ter the lists at all. Among these very few, Drs. Smith and Henderson deserve honorable mention. The English mind seems to have no affinity to the study, or rather a positive antipathy to it. Our attention has just been called to a notice, advertising the Rev. J. Prosser's "Key to the Hebrew Scriptures," in which he strenuously argues against the vowel points! The question in regard to their utility appears still to be a disputed topic among our transatlantic brethren. They have but little appreciation yet of the vast stores of erudition (no small part of these stores well digested too) which are to be found in the German language. There is a horror, almost amounting to Gallo-phobia, at the sight of a book bearing the Teutonic impress.* A wretched ignorance of the true principles of biblical interpretation is prominent in the one thousand and one efforts which have been made to decipher the prophetical portions of the Bible. The theory which maintains the personal and visible reign of Christ on earth, before the millennium, embraces not a few distinguished adherents, and is said to be rapidly gaining ground; a theory which would never become popular in a country where sound principles of hermeneutics prevailed.

We make these observations in no spirit of ill-will or uncharitableness. Our English brethren are doing themselves great honor in many of the branches of natural science, and in East Indian philology. But in most of the departments of literature, common and sacred, they fall far below their old reputation, and their present capabilities. They must go to work, and master the German language, and be willing to sit at the feet of the continental scholars. Instead of crying out incessantly against German neology and mysticism, let them patiently study, we do not say the philosophy of the Germans, but their great histories, their profound oriental disquisitions, their learned commentaries on the Bible; and then, if they please, let them impregnate these productions with the homely good sense and sterling honesty and sober piety of England. They will be the wiser and the better, and the world will thank them.

Finally, England must educate and Christianize the swarming millions of her own poor peasantry in Ireland, in London, and in

* Two volumes from Chrysostom have just been published at Oxford, under the care of Profs. Pusey, Keble, etc. In these volumes there is no allusion to the life of Chrysostom by Neander.

her great manufacturing districts. In this way alone can she put down Chartism, and every other form of turbulent democracy. In this course only will she accomplish salutary, peaceable reforms in church or state. England has most solemn duties now to be performed at home. She has no time to waste in bickering. Her nobility and gentry, her merchant princes and her geat landed proprietors have a vital and an untold interest in this work of evangelizing the whole country. Their rights will be as chaff before the whirlwind when once a million of uneducated Chartists are in motion. The universities must adopt needed reforms, and show a warm sympathy in the well-being of the whole people, if they would preserve their charters untouched and their walls undesecrated. Ministers at the altar must aspire after a profounder scholarship, a more radical acquaintance with the word of God, a deeper knowledge of the science of theology. While physical researches are pushed farther and farther, it must not be forgotten, that mental and especially moral subjects are of higher moment, and demand a more earnest attention.

ARTICLE VIII.

A NOTICE OF THE REV. DR. WOODS' REVIEW OF "AN ESSAY ON CAUSE AND EFFECT, IN CONNECTION WITH FATALISM AND FREE AGENCY:"-Am. Bib. Repos. Jan., 1840, Vol. III. pp. 174-193. Ibid. July and October, 1840, Vol. IV. pp. 217-242, and 467-485.

By the Author of the "Essay."

THE writer of the above mentioned Essay on Cause and Effect,* did not design to enter the lists in any theological or metaphysical controversy, but rather to excite other and more competent minds to engage in the discussion. As this aim has been so happily accomplished, and the matter is fairly in the hands of others, fully competent, the writer will notice Dr.

*This "Essay" appeared in the Repository for October, 1839, p. 381.

Woods' articles only so far as is needful, either to explain misconceptions, or to suggest topics for farther discussion.

A great part of Dr. Woods' remarks are based on the supposition, that the article he criticises teaches, that emotions and desires are not under the control of the will. An article on this subject in a preceding number of this work,* exhibits the writer's views more at large, and it is supposed that nothing there presented is inconsistent with any thing advanced in the Essay on Cause and Effect. The appalling deductions made by Dr. Woods, it will be seen, do not result from any thing actually presented, but merely from a misapprehension.

Most of the remaining part of Dr. Woods' criticisms are based on another misconception of the ideas expressed in the original article. But in order to present this part of the subject clearly, the writer asks attention to the following definitions and remarks, which are either expressed or assumed to be true, in the article on Cause and Effect.

Power:-a simple idea, gained when any change takes place. Power is spoken of in several relations, as the following illustration will show. A man may have all the power and skill needful to swim, and yet may not be able to exercise this power for want of the appropriate fluid. In this case, he has power in one sense, and no power in another; that is, he has constitutional power, but not actual. But suppose the man has power to secure the appropriate fluid, then he has actual power, in case he performs a previous act, and no power if he does not. Before he performs the act he has indirect actual power, and after it is performed, he has direct actual power. In these relations, therefore, it can be asserted, that a man has and has not power to swim. He has power in one sense, i. e. indirect actual power. He has not power in another sense, i. e. he has not power, until he performs a previous act. This distinction between actual and constitutional power, and between direct and indirect actual power, is very important in this discussion.

Impossible signifies without power.

Impossible, absolutely, signifies that there is no power anywhere to make a given change. For example:-God exists. A thing cannot be, and not be at the same time. These propo

* An Essay on the Power of the Will over the other Facul ties:-Am. Bib. Repos. October, 1840, p. 378.

sitions express things which there is no power, anywhere, to make otherwise. The last is called a contradiction. The following is another example of an absolute impossibility. Salt is that which has power to produce a given sensation, so that, without this power, it is not salt. It is, therefore, an absolute impossibility for salt not to produce the given sensation, for that is a contradiction. It is saying that a thing has, and has not a given power at the same time, and in the same sense.

Impossible, relatively:-That is, impossible without a previous change, but possible with it. Thus it is relatively impossible for salt to produce a given sensation, when it is not in certain circumstances, though, in relation to the possible existence of these circumstances, it is possible.

Certain, absolutely :-A thing is absolutely certain, when there is no power any where to make it otherwise.

Certain, relatively:-A thing is relatively certain, when there is no power, anywhere, to make it different, without a previous change.

Producing cause:-That peculiar power possessed by each individual existence, which enables it, in given circumstances, to produce a change.

Occasional causes-Those circumstances which are indispensable antecedents, in order to enable a producing cause to act. Producing causes are of two kinds: first, those which in given circumstances have power to produce either of two kinds of change (i. e. mind), and those which, in given circumstances, have power to produce a particular kind of change, and no power to refrain from producing this kind, or to produce any other kind (i. e. matter). These last are called necessary producing causes.

Changes are of two kinds: first, those changes where the thing changed had power to refrain from this particular kind of change, and to produce another instead; secondly, those changes, where the thing changed had no power to refrain from this particular kind of change, and no power to produce any other instead. The first are called actions of mind; the last are called necessary changes or effects. If these distinctions are correct, then the maxim: "every effect has a cause," would be more properly expressed thus: "every change has a cause."

Volitions:-Changes in mind, which take place when desires are excited, and the mind decides either to gratify or not to gratify these desires.

Mind is the producing cause of volition—that is, mind is that which has power, in given circumstances, to produce the changes called volitions.

The question now in discussion:-Has mind, when desires exist, the power to decide in either of two directions, without a change of circumstances? The fatalist says, "no," his opponent says, "yes." Both are required to prove their positions.

Proof is that which produces belief. It is divided into two kinds, intuitive, or that which results from the constitution of mind, and rational, that which results from a course of reasoning.

The opponent of fatalism establishes his position thus: That the mind has this power, called free agency, is an intuitive truth; and this position is established by the words and actions of all mankind, which prove that they believe it, from the very constitution of mind.

The fatalist attempts to prove his position thus: He first assumes the following as an intuitive truth :-"Wherever there is a particular kind of thing as an invariable antecedent of a particular kind of change, which is an invariable sequent, the antecedent is a necessary producing cause, and the sequent is a necessary effect." This is the major proposition. He then assumes, without proof, the following as his minor proposition: "Volition to gratify is the invariable sequent of the strongest desire, as the invariable antecedent." Then follows his conclusion:-Therefore the thing changed, i. e., mind, has no power to refrain from this particular kind of change, and no power to produce any other. When, therefore, his opponent claims that free agency is established by one intuitive truth, the fatalist claims that it is demolished by another, and may say that his intuitive truth is as good as the one that opposes it. The writer of the "Essay on Cause and Effect" endeavored to meet the fatalist, not by questioning the intuitive maxim, which is the major proposition, but by denying the minor, and showing that the fatalist has no way to establish this proposition but by begging the question and reasoning in a circle. The writer did indeed concede the truth of the major proposition, in order to meet the argument where it could most readily be destroyed; but it was a species of hypothetical reasoning, amounting to this: "Suppose I grant your major-your minor is false and cannot be established." In criticising the writer, Dr. Woods assumes, that the writer concedes and teaches the major propo