly on his birth, attributing with justice the smallness of the family inheritance to the English invasion. He is said to have united many advantages of person to high talents and consummate address; to have entered upon the undertaking rather with the generous ambition of vindicating what he conceived to be the liberties of his country, than Temple, p. 46. |