law the Prisoner ought to be tried; and we preferred a claim which we do now solemnly prefer, and which we trust your Lordships will concur with us in a laudable emulation to establish a claim founded upon the great truths, that all power is limited by law, and ought to be guided by discretion, and not by arbitrary will: -that all discretion must be referred to the conservation and benefit of those over whom power is exercised; and therefore must be guided by rules of sound political morality.

We next contended, that wherever existing laws were applicable, the Prisoner at your bar was bound by the laws and statutes of this kingdom as a British subject; and that whenever he exercised authority in the name of the Company, or in the name of His Majesty, or under any other name, he was bound by the laws and statutes of this kingdom, both in letter and spirit, so far as they were applicable to him and to his case and above all, that he was bound by the act to which he owed his appointment, in all transactions with foreign powers to act according to the known recognised rules of the law of nations; whether these powers were really or nominally sovereign, whether they were depen dent or independent.

The next point which we established, and which we now call to your Lordships recollection, is,

that

that he was bound to proceed according to the laws, rights, laudable customs, privileges and franchises of the country that he governed; and we contended, that to such laws, rights, privileges and franchises, the people of the country had a clear and just claim.

Having established these points as the basis of Mr. Hastings' general power, we contended that he was obliged by the nature of his relation, as a servant to the Company, to be obedient to their orders at all times; and particularly where he had entered into special covenants regarding special articles of obedience. These are the principles by which we have examined the conduct of this man, and upon which we have brought him to your Lordship's bar for judg ment. This is our table of the law. Your Lordships shall now be shewn the table by which he claims to be judged, but I will first beg your Lordships to take notice of the utter contempt with which he treats all our Acts of Parliament. Speaking of the absolute sovereignty which he would have you believe is exercised by the princes of India, he says, "The sovereignty "which they assumed, it fell to my lot very

unexpectedly to exert, and whether or not "such power or powers of that nature were "delegated to me by any provisions of any Act "of Parliament, I confess myself too little of a lawyer

a lawyer to pronounce," and so on. This is the manner in which he treats an Act of Parliament! In the place of Acts of Parliament he substitutes his own arbitrary will. This he contends is the sole law of the country he governed, as laid down in what he calls the arbitrary institutes of Ghinges Khan and Tamerlane. This arbitrary will he claims, to the exclusion of the Gentoo law, the Mahometan law, and the law of his own country. He claims the right of making his own will the sole rule of his govern ment, and justifies the exercise of this power by the examples of Aliverdi Khan, Cossim Ali Khan, Sujah Dowlah Khan, and all those Khans who have rebelled against their masters, and desolated the countries subjected to their rule. This, my Lords, is the law which he has laid down for himself, and these are the examples which he has expressly told the House of Commons he is resolved to follow. These examples, my Lords, and the principles with which they are connected, without any softening or mitigation, he has prescribed to you as the rule by which his conduct is to be judged.

Another principle of the Prisoner is, that whenever the Company's affairs are in distress, even when that distress proceeds from his own prodigality mismanagment or corruption, he has a right to take for the Company's benefit priMAVOL. XV. vately

H

vately in his own name, with the future application of it to their use reserved in his own breast, every kind of bribe or corrupt present whatever.

I have now re-stated to your Lordships the maxims by which the Prisoner persists in defending himself, and the principles upon which we claim to have him judged. The issue before your Lordships is a hundred times more impor tant than the cause itself, for it is to determine by what law or maxims of law the conduct of Governours is to be judged.

On one side, your Lordships have the Prisoner declaring that the people have no laws, no rights, no usages, no distinctions of rank, no sense of honour, no property; in short that they are nothing but a herd of slaves to be governed by the arbitrary will of a master. On the other side, we assert that the direct contrary of this is true, And to prove our assertion we have referred you to the institutes of Ghinges Khan and of Tamerlane we have referred you to the Mahometan ław, which is binding upon all, from the crowned head to the meanest subject; a law interwoven with a system of the wisest, the most learned and most enlightened jurisprudence that perhaps ever existed in the world. We have shewn you, that if these parties are to be compared together, it is not the rights of the people which are nothing, but rather the rights of the sovereign

which are so. The rights of the people are every thing, as they ought to be in the true and natural order of things. God forbid that these maxims should trench upon sovereignty, and its true, just, and lawful prerogative: on the contrary, they ought to support and establish them. The sovereign's rights are undoubtedly sacred rights, and ought to be so held in every country in the world; because exercised for the benefit of the people, and in subordination to that great end for which alone God has vested power in any man or any set of men. This is the law that we insist upon, and these are the principles upon which your Lordships are to try the Prisoner at your bar.

Let me remind your Lordships, that these people lived under the laws to which I have referred you, and that these laws were formed whilst we, I may say, were in the forest; certainly before we knew what technical jurisprudence was. These laws are allowed to be the basis and substratum of the manners, customs, and opinions, of the people of India; and we contend, that Mr. Hastings is bound to know them and to act by them; and I shall prove, that the very condition upon which he received power in India, was to protect the people in their laws and known rights. But whether Mr. Hastings did know these laws, or whether, con