it is at the same time proposed that he shall violate essential portions. Which then is to prevail? the law which the "Statement" acknowledges, and to which it is subordinate, or the opposition to the law which it simultaneously contemplates? The "Statement," indeed, does not seem to have been framed upon any supposition of such a conflict, and so abstains from explanations of its own inconsistency. Dr. Hook however had this inconsistency before him, and declares that the law must be maintained.* Mr. Maurice has other thoughts, he says the law must yield; let us then see upon what grounds. †

In the constitution of the English Church he says, "there are 66 some Catholic elements which are distinct from its national "elements; these Catholic elements must by their very nature "be the ground of communion with other Christian bodies, "the national elements can never form the basis of commu"nion: they are necessary to our own existence, but it is a "plain Catholic duty not to enforce them upon others." (p. 81.) But " Mr. Hope's objections turn upon points where "national and Catholic jurisprudence touch upon each other, upon the position in which a bishop of the national English "Church stands in reference to certain canons of that Church; "upon the rules which, according to those canons, must

govern his intercourse with foreign Protestants; upon the "kind of terms which he must exact from those Protestants, "before he can consent to let them be accounted members of "the English Church; upon the impossibility of their being

*It is curious that Dr. Hook should be cited in support of the bishopric generally, considering that his approbation does not extend beyond the point at which the practical objections which I have urged come into operation. He says distinctly that "the first step which the Prussians will have to do, "will be to conform to our Church; that is, since we cannot renounce our "Catholicism, they must become Catholics."—(Reasons, p. 32.) What more have I required than this?

+ Mr. Maurice has in some particulars misunderstood the meaning of my Letter. And I think it very possible that I may have made similar mistakes as to the sense of what he has written. If this should prove to be the case, I am sure he will extend to me that indulgence, which, (however slight the degree in which he may have required it,) I am most ready to allow to him.

I take this opportunity of thanking him, as well as Dr. Hook and others who have commented on my Letter, for the kindness with which they have treated me.

"accounted members of any body, except the English Church, provided they are in relation with him. All these points

may be of great value and significance, but it will be a great "and serious mistake, if any person goes away with the im"pression that they are Catholic principles, or have any thing "to do with Catholic principles." (p. 83.) The inference therefore is that my objections must give way, or, at least, cannot, on Catholic grounds, be maintained.

Now, supposing that for the sake of argument it be granted, that Mr. Maurice's view is so far correct, and that the particular canons and rubrics which I have cited are not themselves in such a sense Catholic as to render it unlawful to resign them for purposes of unity-What ensues? Bishop Alexander is subject to these laws, and has sworn to observe them, whatever their character may be; nay more, he has undertaken to administer them, and for this purpose has been commissioned by the Church. Allowing therefore that all these provisions are not in the same degree Catholic, or even that some of them are not Catholic at all, does it follow that Bishop Alexander's obligation to observe them is not based upon Catholic ground? From what part of scripture or primitive antiquity can it be shown, that oaths do not bind men except in things otherwise imperative upon conscience; or that the subjection of individuals to the common order of the Church to which they belong, is limited to those portions which are certainly Divine or Catholic; or, lastly, that when persons are deputed in the name of a Church to the performance of definite functions according to prescribed conditions, they are at liberty to extend those functions and vary those conditions, and yet still act in the name of that Church?

But if there be these difficulties, even upon the supposition that the limits of what Mr. Maurice calls "National and Catholic jurisprudence” are already defined, what shall we say of a case in which this preliminary question is undisposed of? Before the Reformation, there would have been little doubt as to what should be considered the national portions of our Church system. And had a bishopric at Jerusalem been erected in those times by the joint efforts of England and Prussia, the "Salisbury Use" and other liturgical and disci

plinary rules, in which we differed from other portions of the Western Church, might readily have been pointed out.

There was then a state of actual communion established upon general and recognised principles, and the national elements were self-evident. But what is the case now? At the Reformation, the Western Church was broken into fragments in some cases, these sections were co-extensive with territorial divisions, in others they were not. But whether each particular communion, which then assumed a distinct position, could be called a national body or not, it is certain that nationality as such was not the exclusive, nor in most cases even the original, basis of the different changes which ensued. Granting that the rejection of the Papal power was, in some cases, founded on (so called) national principles, can it be denied, that, as between Rome and the Reformed bodies generally, or as between various portions of those reformed bodies, the main differences were ecclesiastical and doctrinal, and that all parties professed to be chiefly occupied with establishing, not what was most congenial to local or generic feelings, but what was most agreeable to the law of Christ?

So evident was this, that while Rome rejected the reformed bodies in general, and that upon many grounds besides the denial of the Papacy, those bodies likewise lost communion amongst themselves; so that within the same civil district, speaking the same language, and sharing the same national feelings, there may be, and often are, religious congregations as widely separated from each other as if the ocean flowed between them. Now, in such a state of things as this, it is plainly obvious that the mere fact of our Church having, at the Reformation, been designed to be co-extensive with our nation, is no evidence that those things in which it differs from the religious communities existing within, or themselves comprising, foreign nations, are national as distinguished from Catholic. The ground of previous communion is wanting on which to erect the test which is required. When all parties are agreed as to what constitutes Catholicity, then, but not till then, can there be an ascertainment of what is merely national.

Mr. Maurice, indeed, is well aware of this, and therefore he

has propounded very eloquently and very ably his theory of what constitute the grounds of Catholic unity;* and it seems that there are others who think his theory a very good one, and are willing to make it their own. He admits, however, that there are those in the Church of England who hold a different view; and I think that it would require no great research to discover, for each of some two or three more theories, at least as many adherents as can be reckoned for either of those which he mentions.

Now, in the midst of all this, the Church of England by its very silence says-" these are my laws, and if you are a true member of my communion you will obey them. Which of them are Catholic, which are merely national, you may reason about as you please, but I, who have imposed them on you, have made no such distinctions, and, if your obedience is to depend upon individual theories, my authority is at an end.”

Has the conduct of an individual under such circumstances nothing to do with Catholic principles? Above all, can the conduct of a Prelate representing the Church of England, and exercising her power over his brethren, be said to find no guidance or control in these principles ?

But, says Mr. Maurice further-admitting that there are impediments in the Canons-"I wish to know whether Mr. "Hope is ready to carry out this principle of literal obedience "to canons and statutes in all cases? Is he prepared to say, "for instance, that every fellow of a college, ipso facto, ceases "to be the member of a college when he commits a literal or "formal violation of its statutes?" (p. 86.)

It is no part of my design, and wholly unnecessary to my argument, to consider in detail the principles of union advocated by Mr. Maurice. The unsoundness of them consists, in my judgment, chiefly in this—that they rest upon a private theory of what constitutes the groundwork of the Church Catholic, instead of being derived from her own acts, and from a review of the maxims which she has at all times and in all places received.

I shall only add that I think Mr. Maurice by no means clears his scheme of the objection that it rests upon a negative. Our Lord's headship of the Church he does not deny to be acknowledged by the Roman Catholics. This doctrine then, to suit his theory, must always be held to imply a negation of the Pope's supremacy, and it is upon this implied negation, and not upon the positive doctrine, that his union is practically based.

Now, if Mr. Maurice will turn to my letter, he will see that the case of ipso facto separation which I have put, is that which would have arisen had Bishop Alexander's suffragancy and the obligation of the Anglican Church-constitution within his jurisdiction been totally repudiated. And this, to follow the analogy which he suggests, would have been equivalent to the rejection of the whole body of statutes, and of the authority both of head and visitor, by a member of a college; upon the supposition of which case I cannot understand his question being answered otherwise than in the affirmative.

The "Statement," however, does not allow this case to arise; for it establishes the suffragancy, and declares the general application of the canons. The points, therefore, to be considered are, what deviation from those canons is tolerated by the coercive jurisdictions of our Church, and what license may be allowed to a conscience really desirous to do its duty under them.

Now, into this wide inquiry we need enter but a little way; for, either it must be admitted that there are no injunctions of the Church of England which are binding upon her clergy, or the most material to this question of those which I have pointed out are obligatory, both in a judicial and a moral sense. No impossibility attends them; no inconvenience, which could not be foreseen when they were passed, renders them unreasonable; canons, rubrics, acts of parliament, conspire to enforce them; the courts take notice of them; custom, "viridi observantiâ," receives, enjoins, and acts upon them; the power which framed exists, and may be applied, if need be, to modify or repeal them.

What matters it, then, whether the Church-law of England be in some cases doubtful, if here it be plain? What, whether some points of it be in desuetude, if here there be a living observance? or what skills it that there may be perplexities about some college statutes, or that some of the decrees of the Apostolic Council of Jerusalem have by the Universal Church been held to be of particular and limited application, when the Church of England, which framed these laws, acts upon them, and, as the interpreter of them, holds them to be co-extensive with her own communion?