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make themselves felt as a power in the nation, in Convocation, in
Episcopal palaces? If it be, indeed, too late, then are the days of the
We
Church of England, as a portion of Christ's Church, numbered.
may succeed in plucking this or that brand out of the fire-possibly
the Eastward position-possibly the chasuble, or that absurdest of com-
promises, the cope at the altar-but cui bono if meanwhile the Church,
as a body, becomes a mere creature of the State, the "home of every
foul and unclean bird"?

If after forty years of existence and progress we are too weak to extort
the barest justice from the authorities in Church and State, then are we
weak indeed.
CHARLES Walker.

12, Powis-road, Brighton.

Endications of Current Opinion.

"We all like to see what the World says; though, perhaps, the World's sayings would not be so highly regarded, did we know who guided the pen and registered the opinion."-COLERIDGE.

ARCHBISHOP TAIT'S MANIPULATION OF CONVOCATION. (From the Morning Post, Feb. 25, 1876.)

The debates in Convocation during its recent session have been of more than usual interest both as to their subject-matter and the tone and ability by which they were distinguished; but for reasons known best to the President and his advisers they came to an untimely end just when they were on the point of culminating in some useful decision. The present is a time of considerable excitement and activity in Church matters, the questions raised in Convocation were of pressing and momentary importance, yet before any permanent conclusion upon them is put on record the session is prorogued, and these critical questions are hung up till after Easter. In the meantime the legislation which the expressed mind of Convocation ought to influence goes on, of course unimpressed, and the corporate voice of the Church is unheard even when the Church's dearest interests are under discussion. Take, for instance, the Burials agitation-one of the most serious of the whole catalogue of gravamina ecclesiastica. It was ably brought forward in Convocation and debated with an ability and temper that would have done honour to any assembly. The many proposals with a view to meet the wishes of Dissenters, the desire to strain every point to take away even the semblance of a grievance short of surrendering the full claim of Dissent to an equal proprietary right in the churchyards, proved the desire of the clergy to meet Nonconformity with reasonable coucessions, if that were possible. Yet just when the climax of the business was being reached, when discussion had reached the point where definite action becomes practicable, the adjournment takes place, and things stand as they were till May. Yet on the 3rd of March Mr. Osborne Morgan is to move his resolution! There may be reasons which we do not see, but they ought to be good reasons to justify this sort of stultification. We shall perhaps be told that Lent is at hand, and the parochial clergy will be hard pressed and need this intervening week for rest or preparation. Perhaps so, but in the presence of the great injury done to Convocation and its influence out of doors by these brief, abruptly-closed, and profitless sessions, we would recommend that those clergy who are elected to represent their brethren should make their Lent arrangements in good time, so as to enable them to do the one set of duties without leaving the other undone. It is hard to conceive an instance in which a clergyman of ability-such as most members of Convocation are-could not so have arranged his work as to leave him at liberty to have spent this week in town, in order to have carried to some useful effect the much and able talk reported in our columns last week. This inefficiency, this barrenness of result, this stopping short of anything demonstrably useful, completely spoils the influence of Convocation with the general public and with statesmen and politicians, and causes it to be actually laughed at in the House of Commons. How far the Assembly and its proceedings command the confidence of the clergy it is for them to say. We only speak for the laity when we say that it would have been of immense use to the advocates of the Church's rights, in the debate on the 3rd of March, if they could have pointed to some wise, temperate, and decided conclusion arrived at by the official representatives of the clergy in synod assembled.

Take another case of immense importance just now-the Final Court of Appeal. Rightly or wrongly, the Church is much agitated on this subject. The Court of Privy Council has failed to win the confidence of Churchmen. It was never intended to be a court for ecclesiastical cases, as Lord Brougham himself declared. It is only by an accident that such appeals are carried there at all. The Act abolishing the old appellate jurisdiction in ecclesiastical causes made no provision for a tribunal in lieu of that which it displaced, and therefore Church suits went to the Privy Council because they had nowhere else to go. Even this was only adopted as a temporary resort, and over and over again bishops and judges have said that it is not a suitable court, and that some better one is absolutely necessary. Indeed, promises of a better one have been more than once held out in various schemes of law reform. Well, at this moment there is a Bill for a new Court of Appeal before Parliament, and this, therefore, is the time for the Church to speak on this subject if she has anything to say; and her proper mode of speaking is, in her corporate capacity, through her synods. Accordingly the subject was mooted, and talked about; but it was also dropped. Like the Burials Question, it is suspended for nearly three months-i.e., until Parliament shall have made up its mind, and representations from Church quarters will be too late. This want of persistence is not creditable to the Church; on the contrary, it is extremely damaging. Roman Catholics and Dissenters get what they ask for because they know their own mind; they ask for something definite, and they persevere until they get it. The Church halts and hesitates, talks and adjourns, considers and reconsiders, till all opportunity is gone, and then puts out some elaborate scheme, admirable in itself, but simply too late. Yet here Convocation had a great oppor

tunity. In the former Judicature Bill the proposals for a new Court of Appeal included the hearing of ecclesiastical causes, and great satisfaction was expressed in many quarters because it was to be a purely lay tribunal, where the rigid letter of the law would be duly constructed without ecclesiastical bias or the prepossession of party views or public policy. Such a court, it was thought, would adjudicate, without reference to the party questions of the hour, in a spirit of impartiality such as the most conscientious of bishops or archbishops could scarcely hope to attain. But these proposals though for the most part acceptable to the clergy, and still more to the laity, were not regarded with favour by the bishops, and especially by the Primate, who has frequently expressed not only his contentment with the Court of Privy Council, but his admiration of it. Is it to his Grace that we owe the absence of any reference to ecclesiastical suits in the present Bill? We cannot say; but it is certain that it is to his Grace that we owe the adjournment of Convocation. The proroguing power is in his hands, and he could, if he had pleased, have lengthened the brief session thus ended till some useful determination on this point had been adopted. As it is, any influence that the Church is entitled to exercise through her synods on current legislation is put in abeyance at the very moment when two of the most hotlydisputed questions of the day are awaiting the consideration of the House of Commons. We do not impute motives, but we say that it is bad management, very damaging, and much to be regretted.

POLICY WITHOUT PRINCIPLE.

(From the Nonconformist of March 1, 1876.)

I was not wrong in my conjecture, in my fifth letter, as to the way in which "my lords" would decide in the Clifton Communion case. I am very glad to see that Mr. Cook prefers to resign his living rather than give the Sacrament to one who disbelieves in considerable portions of the Holy Scriptures. This course is the only one which would naturally be adopted by high-minded and conscientious individuals. I am afraid it is reserved for the Ritualistic party alone to appeal to courts of law, and then, when the case goes against them, to take meekly their punishment of suspension, or whatever it may be, for their past offences, and afterwards go on calmly disobeying the Church to which they profess to belong, after she has spoken by every channel through which it is possible for her to express her voice, that she forbids their practices. I was a good deal interested, and a little amused at the report which has gone the round of the papers of Mr. Mackonochie's deliverance to his congregation touching the Folkestone case. He is reported to have addressed the faithful at St. Alban's as follows:-"You men sit still and submit to such indignities, and allow the State to inflict such an outrageous act of tyranny and to insult God in your own persons! Ye are dumb! dumb! How shall we stand before our dear Lord with clear consciences when He looks us in the face and says:- When the ungodly State trampled on My body, where were ye? Did you rise up when I was persecuted, not by the pagans of history, but by the pagans in your own day?""

If I were a member of Mr. Mackonochie's flock I fancy I should be somewhat puzzled at all this. I am afraid my memory would be inconveniently troublesome. I should ask myself—"Was it a dream I had, or was it the reality of sober life, that when the ungodly State,' in the persons of my lords,' gave Mr. Mackonochie an order, he did not do as Mr. Cook is about to do, but meekly obeyed?" Unless I am very much mistaken indeed, Mr. Mackonochie pleaded, when he was hauled up before the "ungodly State," that is to say, before "my lords," a second time, on the charge of having disobeyed their first orders, that he had done strictly and literally as "my lords" had ordered him to do. Unless I am very much mistaken, a pathetic appeal was made to "my lords" not to condemn or punish him, because when they ordered him not to elevate the Host above his head he had been most careful not to do so; that when "my lords" had forbidden him to pay any outward respect or worship to Christ present in the Sacrament of the Altar, he had, in obedience to "my lords," surceased from any such worship and respect to the Divine Head of the Church. And am I still in a dream, or is it a fact that when "my lords" declined to believe Mr. Mackonochie's affidavits, and sentenced him to three months' suspension from the priestly office, he still meekly obeyed them, and accepted their jurisdiction over him in spiritual things by submitting to their spiritual censures? It strikes me that when an "ungodly State," as represented by "my lords," ordered Mr. Mackonochie not to preach the Gospel for the space of three months, Mr. Mackonochie meekly surceased from preaching the Gospel accordingly. When the "ungodly State" ordered Mr. Mackonochie not to obey Our Saviour's command by breaking bread and pouring out wine in remembrance of Him, unless I am again very much mistaken, Mr. Mackonochie obeyed "my lords"" prohibition in preference to the divine injunction. I must say I think the Vicar of St. Alban's is just a little hard upon his flock, when now that "my lords" suspension has come to an end, and he is at present graciously permitted by them to preach he thunders out to his congregation, "You men sit still and submit to such indignities, and allow the State to insult God in your own persons. Ye are dumb! Ye are dumb!" Why bless me, what are those poor St. Alban's people to do? Why should they not follow their pastor's example? When "my lords" told Mr. Mackonochie to be "dumb" he was "dumb." When my lords " ordered him "to sit still" and not "break bread" for the space of three whole months, he "did sit still" in his chancel-stall, and refrained from "breaking bread."

66

So far as I am able to gather Mr. Mackonochie's views from his published deliverances, he regards the English State and the ecclesiastical courts as occupying a similar position to that of the Jewish Sanhedrim, or Nero's judgment seat in earlier ages. But if this be a correct viewand it is no concern of mine to dispute its correctness-would it not be as well to remember that when the Apostles were forbidden by the Sanhedrim to teach or to preach in the Name of Jesus, they did not obey the Sanhedrim, as Mr. Mackonochie obeyed" my lords;" but went straight from the presence of the Council, and preached just as they had done before? Neither, I think, would it be possible to imagine St. Paul leaving off "to break bread" at the bidding of "the Pagans of History," as Mr. Mackonochie ceased "to break bread" for three whole months

at the bidding of those highly respectable English gentlemen, whom Mr. Mackonochie calls "the Pagans of our own day" but whom I prefer to call "my lords."

It may be true that Mr. Mackonochie indemnifies himself for the unkindness of "my lords" by the strong language which he uses about them; but I do wish he could be brought to see that his line of action will never win for the Church the birthright of her spiritual freedom. I do not think an instance can be found in history where freedom, either spiritual or political, was won by strong or abusive language. What is wanted is calm determination and quiet suffering. There are some things Englishmen admire, and there are some things they do not admire, and I fancy among the things they like least is abuse of the constituted courts and tribunals of the country, even when those tribunals are probably in the wrong. I greatly fear Mr. Mackonochie mistakes the utterances of the Church Times, which often boasts that it speaks in the name of the Ritualistic party, for the dictates of a religious policy, and Christian wisdom, in the great crisis through which we are passing. Other people, who, like myself, are to some extent more in the position of bystanders than of active combatants, fail to discern any gleam of Christian principle in the advice with which the Church Times from time to time favours its friends. To give a single instance, I have a rather vivid recollection of an article written when the case of Mr. Bennett, of Frome, for holding what is called the "Objective Presence," was sub judice. A good deal of alarm was felt in Ritualistic circles lest the case should go against Mr. Bennett, and that "Catholic doctrine on the Eucharist should be condemned, and its preaching forbidden in Church of England pulpits, by "my lords." But the Church Times was equal to the emergency. It tendered its advice to the "Catholics" of its clientage. And that advice was, I believe, in substance as follows-that "Catholics should cease to preach the doctrine of the "Real Objective Presence" from the pulpit, but that the clergy of such churches as St. Alban's should write and distribute tracts upon the Eucharist among their congregations, teaching the condemned doctrine. This advice, had it been followed, would have been much the same as if Athanasius had ceased to preach the doctrine of the Trinity, and contented himself instead with distributing tracts upon that central dogma of the Christian faith at the door of the great church of Alexandria.

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It is my belief, Sir, that it is such things as this, added to the fearful language in which all civil and ecclesiastical authorities are almost invariably spoken of in the columns of the Church Times, which has caused the Ritualistic party to become utterly contemptible in the eyes of the people of England; and I doubt very much if people in general have the slightest confidence in the honesty or truthfulness of its members, generally speaking.

On no other hypothesis am I able to account for the half-bantering, half-contemptuous way in which almost the whole of the secular Press has treated the disclaimer of any inclination Romewards with which a hundred leading Ritualistic priests have just made their very respectful obeisance to the Protestant public.

I have read an immense number of articles and comments upon this notable production, and so far from the Protestant public being propitiated by it, the universal estimate seems to be-"Really, gentlemen, a joke, to be a good one, ought not to be absolutely transparent; and there is positively no fun in your telling us that you would not look even at the same side of the hedge that you guessed Rome to be on. Of course we know you mean us to take it as a joke, but if you had wished us to enjoy it, the pith and point of it ought to have lain just a little more below the surface."

To speak seriously, I doubt if there be a single Englishman outside the Ritualistic party who takes the recent Manifesto for what it professes to be, and without reading between the lines. Such is the pitiable condition to which we have been reduced by the ỏikovoμía of the Ritualistic press.

Who may be the real author of the Letter to Cardinal Manning which has produced so great a sensation, I know no more than anyone else. But one thing I am able to see very clearly, through all the bitter and furious invectives in which the Church Times has indulged against the Letter and its supposed author, that they are dictated not by any abhorrence of the principles enunciated in the said Letter, but inspired by the thought that it will be injurious to the Ritualistic programme. Now I do not suppose the Church Times' Editor will care much for anything I may say, still I would tell him that his policy, clever as it is, is not one which will in the long run commend itself to the people of England. A HIGH CHURCH RECTOR.

"WHO IS THE JUDGE?" NOT "WHAT IS THE LAW?" (From the John Bull March 4, 1876.)

SIR,-I cannot help thinking that the so-called Church papers* have damaged their own cause and grossly misled their readers by dinning constantly in their ears the cry, What is the Law? instead of Who is The following, as we learn from Mr. Huff, is the paragraph referred to :"S. T. R.-- 1. The divergence of the living officials of a Church from the Faith does not affect the authority of that Church's teaching, so long as its formularies remain intact, and witness against disloyal prelates and priests. So long, for instance, as the Nicene Creed stands in the Prayer Book, the English Church teaches, with all the authority of the Fathers of Nicaea, the cardinal doctrines of the Faith, and would so teach if all the bishops were Arians. 2. Similarly, the personal misconduct of the bishops in their individual capacity, however discreditable in itself, does not compromise the Church. The alienation of their ancient jurisdiction by the Public Worship Act was not sanctioned by any synodical assent, for the Convocations of Canterbury and York both resisted it, and that Act remains, therefore, a mere forcible encroachment, by brute force, of the State upon the Church, which not being a consenting party, is not responsible. 3. Disestablishment, though it would so far mend matters in the future that no Tait or Thomson could obtain a mitre, would put more power at first into the hands of the existing bishops, and, therefore, is not to be desired until the more obnoxious of them have been mercifully removed."

the Judge? For example, I have read in a Church paper something to this effect-that it does not much matter what the secular courts decide in questions of the law divine so long as the law of the Prayer Book remains the same. The fallacy lies in this, that the writer sees no difference between a person and a thing, between "The Church hath authority in controversies of Faith," and "The Prayer Book hath authority in controversies of Faith." It is objected the Church's law remains the same, whilst the decisions of the secular court are forcibly intruded upon us by the civil sword. The Church is not expressing her own mind, but merely suffering from the persecution of the State. This is language which seems if not to obliterate the truth, at least to mystify the real bearing of the controversy between Church and State. The objections do not cancel the fact that the "Church hath authority in controversies of Faith," and that it is not enough to have a law whereby to judge, but she must also exercise her authority in judging. A book is no judge, it cannot get up on its legs and say what it means. speak of the Prayer Book as having authority in controversies of Faith, what is this but another form of private judgment? And if it be competent for every man to exercise his own discretion in the interpretation of the creeds how are we a whit better off than the Ranters and Primitive Methodists? But if the Church has authority in controversies of Faith, the first question is not What is the law? but Who is actually the judge? The sons of the gentry do not enter the Church, and there is a great deficiency in candidates for Holy Orders, not only in numbers but in qualifications. No wonder! There may be some who say, "Put me into the priest's office that I may eat a morsel of bread;" but there are others who consider it an act of profanity to ask them to recognise as a Church authority a flight of lawyers deriving their spiritual authority from the Imperial Crown, amongst whom "Chaos umpire sits."

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Again, it cannot be said with any truth that the Prayer Book remains the same, if the Church allows the secular courts to cancel its meaning, because it is an established rule of all societies, whether of Church or State, a principle of public universal law, eternal, immutable, irrevocable, that the meaning of laws is not fixed by individual private judgment, by any inferior court, but by the supreme court-the public authority of the community that made the laws. Whole full Parliament, not the House of Lords alone, is the supreme and the only supreme court of final appeal and dernier resort in things temporal; and whole full Convocation, not the House of Bishops alone, is the supreme and the only supreme Court of Final Appeal and dernier resort in things spiritual. (The statutes of Henry VIII. left Convocation as a Court of Judicature, consisting of Bishops and Priests, where they found it.)

It is said again, that the Church is only the weaker vessel coerced by the stronger, and that such coercion exempts from responsibility. But if Bishops and priests are not forcibly made to offer incense, as in times of heathen persecution, and if regard to goods and chattels be the only restraining power, this is not that sort of coercion which exempts the Church from responsibility in the sight of either God or man. If the Church subjects herself to mere secular tribunals in questions of the law divine and spiritual learning, she virtually transfers to them her own divine authority. To what end does A. B. "receive the Holy Ghost for the office and work of a Bishop," if the Bishops are prohibited from exercising the office? If our rulers recognize the decisions of mere secular courts set up by "the law of this realm" in defiance of the "authority of this Church" as binding; or if they sit still without declaring the Church's mind by some legislative or judicial act, how can the Church be said to dissent? Who is the Judge? The answer is given in several passages of the Roman Civil Law. If the words of the law express clearly the sense and intention of the lawgiver, we must hold to that. And if the law be injurious to the public good, we must have recourse to the power that made the law to learn the law of the lawgiver as to what is open to interpretation, explanation, or mitigation. The Roman Emperors, as the makers of the civil laws, claim the interpretation of the civil laws. But a constitution of the Emperors Honorious and Theodosius, dated A.D. 421, shows that by the civil law the Roman Emperor did not claim the interpretation of Canons; this was left exclusively to the Synods of the Church. "De Interpretatione Canonum Ecclesiæ. Si quid dubietatis emerserit, id oportet Conventui Sacerdotali sanctoque judicio reservari."— Codisis Theodosiani, Lib. xvi., Tit. ii. 45., transferred to the Code of Justinian under Lib. i., Tit. ii., Const. 6. I turn to cxxiii. Novel of Justinian, which is a kind of compendium of the canon law, ancient and common (cap. xxi., at the end of the law), where it says:-"But if the matter be ecclesiastical, let the civil magistrates have nothing to do with a question of this sort, but let the most holy Bishops put an end to the matter according to the sacred canons." Who is the Judge? That is a rule which concisely states the actual doctrine of the case. The law is not taken from the rule, but the rule is made by the law. Now the rule as to who is judge, is thus laid down by Lord Hale in his treatise upon the "Jurisdiction of the Lords' House," chapter xxxiv., p. 207-"The supreme decisive power or jurisdiction and the dernier resort must be where the legislative power is," and in the Civil Law in these words-" ejus est interpretari cujus est condere."

So much for the old Judge according to Lord Hale and the first Christian Emperors. You ask, but what about the new Judge? Why, this new creation of Parliament and the Imperial crown of these realms makes the national will govern the law, instead of the law governing the national will. So at first he decided "what is not expressed is prohibited," now he says "what is not expressed is not rejected." What greater ignorance could have been exhibited by the "King of the Cannibal Islands ?" what chance of justice can the appellant have from such a quarter, and what class of practitioners is such a Judge likely to encourage. Peradventure the Bishops and their allies (when they have made the discovery who is the Judge) will ignore "the Bill," and fall back again upon ancient precedent, the statute book, the membrane, the roll, the ordinance, the charter, and "the law of this Church and Realm," as laid down in the Ordinal, and which the clergy have pledged themselves to obey. EDMUND HUFF.

Printed and Published by JOHN H. BATTY, 143, Strand, W.C.-March 15, 1876.

WK Ban

A Journal of Religion, Politics, Literature

No. 2.-VOL. I.]

and Art.

LONDON, WEDNESDAY, MARCH 29, 1876.

RELIGION IN GERMANY, AND ITS WARNINGS.

G

ERMANY must be a charming country for Christian people to dwell in. Its religious laws are so just, mild and loveable: it deals with its clergy in such a fatherly and beneficent manner; while those of the people who are Roman Catholics must constantly rejoice that they live under so paternal and "Liberal a rule-a government of fines, "freedom" and fortresses. This is one aspect of the subject. But there are others, to which we now draw the particular attention of our readers. They specially concern 66 Protestants of all denominations."

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The decline of what is called "Evangelical Lutheranism" has been at once rapid and sure. Reason has triumphed over Revelation. For example, in the year 1831 eight Prussian Universities could boast 2,203 theological students; in 1873 no more than 740. In the Universities of Southern and Western Germany the decline has been the same. Even in Wurtemberg, the most theologically-disposed region of Germany, the supply of candidates for clerical honours has long been steadily diminishing. In Prussia one third of those theological students who matriculated between 1851 and 1873 have abandoned theology and declined to offer themselves for the Protestant pastorate. Its Supreme Governing Body has had to proclaim to the world that in a year or so one-sixth of the vacant benefices will have none to fill them. Pastors cannot be obtained for the churches, which are being closed for lack of them. Theological students go not to the Universities; or, even if started fairly, change their minds, and betake themselves to other professions. They have neither the feelings nor the faith, which alone will bring young men to devote themselves to lives of hopeless poverty, unrequited labour, and unrecognized self-denial. Nothing can be imagined less attractive to the usual tastes and ideas of a young man educated in the midst of great social movements, so-called "scientific discoveries, literary successes, and military triumphs, than the life of a Prussian clergyman, condemned to a profession without enterprise, a service without earthly hopes, and a scale of maintenance every year less in comparison with the profits of common trades and professions.

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Now what is thus happening in the hopelessly-Erastian Lutheran sect of Germany will no doubt soon come to pass in Archbishop Tait's State-ridden "Church of the Future" in England. Germany, its people, its penniless princes, and its policy, are all so very popular in high quarters at home that no doubt our Presbyterian Primate is only doing somebody-else's bidding in his absolute changes and tyrannical. manipulations of our own ancient Church, to bring it down to a like state of degradation. Here all people on the look out for good things-for place, pensions, and pay-hold their tongues while His Grace is changing, persecuting, and reforming; and so Ruin stalks onward.

An able correspondent from Germany-not a Roman Catholic, a Lutheran, but a believer in Christianity-gives the following picture of the religious state of the so-called "German Protestants." We present it to our readers in this prominent place, because it only too truly depicts that state of things which, alas! is rising and spreading amongst ourselves, and which can only be met by the National Church continuing to be a communion which is a True part of the One Family of God:

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soul?' The distinction of position and fortune, the different adversities of life, contribute to undermine the belief in God. They consider Religion good enough for children, but mere nonsense for grown-up people. We can well imagine that such ideas cannot further Christianity. Christ was a good man,' said one of the workmen to me, but He preached too much of loving our neighbours, whilst everybody, in this life of everlasting struggle and strife, ought to love themselves best.' Only recently in high Berlin society the hope was expressed that thirty years hence there will be no more clergymen, because nobody wants to study theology. 'How pleasant it will be,' said a man of high standing, when all the churches are turned into places of amusement!' Many ladies boast of not having been to church since their childhood. 'The Bible is not true,' they say, 'and life after death a fable.' But, when such impious infidels are on their death-beds, there is nothing but despondency and despair. As people have neither the want nor the time for prayer, they also neglect to teach their children to pray. When requested to attend church and receive the sacrament they say that Common Sense has now triumphed over the Christian Faith, which is falsehood and swindling. The profanation of Sunday increases more and more. It seems as if the day of Our Lord were established in Berlin to indulge in pleasures, which are very often criminal. The desire of gain induces the proprietors of manufactories to compel the workmen to labour on Sundays; and thus, between the burden of work and pleasure, people forget that which is most necessary,―their salvation. An accruing restlessness now characterizes the population of all large German cities. It makes one uncomfortable to witness the discontent of the working classes and their hatred of the rich. As long as they earn they never think of saving, and when they are out of work and suffer from poverty they make their employers responsible for it. Another deplorable condition is that the ties of families are no longer respected, which must hasten social and moral ruin. The introduction of civil marriage has done great harm, because people in their ignorance will not understand that this new law does not release them from their duties to God, and the enemies of Christianity use it to confirm them in their unbelief."

Surely here is a dark picture indeed. Strauss-who was personally honoured by some of our English Royal Family,— and other odious infidels of the same kind, have done their dark and deplorable work. Except amongst Roman Catholics, Christianity is practically banished and inoperative.

On their side, thank God! the grand and noble policy of resistance on principle has been openly and universally adopted. The Bishops are unanimous; the clergy are united; the faithful generally are true. The contemptuous manner in which, as we learn, the new and insignificant sect of Döllingerites is spoken of, even by Bismarckian toadies, shows that, when the former people have been used for the immediate political work on hand, they will be soon flung aside as very worthless tools. Christian Independence and Church Authority are hated in Germany quite as cordially as they are disliked by Dr. Tait in England. Von Schelling, one of the German judges, can speak of Church Synods with the same kind of nonchalant contempt as, in the worst of taste, our Erastian Archbishop recently spoke of his own Convocation in the House of Lords. In Germany, however, Von Schelling is promptly answered by the Bishop of Mainz. Here, in England, on the other hand, the Convocation Doctors and Proctors dare not apparently maintain that their souls are their own. They are His Grace's most obedient and most humble creatures. So the more they are insolently snubbed by their spiritual chief, the deeper grows their profound regard for him and the more prolonged their shameful silence.

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The contrast between our own gloomy position and the position of our German fellow-Christians is great. There the faithful follow their episcopal leaders,-tried and trusted generals and valiant soldiers of the cross. There Bismarck has to fight an army, united, compact, well-led, and resolute. Here, at home, our official leaders, having deserted us, have sold themselves to the enemy. There is not one single Bishop on whom we can depend. If the Bishop of Salisbury stood alone in voting against the P.W.R. Act-as he did, and all honour be to him for the deed!—yet, on another occasion, he communicated with an Unitarian, and has never yet publicly repudiated, or confessed his sorrow, for the act. The clergy of the second order, therefore, a very mixed multitude, will have to fight the battle in England. Yet, even as an unled rabble, they cannot do it except on principle. The dangerous "Liberal" plea for universal toleration of everything and everybody-High Churchism, amongst the rest, now so popular amongst the shallow, is a plea that can only produce still greater evils than already exist; and, in the long run, will secure only an Establishment (moulded by Dr. Tait on German patterns), in which the Divine warning "Let us depart hence!" will have been heard and obeyed by all who, rejecting Erastianism, believe in Christianity and desire to save their souls.

OTHER FALLACIES OF LORD PENZANCE.

ON

N the above subject we proceed to fulfil the promise made in our last issue. The second proposition which, according to Lord Penzance, is "absolutely incorrect in fact," is this-" that the authority of his Court is independent of the Church."

A very good advocate will often say as little as possible upon some particular part of his case. We are not, therefore, surprised to find that Lord Penzance limits his observations on the above proposition to the following paragraph:

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"This explanation" (i.e., the attempt to prove that he is "Provincial Judge," with which we dealt in our last number) removes also the objection that the Courts upon which the powers given by the statute are conferred, are Courts independent of the Church; unless, indeed, those who make this objection are willing to contend that the Provincial Courts of the two Archbishops deserve that designation." But as "this explanation" was shown in our last number to be altogether insufficient and erroneous, the proposition that the authority of Lord Penzance's Court is "independent of the Church" remains unassailed.

Lord Penzance makes the truth or falsehood of this proposition to turn upon the fact of his being a Provincial Judge; and upon the question whether his Court is a new or an old Court. Our previous argument will, we think, have persuaded our readers that Lord Penzance is not a Provincial Judge; and that his Court is necessarily a new Court; since both Judge and Court now rest for the first time in the history of the Courts Christian 66 upon a pure Act of Parliament foundation.

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Perhaps we ought here to notice a correspondent of the Times, "Serviens ad Legem," whose mysterious nom de plume may designate only an attorney's clerk, or may describe even a member of the Judicial Committee itself. "Serviens ad Legem" contended that in adding an "additional" Judge to the Provincial Courts, Parliament did no more than when it added an additional Judge to the Courts of Queen's Bench, Common Pleas, or Exchequer.

This is the most plausible, and at the same time the most insincere fallacy which has been as yet employed to prop up the disputed jurisdiction of Lord Penzance. We partly answered it by anticipation last week, when we showed (1) that the constitution of "Courts Christian" is a matter for the Church's Synod not for the nation's Senate-that an Act of Parliament cannot constitute a bona fide Provincial Judge; and (2) that there cannot be more than one Official Principal with general powers in a Province at a time. But there is a further answer to "Serviens ad Legem," and it is this: the Court of Queen's Bench is a corporate entity consisting of a Chief Justice and of several inferior or puisne judges. These latter are parts of one whole: they sometimes sit together, they sometimes preside individually; but their duties are identical and interchangeable: the decision of any one of

them (when acting singly) is often reviewed by the full Court: they have an organic relation to one another, and can be substituted for each other. No relation of this kind existed between Sir Robert Phillimore when Dean of Arches, and Lord Penzance when pretending to be an "additional" Provincial Judge: they were as independent of each other as a County Court Judge and a Police Magistrate; and had not Sir Robert Phillimore made things easy for the Erastians by resigning at the critical moment, the spectacle might have been presented to the world of the Archbishop (in the person of Sir Robert Phillimore) deciding in favour of such and such a practice, and of the same Archbishop (colourably in the person of Lord Penzance) condemning the same practice.

It is not strictly correct to say of Lord Penzance that he was appointed Dean of Arches, or Official Principal of the York Provincial Court, by either Archbishop, or by both of them. What the Archbishops really did was to appoint Lord Penzance to be "the Judge" under the Public Worship Regulation Act (though, if rumour be true, he was "found " for them by Mr. Disraeli). When they had once appointed him to this post, his appointment to the Jugdeship of the two Provincial Courts followed as a mere matter of routine under the Act; and in this matter the Archbishops, if they acted at all, acted in a purely ministerial capacity: if, in the interval between Lord Penzance's first appointment and the resignation of the two Official Principals, they had been moved by the Grace of God to appoint some one else than Lord Penzance to administer the discipline of their respective Provinces, they could not have done so without repudiating the Public Worship Regulation Act.

We do not contend that the constitution of the Provincial Courts, previous to the passing of the Public Worship Act was perfect or even satisfactory; but it was not so impaired as to be beyond the possibility of restoration. Previous to 1874 it would have been possible for an Archbishop who possessed Christian zeal and some knowledge of the Canon Law to remedy many defects in the practice and constitution of his Provincial Court. Since the passing of the Public Worship Regulation Act Canonical reform on Christian lines has become absolutely impossible. It should, we think, even on mere sentimental grounds, be matter of regret to the two Primates that they have (whether in ignorance, or in unbelief, it matters not) parted with powers which all their predecessors have enjoyed from time immemorial, and to which all their successors were entitled.

When Lord Penzance affirms from the judgment seat that "it is absolutely incorrect in fact," to say that the authority of his Court is "independent of the Church," he throws us back upon the question, How is a Court dependent upon, or independent of, the Church? Now the Secular Courts depend upon the Secular Legislature in three ways: (1) because they wield Secular authority, which, though it nominally resides in the Crown, practically belongs to the Legislature; (2) because they acknowledge the authority of the acts of the Secular Legislature, which may at any time by fresh Legislation correct any erroneous judgment which is hurtful or distasteful to the nation; (3) because the acts and sayings of the Judges of the Secular Law Courts are liable to be criticised, and, if need be, censured in Parliament, which can at any time take steps to ensure the removal of a Judge who has misconducted himself, or can at any rate prevent his decisions from injuring the innocent or defeating the ends of justice.

In fact Parliament is itself "a Court;" it is "the High Court of Parliament:" a phrase which is used so often by the clergy in the services of the Church that they are without excuse for adopting the mischievous and fallacious distinction between legislation and interpretation, between the judicial and interpretative functions. The other Courts at Westminster might be likened to planets revolving round their sun, "the High Court of Parliament."

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In the same way "Courts Christian," whether Diocesan or Provincial, depend upon the Synods of the Church. The Judges of these Courts are the delegates of the Archbishops and Bishops who are members of the Provincial Synod: the law which "Courts Christian ought to administer is the Divine Law; and in their administration of it they are, in any healthy system of Church government, subject to the control, and, if need be, to the animadversion of the Provincial Synod which is constituted by the Archbishop and Bishops from whom each Court Christian within the Province derives its

jurisdiction. When this system prevails the Courts Christian may be truly said to be dependent on the Church just as Secular Courts of Law are dependent on Parliament.

But nothing of this kind obtains in the case of Lord Penzance and his Court. He can only be likened to a comet which belongs to no recognised system whatever. The law which he interprets is the Book of Common Prayer, for which Convocation is responsible; but the powers which he wields are statutory powers over which Convocation has no control, and against which, so far as it has made its voice heard at all, Convocation has protested. Lord Penzance, in the discharge of his duty, acknowledges no superior but the Judicial Committee. If all the Bishops, Clergy, and Laity of the Church of England were for once to be unanimous in differing from him on any point, he would not be bound to take any notice of their dissent, or to prefer their opinion to his, and yet, he tells us, that it is "absolutely incorrect in fact" to say that his authority is independent of the Church.

It is a serious matter when such a statement is deliberately made from the seat of justice; unless the Judicial Committee is the Church in Lord Penzance's estimation, it is difficult to characterize the hardihood of his assertion. Notwithstanding much self-assertion on the part of judges and lawyers, many thoughtful persons are beginning seriously to doubt whether there has not been great deterioration in the judicial personnel of late years. One thing is as clear as day, that in ecclesiastical matters judges and lawyers are as great partisans, and can make as rash and sweeping assertions, as the rest of mankind. | Does Lord Penzance seriously wish it to be thought that his authority is not "independent of the Church?" Is he ready to acknowledge in the Church a right to review his Whatever interpretation he himself is pleased to put upon the phrase "independent of the Church," or whatever may be his lordship's notion of "the Church," plainspoken Churchmen know well enough what the real meaning of this phrase is. A Court not independent of the Church must be a Court whose decisions the Church can control, and whose power for mischief she can restrain.

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Now is Lord Penzance's authority thus subject to the Church or is it not rather "independent of the Church?" Solvitur ambulando. Suppose some question of the law Divine" to arise: it may be a question of ritual, as in Mr. Ridsdale's case; or it may be a question of doctrine, as in Mr. Bennett's case; or a question of the exercise of the power of the keys, as Mr. Cook's. This question, when raised, may seriously affect the welfare of the whole Anglican Church; it may touch in their tenderest point the consciences of the most devout Churchmen and Churchwomen of the day; the very character of the Anglican Communion for orthodoxy, or the validity of the Sacraments, may be involved in it; and by whom is it to be decided By Lord Penzance in the first instance; and by Lords Cairns, Selborne, Hatherley, and a few other lay judges in the last resort. Now we believe that these personages have not as yet asserted themselves to be infallible; though the perusal of some of their stilted utterances about obeying the law is calculated to leave us in doubt as to what they believe on this point. They may decide erroneously; if they do, has the Church of England any power (under the system to which our obedience is required) to correct their error? or even to protest against it? They may condemn what the Church approves; deprive a Priest whom the Church would gladly retain and support in the exercise of his ministry; admit to Communion a layman whom the Church would certainly repel; and all the while Bishops, Priests, Deacons, and faithful laity must sit still and see the doctrine, discipline, and worship of the Church dislocated and mutilated, and say nothing. The Privy Council has spoken; the cause is ended. And in the face of this the new Judge tells us from the Bench, we suppose in all seriousness, that it is "absolutely incorreet in point of fact" to say that the authority of his Court is "independent of the Church." We must leave it to our readers to determine what term most fittingly describes such an assertion.

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men which constitute a distinct and regularly organized society or state. We have seen that law, in its essence, is the expression of that force by which any society or body of men is held together. So that the citizens of a state are the subjects of law. And in relation to its subjects, human law is defined as the rule, measure, or guide of the overt acts of man. St. Augustine, after Cicero, derives the word lex, law, from eligendo, thus teaching that it shows what is to be chosen. Others derive it from ligando, because it binds us to what we ought to do.

The end, or purpose of law is the common good. This is true of law in general, for the end or purpose of law in general is the highest good of universal being.

Law commands, forbids, allows, punishes; this is its material aspect. Why is it not added that law rewards? Simply because the only intrinsic advantage law, as such, secures, is the fulfilment of its end or purpose. Divine rewards are altogether extrinsic to human law, inasmuch as we cannot merit them thereby. And here it becomes necessary to speak of the divisions and sanctions of law.

As to its origin; law is divine or human. Divine law is subdivided into the implicit and explicit. Implicit divine law is eternal, and natural or moral. Explicit divine law is revealed positive law, which again is either Primitive, Mosaic, or Christian.

Human law may, in the first place, be conveniently subdivided into constitutional or organic, and applied or judicial law. Constitutional or organic human law is that which relates to the regimen of the legislative authority, and thus indicates the mode of origin of applied law; it is called organic because it secures the being of the body politic. Applied law is that which relates immediately to the subjects of the supreme authority, and secures the well-being of the body politic. This is divided into the jus gentium and the jus civile. The jus civile in its unrestricted meaning, includes the laws binding upon all classes of citizens; so that the martial law, and even the canon law, can be so far included under this head, inasmuch as they are binding upon the subjects of the State, considered as members of one body politic. Thus it is evident that there is a class of laws which partakes at once of the character of divine and human law, namely, the ecclesiastical or canon law. And the natural law of God is the ultimate source of all human law.

Thus far we have barely stated the divisions under which law may be conveniently arranged. And it may well be asked, What has this complex system to do with the main subject? The answer is, that it will not be difficult to show that every step in the division here adopted, affords a cogent argument in favour of an intelligent conservatism, which, be it remembered, is concerned with law as cementing the fabric of human society, and by no means implies the retention of excrescences or mere encumbrances, which, on the other hand, are inconsistent with its spirit, and are far more congenial with that of turbulent empiricism.

Reviews and Notices of New Books.

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SOME MODERN DIFFICULTIES: Nine Lectures. By the Rev. S. Baring-Gould, M.A. London: W. Skeffington, 1875. HESE lectures were, as the preface, to our surprise, states, "delivered ad Clerum in the Trophy-room of St. Paul's Cathedral, by kind permission of the Dean and Canons." The character of the book may be fairly gathered from the author's declaration that Christianity, unless supplemented by something called the Gospel of Science, is "imperfect." He begins by scolding "the Clergy" for their hostile attitude towards certain conclusions which have been, he affirms, arrived at by science and criticism. These conclusions having, according to Mr. Baring-Gould, been established by an appeal to undoubted facts, as to the interpretation of which, moreover, all competent persons are, it seems, agreed, "the Clergy' are warned of the presumption and folly of walking in the footsteps of those who once condemned Galileo, or of St. Bernard, "the shrieking prophet of Clairvaux."

As the narrator of the "Lives of the Saints," Mr. BaringGould has candidly avowed that he is not restrained by the trammels of history; and we therefore need not, perhaps, pause here to ask by what authority he asserts that St. Berhard either "shrieked" or "prophesied." But, with regard

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