person of a learned profession, "a spider of hell." My Lords, Sir Walter was a great soldier, a great mariner, and one of the first scholars of his age. To call him a spider of hell, was not only indecent in itself, but perfectly foolish, from the term being totally inapplicable to the object, and fit only for the very pedantic eloquence of the person who used it. But if Sir Walter Raleigh had been guilty of numberless frauds and prevarications; if he had clandestinely picked up other men's money, concealed his peculation by false bonds, and afterwards attempted to cover it by the cobwebs of the law, then my Lord Coke would have trespassed a great deal more against decorum than against propriety of similitude and metaphor.

My Lords, the Managers for the Commons. have not used any inapplicable language. We have indeed used, and will again use, such expressions as are proper to pourtray guilt. After describing the magnitude of the crime, we describe the magnitude of the Criminal. We have declared him to be not only a publick robber himself, but the head of a system of robbery; the captain general of the gang, the chief under whom a whole predatory band was arrayed, disciplined, and paid. This, my Lords, is what we offered to prove fully to you, what in part. we have proved, and the whole of which I believe

believe we could prove. In developing such a mass of criminality, and in describing a criminal of such magnitude, as we have now brought before you, we could not use lenient epithets, without compromising with crime. We therefore shall not relax in our pursuits, nor in our language. No, my Lords, no; we shall not fail to feel indignation wherever our moral nature has taught us to feel it, nor shall we hesitate to speak the language which is dictated by that indignation. Whenever men are oppressed where they ought to be protected, we called it tyranny; and we call the actor a tyrant. Whenever goods are taken by violence from the possessor, we call it a robbery; and the person who takes it, we call a robber. Money clandestinely taken from the proprietor, we call theft; and the person who takes it, we call a thief. When a false paper is made out to obtain money, we call the act a forgery. That steward who takes bribes from his master's tenants, and then, pretending the money to be his own, lends it to that master and takes bonds for it to himself, we consider guilty of a breach of trust; and the person who commits such crimes, we call a cheat, a swindler, and a forger of bonds. All these offences, without the least softening, under all these names, we charge upon this man. We have so charged in our record, we have so charged in

our

our speeches; and we are sorry that our language does not furnish terms of sufficient force and compass to mark the multitude, the magnitude, and the atrocity of his crimes.

How came it then that the Commons of Great Britain should be calumniated for the course which they have taken? Why should it ever have been supposed that we are actuated by revenge? I answer there are two very sufficient causes: corruption and ignorance. The first disposes an innumerable multitude of people to a fellow feeling with the Prisoner. Under the shadow of his crimes thousands of fortunes have been made; and therefore thousands of tongues are employed to justify the means by which these fortunes were made. When they cannot deny the facts they attack the accusers; they attack their conduct, they attack their persons, they attack their language, in every possible manner. I have said, my Lords, that ignorance is the other cause of this calumny by which the House of Commons is assailed. Ignorance produces a confusion of ideas concerning the decorum of life, by confounding the rules of private society with those of publick function. To talk, as we here talk, to persons in a mixed company of men and women, would violate the law of such societies; because they meet for the sole purpose of social intercourse, and not

for

for the exposure, the censure, the punishment of crimes; to all which things private societies are altogether incompetent. In them crimes can never be regularly stated, proved, or refuted. The law has therefore appointed special places for such inquiries; and if in any of those places we were to apply the emollient language of drawing rooms to the exposure of great crimes, it would be as false and vicious in taste and in morals, as to use the criminatory language of this Hall, in drawing and assembling rooms would be misplaced and ridiculous. Every one knows, that in common society palliating names are given to vices. Adultery, in a lady is called gallantry: the gentleman is commonly called a man of good fortune, sometimes in French and sometimes in English. But is this the tone which would become a person, in a court of justice, calling these people to an account for that horrible crime, which destroys the basis of society? No, my Lords, this is not the tone of such proceedings. Your Lordships know that it is not; the Commons know that it is not; and because we have acted on that knowledge, and stigmatized crimes with becoming indignation, we are said to be actuated rather by revenge than justice.

If it should still be asked, why we shew sufficient acrimony to excite a suspicion of being

in any manner influenced by malice or a desire of revenge? To this, my Lords, I answer, because we would be thought to know our duty, and to have all the world know how resolutely we are resolved to perform it. The Commons of Great Britain are not disposed to quarrel with the Divine Wisdom and Goodness, which has moulded up revenge into the frame and constitution of man. He that has made us what we are, has made us at once resentful and reasonable. Instinct tells a man, that he ought to revenge an injury; reason tells him, that he ought not to be a judge in his own cause. From that moment revenge passes from the private to the publick hand; but in being transferred it is far from being extinguished. My Lords, it is transferred as a sacred trust to be exercised for the injured, in measure and proportion by persons who, feeling as he feels, are in a temper to reason better than he can reason. Revenge is taken out of the hands of the original injured proprietor, lest it should be carried beyond the bounds of moderation and justice. But, my Lords, it is in its transfer exposed to a danger of an opposite description. The delegate of vengeance may not feel the wrong sufficiently; he may be cold and languid in the performance of his sacred duty. It is for these reasons, that good men are taught to tremble