of to-day, but who among them can claim to have had such consummate experience, to have such a sure touch, such a variety of profound knowledge, such a broad grasp of the science of politics, of things and of men, as he?

If he were still living, what would be his counsel to us to-day? To do our duty. What duty? The duty of bringing ourselves into closer and still closer association with our Allies and of marching with unwavering agreement, steadfastness and energy towards the common aim—against the New Barbarism, against the skilled and studied barbarism of a nation of prey. I can hear him again asking us :

'Quelle doit être la préoccupation continuelle des Puissances? C'est avoir le soin de leur propre grandeur, de veiller sans cesse les unes sur les autres, pour qu'aucune d'elles ne menace la sûreté commune; et, s'il y en a une qui, par les prétentions qu'elle affiche, par la force qu'elle déploie, devient dangereuse pour l'indépendance des autres, on se réunit contre elle afin de la réduire ou de la contenir. Quelle est cette politique là? Qu'est-elle en réalité? C'est la politique de l'indépendance des nations.'

When in 1867, Thiers-who even then had observed the tendency of Prussia to predominate Europe--wrote: 'La monarchie universelle est de toutes les formes du despotisme la pire,' he already foresaw what must one day result from the insolent desire of that Power to crush all nations under the same yoke, to stifle their natural genius and to turn them into slaves. Such efforts, of course, must always end in a catastrophe, but at this period of the world's history we have a right to demand that the whole race should be able to render such cataclysms impossible. To this end we are bound to follow the counsels of those who, having pursued a political career not as an object of vainglorious ambition but as the unceasing occupation of their disinterested studies, have had no other desire than to defend the real interests of Humanity.

HENRI WELSCHINGER.

Art. 2.—GERMAN METHODS IN TURKEY.

As an Oversea Briton' who has resided in Turkey for over thirty years, without losing touch with the old country, the present writer has had an exceptional opportunity of being brought into contact with the question of British oversea trade with the country he lived in. Certain aspects of the foreigner's trade as compared with British oversea trade, to which but little attention has hitherto been directed, have been forcibly brought home to him. In particular, there is one which stands out above all others. It is bound up with the whole question of oversea trade, and may, perhaps, be summed up, by saying not that 'Trade follows the Flag,' but thatTrade follows the Bank.' The utilisation of banking credit, in other words the financing of oversea trade, combined with other factors, has rendered immense services to German and Austrian commerce, and makes their competition with us very serious.

It was recently said that 'To understand German methods and to appreciate them at their proper value is to go more than halfway towards winning the commercial war.' The intention of the present writer is to endeavour to open British eyes to some of the German methods in oversea trade, and to indicate the points of value in the foreign system, as well as the faults in our own. The writer has watched the development and growth of German trade under the fostering care of the German Government. Diplomacy, commercial influence and finance have all assisted; and the combination has permeated the country, with the result that the volume of British exports to Turkey, and even of Turkish exports to Great Britain, has seriously fallen off. It is, however, not only British trade that has suffered; the trade of other countries has been similarly affected. Italy is an exception, but this is chiefly because Italy has been so much under the influence of German-owned and controlled banks and industries.

A few figures may be given to show the falling-off of British export trade to Turkey and the increase of German trade. The figures as shown below are the Turkish Custom House figures, and are fairly complete down to 1911-12 (the Turkish financial year commences in

March). It has not been possible to obtain the Turkish figures for 1912 and 1913, but the British figures for those years, ending Dec. 31, are given. The larger figures for 1910-11-1911-12 are those of German exports to Turkey, including railway and war material.

Perhaps the best comparison of figures down to 1909 is that given by Sir Adam Block, K.C.M.G., President of the British Chamber of Commerce in Turkey, in his Presidential address in March 1910, when he stated

'that, whereas the total imports into Turkey have increased in 1908-9 by more than 7,000,000l. as against 1900-1, and by almost 1,000,000l. as against 1905-6, British trade, which is pre-eminent, is slowly dropping proportionally to the trade of other countries and is less in bulk in 1908-9, as compared with 1905-6, by nearly 1,000,000l. Italian trade is steadily increasing; and German trade, which was 583,300l. or 2 per cent. of the whole in 1900-1, rose to 1,174,300l. or 4 per cent. of the whole in 1905-6, and 1,759,700l. or 6 per cent. of the whole import trade in 1908-9.* In eight years German trade increased by 1,176,4007. The volume of their imports increased in that period about 300 per cent. As compared with 1905-6, German imports show an increase of 600,000ʊ., whereas British imports have dropped by nearly 1,200,0002. in the same period.'

In 1888, the British imports into Turkey were 42.80 per cent. of the whole import trade; in 1900-1, 35 per cent.; in 1908-9, 30 per cent. Sir Adam Block further stated, in regard to exports from Turkey, that

As compared with 1908-9, the figures of 1911-12 for German imports show an increase of 2,871,000l., whereas British imports only increased by 442,9601.

'those to the United Kingdom are still at the head of the list, but have dropped about 1,000,000l. since 1905-6; and, from 38 per cent. of the whole export trade in 1900-1, the proportion has dropped to 32 per cent. in 1905-6, and to 28 per cent. in 1908-9. Germany has increased from 4 per cent. to 6 per cent. of the whole.'

The capture of commerce in the Near East was accomplished by German activity on the one hand and British inactivity on the other. On the one side there was a thorough and continuous effort to capture the Turkish import trade, which was backed by German diplomatic and consular influence, and furthered by the offer of commercial facilities and financial assistance. To these must be added the careful conduct of the German merchant and his capacity to meet the wishes of the client, in regard to the quality of the goods and the form best suited to the necessities of the country and customer. On the other side we have to note the absence of diplomatic and consular influence as well as of commercial and financial aid, while the somewhat crude methods of English commerce and the generally careless, 'take-it-or-leave-it' style of the British merchant, together with his reluctance to study the nature of the article wanted, the requirements of the country and the wants of the client, placed him at a further disadvantage.

Let us endeavour to describe the two methods. To understand the diplomatic activities of Germany, one must depart from the usual conception of diplomacy as illustrated by the work of the British diplomatic body. The German diplomatic corps is on a quite different footing. They are not out for political objects alone, but for business; and the members of the consular corps are at one with them, in the sense that they form part of the diplomatic corps, and their best men have a career open to them and can occupy high positions ; whereas, on the contrary, the British consuls, trained as they are in a special consular service, specialists in regard to the country in which they reside, and employed hardly anywhere else, were and are a class apart from the diplomatic body. No one can rise beyond a ConsulGeneralship or the head dragomanship at the Embassy;

and the man who has attained even such a position is hardly on a level with the latest Third Secretary or Attaché just out from England.

When the German Emperor and his advisers determined to capture the country, they meant to capture it commercially as well as politically. His diplomats were not simply the Ambassador and his staff at the end of a telegraph wire communicating with the Foreign Office, but an active live organisation which directed the Foreign Office in Berlin on commercial matters, and had the Deutsche Bank at its beck and call. The Deutsche Bank was barely second to the German Embassy, for the Embassy was also at its beck and call. Each worked with the other, and all worked together with Berlin. Immediately the order went forth, the Deutsche Bank began its work in Turkey, at first through the medium of the Anatolian Railway Company and subsequently as a separate establishment. It was soon followed by other German and controlled banks, such as the Deutsche Orient Bank, which was opened in January 1906. The Deutsche Bank in Turkey, both before and after its establishment as a separate concern, was continually receiving visits from its Berlin managers, amongst them Dr K. Helfferich and A. von Gwinner; and the German Ambassador, with the whole diplomatic corps in Constantinople, was there to carry out the Bank's directions. The Deutsche Bank, when finally established at Constantinople as a Bank in 1906, was a complete institution perfectly organised. It got hold of every specialist and expert it might think useful for the furtherance of big railway, dock, drainage, mining and other schemes. This was Germany's method of peaceful penetration. 'Haute finance' made full use of the Embassy. Its projects, whether they had a purely political or a quasipolitical object in view, were initiated, elaborated and put into operation subject only to the approval of the authorities in Berlin.

It may be said that the peaceful penetration of the Germans in Turkey began actively immediately after the granting of the concession for the Anatolian Railways in 1899, for in 1890 there was founded at Zürich an institution called the 'Banque des Chemins de fer Orientaux.' Its principal object was defined as being