During thefe tranfactions at home, the King was not idle abroad. One of the principal ends of the King's journey to Hanover was to provide against any future attempts of the Jacobite party, by endeavouring to make alliances with all thofe Powers from whence the Pretender might expect any fupport. But this was an impoffible undertaking, in the then fituation of the affairs of Europe. The King of Spain pretended to have numberless complaints against the Emperor. The evacuation of Catalonia bad given great offence, as to the manner of doing it. A tribunal had been erected at Vienna for the affairs of Spain, and the eftates of the Flemish, who had ferved King Philip, were confiicated. But thefe were flight rievances in comparifon of what was now in agitation. Sicily had been granted to the Duke of Savoy, by the Utrecht treaty, on condition of returning to Spain, in cafe of failure of heirs, The Emperor had looked upon this grant with the utmost concern. He had almoft persuaded the Duke of Savoy to accept Sardinia in exchange, without the partici pation of the Court of Madrid, and with out any regard to the claufe of reverfion. To all thele occafions of rupture were added the pretensions of the two Courts to the fucceffion of the Tu can dominions.

As to France, with refpect to Spain, the two nations were united, but their Governors were not fo. King Philip and the Duke of Orleans were ready to contend for the Crown of Lewis XV, in cafe death should remove him out of the world. Philip had renounced that Crown, and upon that alone was founded the Duke of Orleans's title. But, befides that, the renunciation was generally confidered in France as of no force; the Emperor's con⚫ Aant refufal to cease ftyling himself King of Spain feemed entirely to annul it, as it

was not reasonable that one contra&ing party should be obliged to stand to mutual engagements, to which the other refuses to fubmit. King George therefore could not be attached to France, without offending Spain, nor could he be united to Spain, without giving offence to both the others.

The cafe was much the fame with the northern Powers, and it was still more difficult for King George to manage them, so as to draw none of them upon himself. Denmark and Sweden were at war: the Czar had entered into a confederacy, which had taken from the Swede his German dominions: the Princes of the empire beheld with regret the Ruffians in their country. It was the bufnels of those who called them in, and made use of them, to fend them away. The acquifition of the Duchies of Bremen and Verden, which King George had gained as Elector of Hanover, had enraged King Charles of Sweden. He durit not, as King of Great Britain, declare war against him (though he had done it as Elector of Hanover) nor could he be reconciled with him, unless he restored the two Duchies. The only way therefore was to compel that warlike Prince to make peace. In this fituation, it was neceflary for King George to make alliances, and unite with thofe who could molt annoy him, in cafe they became his enemies. Being fure of the good difpofition of the Regent of France, he trusted to his Minifters the negociation with that Prince, and undertook himself the affairs of the north, where, it is plain, he knew fome enterprize was contriving in favour of the Pretender.

The negociation with France fucceeded to his with. The Duke of Orleans, who had still more need of a fupport to mount the Throne, in case of a vacancy, than the King had to maintain himself on that of

Great

Great Britain, granted all that was defired. The States general, who only aimed at peace and security, readily came into a treaty, which embroiled them with no Power they were concerned to manage, and which laid upon them fcarce any fresh obligation. General Cadogan, the Abbot du Bois, and Penfionary Heinfius, negociated this affair with fo much fecrecy, that the treaty was finished almost before it was known to be in hand.

By this treaty, the Pretender, that his near abode might not encourage commotions in Great Britain, was to depart immediately from Avignon, and to go beyond the Alps; nor was he to be fuffered at any time to come or return thither, or to pass through the French territories, under pretence of going to Lorrain, or even to fet his foot in any place within the dominions of France, much lefs to ftay there on any pretence whatsoever. This was accompanied with the renewing of the promifes made at Utrecht of abfolutely refufing protection to the Chevalier de St. George, and of affifting him in any manner directly or indirectly. No refuge was to be given to the fubjects of either party, who fhould be declared rebels. All that had been formerly agreed, concerning Dunkirk, was to be fully executed, and nothing was to be omitted that the King of Great Britain fhould think neceffary for the entire demolition of the harbour, and for the removing all fufpicion that a new harbour was intended to be made on the canal of Mardyke. This treaty referred to a memorial figned at London, in September, by Monfieur Iberville, Refident of France, and the Lord Townshend and Mr. Methuen, Secretaries of State, containing the particulars required by King George to make him eafy and cure his fufpicions.

After thefe preliminaries (which might be confidered as the purchafe given by France for this alliance) it was added, that the true defign of this treaty being to Strengthen the friendship eftablished by the late treaties at Utrecht, the articles of thofe treaties, as far as they concerned the contracting parties, were confirmed and ratified, particularly, that the fucceffion to the Crown of Great Britain in the Proteftant line, and to the Crown of France in the family of Orleans, exclufive of the House of Anjou, fhould remain in full force. A mutual guarantee was also given for the performance of thefe, and all the other articles, and for the defence of the dominions poffeffed by the three Powers at the time of

figning the treaty. Then was fettled the fuccours each fhould give the party attacked, after fair means had been used to induce the aggreffor to defift from his enterprife. France and England were to furnifh each eight thoufand foot, and two thousand horfe; and the States half that number. It was free to demand ships or money inftead of troops; and, to prevent all occafion of difpute, it was agreed, that a thoufand foot thould be valued at ten thousand Dutch florins a month, and a thousand horfe at 30,000. The fuccours at fea were to be valued in the fame proportion.

The chief end of this treaty being to fupport the fucceffions to the two Crowns, that article was very largely explained. It was agreed, that, if the kingdoms, countries, or provinces of any of the Allies were difturbed with inteftine divifions, or by rebellions, on account of these succeffions, or any other pretence, the Ally fo difturbed fhould have a right to demand aid, as in case of being attacked by a fareign Power; that this aid fhould be fent within two months after demand, and the neceffary expences advanced by thofe of whom it was demanded, and no repayment to be required till a year after the troubles fhould ceafe. In cafe this aid fhould not be fufficient, it was added, the whole forces of the other parties fhould be employed, and, if occafion required, war hould be declared against the aggreffors.

As foon as this treaty was made public, it raifed great murmurings, especially in France, where it was openly faid, the Regent facrificed to his ambitious views the honour and advantage of the nation: the condefcenfion hitherto fhewn for England, on account of the Chevalier de St. George, had been too great, but the present procedings were fhameful and mean: the demolition of Mardyke would be an eternal monument of the fubjection of France to England: Lewis XIV. would never have contented to it, and the unfettled ftate of Great Britain did not put her in a condition to impose laws: a Prince, who had no other intereft but that of his people, would have taken the opportunity to finish a work fo important and neceffary: the expreffions in the treaty, of doing whatever the King of Great Britain fhall judge neceffary to remove his fufpicions, were of a very high ftrain, and derogatory to the fovereignty of the Crown of France."

The King of Spain was highly offended at this alliance, and complained of ir bit

terly,

terly, affirming it belonged to the States of the realm, not to foreigners, fpecially the English, perpetual enemies of France, to decide pretenfions to the Throne, in cafe God fhould, in his anger, call the young King to himself and from that time be took measures to uliconcert this alliance.

This frict alliance with France was found fault with even in England, where it was pretended, that the fucceffion was fufficiently fecured by the treaty of Utrecht, and there was no occafion for fo many foreign troops, which might be called in on pretence of an invafion, and perhaps be used for different purposes. The King and Regent difregarded thefe murmurs, being fatisfied that their mutual intereft would oblige them to an inviolable performance of their engagements. The character of these two Princes had a great refemblance in many particulars. They had both great talents for Government, and may be faid to have equally had an occa fion for them in their respective circumftances, which were much the fame. Alike diffatisfied with the ate Administration of affairs, they oblerved the fame conduct. None of the friends and creatures of Lewis XIV. were in favour with the Duke of Orleans; as none of the friends and creatures of Queen Anne were in favour with King George. The difference, in their manner of treating them, entirely flowed from the different ufages of the nations they governed. King George delivered himself up to the Whigs, who had been perfecuted in the late reign: the Duke of Orleans feemed to give himself up to the Janfenists, whom Lewis XIV. had conftantly ill used: they changed Minifters almoft as often one as the other: their competitors inspired them with the fame views, and almott the fame precautions: they were alike even in their death, for both died fuddenly. The Duke of Orleans is faid to have had a more prompt and ready geaius: the multitude and difficulty of his affairs never hindered him from pursuing his pleasures; whereas King George was always attentive, always ferious, and feemed an enemy to all amufements: and therefore he was, beyond compar fon, more regular in his manners and conduct; befides, he was more conftantly attached to the party he had espoused, and was never feen to waver between the Whigs and Tories, as oid the Duke of Orleans between the Janfenifts and Molinifts.

General Cadogan had much better fuccefs in his negociations with France, than

the King had in his with the norther Powers. Notwithstanding all his endevours, he could engage them neither to be reconciled, nor even to fufpend their refentments. He feemed, however, to have fucceeded in fpite of the King of Denmark's defire to preferve his advantages, and the King of Sweden's eagerness to revenge and repair his loffes. His Swedish Majelly had pref-nted to the Emperor and the Diet pacific Memorials, and even fent Plenipotentiaries to affift at the Congress of Brunswick; but al thefe hopes quickly vanished. King George had, however, made that Prince all the advances imaginable: had ftrongly preffed the Emperor, the Kings of Denmark and Pruffia, and even the Czar himself, that the Ruffians might march out of the empire: nay, it is faid he had proceeded fo far towards a feparate peace with the King of Sweden, as to offer to join with him against the Muscovite, on condition only that he would renounce all pretenfions to the Duchies of Bremen and Verden. King Charles XII. was intractable; incenfed at the war made against him, when he could not defend himself, and still more at the peace, which they would compel him to make, on conditions, as he thought, both dishonourable and hard; he breathed nothing but revenge, and was as much offended with the King of Great Britain, as with the Czar and the King of Denmark.

As King George could not obtain the ceffion he defired, he took the beft meafures to fecure his new acquifitions, and compel the King of Sweden to remain quiet. It was given out, that the confederacy he had endered into was formed purely for the fake of peace. It was agreed by the Confederates, that each thould furnish a certain number of forces and hips, not to make new conquests upon Sweden, but to oblige his Swedish Majefly to fit easy under his loffes, and not endeavour to recover them. This rupture with Sweden was not only detrimental to the trade of Great Britain, but had like to have proved fatal to the King; for, whilft he was labouring for a peace in the north, in order to fecure his German poffeffions, a fcheme was contriving to deprive him of his British dominions.

The difaffected in England, ftill purfuing their defigns in favour of the Pretender, turned their eyes on the King of Sweden to accomplish it. They knew how exafperated he was against King George, and how glad he would be of a revenge: Count Gyllenburgh was the

Swedish