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turn their horses' heads to Downing-street, it will be with a view to staying there comfortably. Il faut reculer, pour mieux sauter.

As for persons who are frightened at Peel's majority, their fear springs from their ignorance of the nature of politics. Never was there so formidable a party as that headed by the Marquis of Rockingham in the spring of 1782, and where was it in two years, aye! or in one? Lord Rockingham's ministry was formed late in March, supported by Lord Shelburne, Fox, and Burke, and the whole of the great Whig party, including all its sections. Recollect that it came into power on the fall of a ministry hated by the country. Alas! it fell to pieces after three short months. The Marquis died, and Fox and Shelburne quarrelled. In July was formed the Shelburne ministry, representing that section of Whigs of which Chatham had been leader. It was supported by the king, but it fell in the following April, and was succeeded by the Coalition Cabinet, including Fox and Lord North, headed by the Duke of Portland, and supported by Burke and Sheridan. Certainly a formidable combination! yet, before the year was out, that ministry became defunct. Thus within two years, there were five great ministries in Downing-street;-Lord North's; Lord Rockingham's; Lord Shelburne's; The Coalition, (nominally Duke of Portland's,) and William Pitt's. Now these momentous changes may be referred to two facts the death of Lord Rockingham, and the quarrel between Shelburne and Fox. Substitute Wellington for Rockingham-Stanley for Shelburne and Peel for Fox, and as great ministerial changes will take place. You may as well expect fire to keep up a cordial acquaintance with water, as Stanley to endure Peel's leadership.

But now, forgive me for asking, what the deuce are you about in Dublin? Why don't the best men of the Liberal Whigs and of the judicious repealers lay their heads together, so as to originate measures for Ireland, for Irish purposes? A new combination of liberal politicians ought to take place in Dublin. It would not be a matter of difficulty to make an alliance on a common principle between the two sections of the Irish Liberals-between the Anglo-Irish Whigs who oppose the Repeal question, and between the more practical politicians of the Nationalists and Repealers. Surely the Irish Whigs ought to see that without popular support their party is powerless, and surely the Repealers have the most decided interest in carrying out Irish measures, which the whole people are interested in? That good which can be done now, and which must be done at some future period, ought earnestly to engage the attention of the friends of Ireland. I need not point out all the questions on which the genuine Irish Liberals cordially agree. Work for those questions, without abandoning any of the more momentous concerns of the country. Recollect, my dear that there are two kinds of Imperialism. There is the Imperialism of subjection, and the Imperialism of participation. Ireland is now under the domination of the first of these systems. Ought it to be so? Remember what De Tocqueville said to one of your

most intimate political friends-to one whose name is already pronounced by many a son of Ireland with mingled feelings of hope, respect, and gratitude. "All your evils in Ireland spring from one thing;-you are two nations there." Admirably said by the French philosopher! And ought it not be the object of the patriot, to bridge over the gaping chasms into which Irish society has been rent? Let us unite amongst ourselves, and then Meantime, such political alliances as would blend men together, and clothe them with a common patriotism, ought to be encouraged. Now is the time to perform something practical. While the Whigs are out of power, you ought to resolve on the measures which you might and ought to extort from them when they regain it.

"Party," says Burke, "is a body of men united for promoting, by their joint endeavours, the national interest, upon some particular principle, upon which they are all agreed. For my part, I find it impossible to conceive that any one believes in his own politics, or thinks them to be of any weight, who refuses to adopt the means of having them reduced into practice. It is the business of every speculative philosopher, to mark the proper ends of government; it is the business of the politician, who is the philosopher in action, to find out proper means towards those ends, and to employ them with effect."

Having quoted Burke, I cannot forbear from adverting to a maxim of his, which is often forgotten or neglected by even the wisest thinkers. That maxim may be elevated into one of those canons for political guidance, which ought never to be absent from the mind of a man of action —a man wishing to do great things, and not merely to think of them.

"To be fully persuaded that all virtue which is impracticable is spurious, and rather to run the risk of falling into faults in a course which leads us to act with effect and energy, than to loiter out our days without blame, and without use."

Aye! young Ireland must man's bell, and I must break off.

but my dear

there's the post

Ask O'B. about what I wrote to him

last week. Present my compliments to F. and tell my charming but I won't trust you with the message, my lad!

cousin Nancy that

So adieu! mon vieux-adieu!

Always yours,

DILLON O'NEILL.

Berkeley Chambers, Bruton-street.

P. S.-Apropos of cousins and charmers.

Tell my cousin Gerald,

when you see him, not to forget that he owes me ten on the Derby, and five on the Oaks, that's fifteen. He went out of town in such a confounded hurry, that I suppose he forgot it.

PAST AND PRESENT STATE OF AFGHANISTAN.

CHAPTER IV.

The Present War-Recent Discussions in Parliament-Mr. Baillie's Motion-Character of Dost Mohamed-Previous neglect of Shah Sujah by the Indian Government— Pretexts for the War-Previous Political Relations between England and Persia, Afghanistan, Scinde, &c.-Subsequent Negociations with Dost Mohamed, Russia, and Persia-Fears from Russia-Perils of Anglo-Indian Supremacy-Indian Finance-Results of the Present Contest.

SINCE our last number was written, Mr. Baillie moved for the production of Sir Alexander Burnes's entire correspondence with the Indian government, relative to Afghanistan. The motion was quietly resisted by the Tories, and more actively by the Whigs, and was rejected by a majority of 75 to 9; yet it has not been without its use. The admissions made by the ex-ministers on this occasion amount to an abandonment of the only pretence of principle, wherein they had previously fortified themselves. It may be that this pretence was too paltry to impose on the public, still 'tis well to have it abandoned; the question is simplified to this, "has England a right to break her solemnest treaties, to invade and plunder her allies, and overrun and tyrannise neutral states?" or more broadly, "has England an exemption from all moral restraints? Is her interest, real or imagined, superior to the laws of God and of nations?

The pretext for the invasion of Afghanistan relied on by Lord John Russell, when Sir R. Peel attacked him in 1839, was that Sujah was the legitimate and popular king,-that he was beloved by the Afghans, acknowledged by the English, and kept from his crown by a cruel usurper;" and the same is spread through Lord Aukland's verbose declaration of war, which bears date Simla, October 1st, 1838. The English government knew that every one of these assertions was untrue. Conolly, Vigne, and Burnes had all borne testimony to the popularity and ability of Dost Mohamed,-to his being the choice of the people, and therefore no "usurper,"—the shield of his country, and therefore its fittest king: and they had likewise witnessed the small capacity, haughty temper, intriguing habits, and consequent unpopularity of Sujah. We may repeat what Burnes says. In his first book he says of Sujah, "He forgot the dignity of a monarch in low intrigues with his subjects, in which he tarnished their honour as well as his own. The fitness of Sujah ul Mulk for the station of sovereign seems ever to have been doubtful. His manners and address are highly polished, but his judgment does not rise above mediocrity:" and in the same work he speaks thus of Dost Mohamed :— "The reputation of Dost Mohamed Khan is made known to a traveller long before he enters his country, and no one better merits the high character he has obtained. He is unremitting in his attention to business, and

attends daily at the court-house with the Cazy and Mulahs, to decide every cause according to the law. Trade has received the greatest encouragement from him; and he has derived his own reward, since the receipts of the custom-house of the city have increased 50,000 rupees, and now furnish him with a net revenue of two lacs of rupees." Sujah and the Suddozye Shahs did not collect half that sum by violence from the same sources. "One in forty (i. e. 24 per cent.) is the only duty levied in his territory; and the merchant may travel without guard or protection from one frontier to another, an unheard of circumstance in the time of the kings. The chief of Cabul, in his zeal for orthodox government, has deprived his subjects of the luxury of wine and spirits, as being prohibited by his creed. The enactment has driven the Jews and Armenians from his country, since they had no other means of procuring subsistence. A good Mohammedan ought not to regret the loss of such luxuries; but, with this single exception, I heard of no complaint against the rule of Dost Mohamed Khan." "No complaint," save the enforcing that temperance which was not only recommended by morals and wisdom, but commanded by the founder of his religion! Burnes goes on"That chief, in common with many of the Afghan nation, was addicted in early life to wine and its concomitant vices. His prohibition of them may be therefore capricious; but he, as well as his court, hold out a bright example of sobriety to the community. The justice of this chief affords a constant theme of praise to all classes: the peasant rejoices at the absence of tyranny; the citizen at the safety of his home, and the strict municipal regulations regarding weights and measures; the merchant at the equity of the decisions, and the protection of his property; and the soldiers at the regular manner in which their arrears are discharged. A man in power can have no higher praise. One is struck," he adds, "with the intelligence, knowledge and curiosity which he displays, as well as his accomplished manners and address." When Burnes wrote of him in 1838, he found no reason for abating this panegyric, except that the duties were increased; though even the merchants themselves admitted to him that the increase was only such as was required to meet the military necessities thrown on the Amir, by the attacks of Sujah and the Sikhs; that these duties were still trifling, compared with all the surrounding states; that commerce had not declined; money continued at 6 per cent. interest; and that a more modest and economical court than the Amir's could not be kept up :" Burnes winds up by saying, that "power generally spoils men; but with Dost Mohamed, neither the increase of it, nor his new title of Amir, seems to have done him any harm. He seemed even more alert and full of intelligence than when I last saw him."

In the book which we last quoted, Burnes says nothing of Sujah, as if

*Notes of a Residence in Cabool in 1836-7-8, by the late Sir Alexander Burnes, p. 142. London, 1842.

he had passed from memory; intimating (as was the fact,) that the Indian government had commenced intrigues and prepared a force against Afghanistan, without reference to the existence of Sujah; and that he was afterwards taken up and made use of as a convenient tool. And indeed it was confessed in the late debate, that Burnes had from beginning to end opposed the attack on Afghanistan as wrong and impolitic, and doubtless upon the same grounds which he has published. What the Indian government thought of Sujah's rights to the throne of Cabul, may be judged by referring to its conduct towards him in 1834, as set out in the papers presented to the House of Commons, 20th of March, 1839. By those papers it appears that Sujah and Runjit Singh made a treaty, bearing date 12th March, 1833, whereby Runjit undertook to aid Sujah in regaining his throne, provided Sujah renounced and abandoned to him the entire east of Afghanistan, between the Solyman mountains and the Indus. On this occasion Sujah applied for aid and countenance to the Anglo-Indian government, which Lord William Bentinck's reply, dated Simla, 20th October, 1832, distinctly and emphatically refuses him. And in an official despatch, dated Fort William, 5th March, 1833, Mr. Frazer, the envoy at Runjit's court, is informed in reply to similar demands for Sujah, made by Runjit, thus-"You did perfectly right, I am desired to state, in acquainting the bakeel that the project of the Shah (Sujah) is regarded with indifference by the British government; and you are authorized on the part of the governor-general in council to declare explicitly to that individual, for the information of the Maharajah (Runjit), that a strictly neutral part has been maintained with regard to the Shah and his proceedings; and that this government, though it did not feel justified in prohibiting the movement of the Shah, has indirectly" (directly, as it appears from Lord W. Bentinck's letter,) "refused to afford him the assistance which he has repeatedly solicited in aid of his undertaking." Pretty cool language this about the sacred and legitimate cause for which the Lord John Russell of 1839, and Lord Auckland of 1838, asserted that the English expedition was undertaken; and in M'Naghten's letter to M'Neill in 1836 (see Correspondence, p. 31), he declares the wish and intention of the Indian government to be "DECIDEDLY TO DISCOURAGE" Sujah's designs. We now leave this topic, having dwelt on it both as an illustration of the state of political morals among English statesmen, and as containing facts closely connected with the rest of the subject.

The ground now taken up in defence of the expedition of 1839 is, that there was imminent danger of Russia using the banner, name, and soldiers of Persia, and their own officers, money, and intrigues, to obtain supremacy over Cabul, and thus approach the frontiers of India. That such approach would destroy English power in India, and was to be resisted by any means; and lastly, that the best mode of resistance was to invade the threatened country, occupy it with English mercenaries, and govern it by English ministers in the name of a native prince.

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