was carried forward about five hundred yards on a front of one mile, and the western portion of Inverness Copse was occupied.

An improvement in the weather made it possible to resume operations on a large scale on Sept. 20. The preparatory bombardment followed the lines which are already familiar. The attack was launched at 5.40 a.m., on a front of about eight miles, extending from the Comines Canal to the Ypres-Staden railway. The ground had only dried superficially, and the advance was much impeded by bogs, and by the all-pervading shell-craters, flooded by the prolonged rainfall, between which narrow causeways afforded insecure foothold. Rain had fallen again throughout the night, but the sky cleared in the course of the morning, enabling the aircraft to fulfil their customary rôle. In the first stage of the battle progress was made against strong opposition in Shrewsbury and Herenthage woods; Inverness Copse, and Glencorse and Nonne woods were completely occupied ; and, further north, Potsdam, Gallipoli, and the intermediate farms were captured. In the second stage the troops reached their final objectives for the day, comprising Tower Hamlets, Veldhoek, the western portion of Polygon Wood, the hamlet of Zevenkote, and Wurst, Quebec, and Rose farms. During the five days' interlude which ensued, the enemy made repeated and determined attempts to recover the high ground about Veldhoek, and the Tower Hamlets spur, which projects thence in the direction of Zandvoorde. When the battle was resumed, on Sept. 26, the most obstinate resistance was encountered on this portion of the front, the struggle being especially severe on the north of the Menin road. By the close of the day our troops were in possession of their appointed objectives, including the Tower Hamlets spur and strong works on the eastern slope, Polygon Wood, with the system of trenches on the east, Zonnebeke, and an area half a mile in depth between that village and the St Julien-Gravenstafel road. During the rest of September the Germans made repeated but fruitless attacks upon the commanding positions between

* Quebec and Rose farms are, respectively, 1 miles E.S.E., and 1 mile E. of Langemarck.

the Menin road and the north-western corner of Polygon Wood.

Minor operations have taken place on other portions of the British front, of which the most important have been in the Lens sector, where the Germans have made strenuous efforts to stem our encircling advance. After the engagements of the latter part of June, which carried our troops into the southern and western outskirts of the town, and gave them a footing in Avion, there was a comparative lull until Aug. 15, when an attack south-east and east of Loos gained possession of the entire German first-line system on a front of two miles, and reached Cité St Laurent. On this occasion the famous Hill 70, which had proved untenable by either army since the battle of Loos (September 1915), fell into our hands. The enemy resisted vigorously, and for ten days the fighting was exceptionally severe; but our troops, while maintaining their positions, extended their new front by gaining ground to the south-west of St Laurent.

Intermittent fighting, which deserves passing notice, has also taken place before the Hindenburg line on the front Villeret-Lempire, where the objective is the high ground south-west of Le Catelet, which commands an extensive view over the surrounding country, especially in an easterly direction. The Malakoff and Cologne farms, lying respectively 2000 and 1200 yards due north of Villeret, are situated on the western slopes of the ridge, which attains its maximum elevation one mile east of Malakoff Farm, at a height of 500 feet above sealevel. A mile and a half north of Malakoff Farm, and somewhat nearer to Lempire, Gillemont Farm stands on the watershed.*

Sir Henry Rawlinson's troops occupied Lempire on April 6, and Villeret ten days later; but no further move of importance took place until Aug. 19, when they captured the positions about Gillemont Farm, and established themselves on the crest of the ridge. Fighting continued with fluctuating success till the end of the

Lempire is shown on the map published in the Quarterly Review' for April last. Villeret, which lies three miles south-by-east from Lempire, is indicated by a circle, but not named. The unnamed circle between Villeret and Ronssoy indicates the position of Hargicourt.

month, when the enemy, after repeated efforts, recovered an isolated knoll north of the farm. The Cologne and Malakoff positions were carried on Aug. 26; a success which was supplemented, a few days after, by the capture of a line of trenches extending southwards to the latitude of Villeret.

Throughout July, and the first half of August, the Germans continued their attacks on the Chemin des Dames ridge, varied by an occasional thrust on the Moronvillers heights, their object being, apparently, to wear down the resistance of the French, and to prevent them from embarking on operations in other quarters. On several occasions they gained slight advantages, which were generally reversed by our Allies' spirited counter-attacks; and when, ultimately, the Germans found it expedient to turn their attention to other regions, the situation which existed at the beginning of their offensive was practically unchanged. The attempt to exhaust or immobilise the French reserves was a complete failure. While General Anthoine was Cooperating with our armies on the Yser, General Fayolle, on Aug. 20, opened a fresh offensive at Verdun, on a front of nearly twelve miles, lying athwart the Meuse from the Bois d'Avocourt to Bezonvaux. At the close of the operations his left wing, having captured the dominating heights known as Hill 304, the Mort Homme, and the Côte de l'Oie, lay not far south of the Forges Brook; and the right wing, continuing the line north of Samogneux, touched the southern outskirts of Beaumont, and passed within a short distance of Ornes. Verdun, and the railways in rear of it, were no longer exposed to bombardment by the German howitzers. More than 8000 prisoners were taken during the operations.

There is little that is new to be deduced from the operations in Flanders, so far as their details are publicly known. The Germans have developed their system of defence on the lines indicated in the last article-that of invisibility, rather than of material strength. Continuous lines of entrenchment, and, so far as is possible, objects and outlines which would provide an easy target for artillery, or a well-defined objective for infantry