of their power. Conduct of the Commons in Commons, the greater has been its respect for the law, and the more carefully have its acts been restrained within the proper limits of its own jurisdiction. While its authority was uncertain and ill-defined, — while it was struggling against the Crown,-jealous of the House of Lords, distrustful of the press, and irresponsible to the people, it was tempted to exceed its constitutional powers; but since its political position has been established, it has been less provoked to strain its jurisdiction; and deference to public opinion, and the experience of past errors, have taught it wisdom and moderation. The proceedings of the House in regard to Wilkes, present an instructive contrast to its recent conduct in forwarding the admission of Jews to Parliament. In Rothschild, the former case, its own privileges were strained or regard to Baron 1850. abandoned at pleasure, and the laws of the land outraged, in order to exclude and persecute an obnoxious member. How did this same powerful body act in the case of Baron de Rothschild and Mr. Salomons? Here the House,-faithful to the principles of religious liberty, which it had long upheld,—was earnest in its desire to admit these members to their place in the legislature. They had been lawfully chosen they laboured under no legal disability; and they claimed the privileges of members. A few words in the oath of abjuration, alone prevented them from taking their seats. A large majority of the House was favourable to their claims the law was doubtful; and the precedent of Mr. Pease, a Quaker, who had been allowed to omit these words, was urged by considerable authorities, as a valid ground for their admission. Yet the House, dealing with the seats of its own members,--over which it has always had exclusive jurisdiction, and with 1 See supra, p. 384, &c. every inducement to accept a broad and liberal interpretation of the law, nevertheless administered it strictly, and to the very letter.1 For several years, the House had endeavoured to solve the difficulty by legislation. Its failures, however, did not tempt it to usurp legislative power, under the semblance of judicial interpretation. But it persevered in passing bills, in various forms, until it ultimately forced upon the other House an amendment of the law. of either the exe The limits within which Parliament, or either House, Control may constitutionally exercise a control over the execu- House over tive government, have been defined by usage, upon the principles consistent with a true distribution of powers, in a free state and limited monarchy. Parliament has no direct control over any single department of the State. It may order the production of papers, for its information2: it may investigate the conduct of public officers; and may pronounce its opinion upon the manner in which every function of the government has been, or ought to be, discharged. But it cannot convey its orders or directions to the meanest executive officer, in relation to the performance of his duty. Its power over the executive is exercised indirectly,—but not the less effectively, through the responsible ministers of the Crown. These ministers regulate the duties of every department of the state; and are responsible for their proper performance, to Parliament, as well as to the Crown. If Parliament disapprove of any act, or policy of the government, ministers must conform to its opinion, or forfeit its confidence. In this manner, the House of Commons, having become the dominant body in the - 1 Hansard's Deb., July 29th and 30th, and Aug. 5th, 1850; July 18th and 21st, 1851. See also Chap. XII., on Civil and Religious Liberty. 2 Many papers, however, can only be obtained by address to the Crown. It has con exercise of prerogative. Questions of peace and war. legislature, has been able to direct the conduct of the government, and control its executive administration of public affairs, without exceeding its constitutional powers. It has a right to advise the Crown,-even as to the exercise of the prerogative itself; and should its advice be disregarded, it wields the power of impeachment, and holds the purse-strings of the state. History abounds with examples, in which the exercise trolled the of prerogative has been controlled by Parliament. Even questions of peace and war, which are peculiarly within the province of prerogative, have been resolved, again and again, by the interposition of Parliament. From the reign of Edward III., Parliament has been consulted by the Crown; and has freely offered its advice on questions of peace and war.1 The exercise of this right, -so far from being a modern invasion of the royal prerogative, is an ancient constitutional usage. It was not, however, until the power of Parliament had prevailed over prerogative, that it had the means of enforcing its advice. At a time when the influence of the Crown had attained its highest point under George III., the House of Commons was able to bring to a close the disastrous American War, against the personal will of the king himself. Having presented an address against the further prosecution of offensive war, to which they had received an evasive answer, the House proceeded to declare, that it would "consider as enemies to his Majesty and this country all who should advise, or by any means attempt the further prosecution of offensive war on the continent of America, for the purpose of reducing the revolted colonies to obedience by force." 2 1 E. g. Edw. III., Parl. Hist., i. vi. 609. Nor did the House rest until it had driven Lord North, the king's war minister, from power. During the long war with France, the government was pressed with repeated motions, in both Houses, for opening negotiations for peace.1 Ministers were strong enough to resist them; but,—at a period remarkable for assertions of prerogative,-objections to such motions, on constitutional grounds, were rarely heard. Indeed the Crown, by communicating to Parliament the breaking out of hostilities 2 or the commencement of negotiations for peace3, has invited its advice and assistance. That advice may be unfavourable to the policy of ministers; and the indispensable assistance of Parliament may be withheld. If the Crown be dis- War with satisfied with the judgment of Parliament, an appeal China, may still be made to the final decision of the people. In 1857, the House of Commons condemned the policy of the war with China; but ministers, instead of submitting to its censure, appealed to the country, and obtained its approval. concerning dissolution. Upon the same principles, Parliament has assumed the Advice of right of advising the Crown, in regard to the exercise of Parliament the prerogative of dissolution. In 1675, an address was moved in the House of Lords, praying Charles II. to dissolve the Parliament; and on the rejection of the motion, several Lords entered their protest.4 Lord Chatham's repeated attempts to induce the House of Lords to address the Crown to dissolve the Parliament which had declared the incapacity of Wilkes, have 1 Lord Stanhope, the Marquess of Lansdowne, &c.; Dec. 15th, 1792; June 17th, 1793, &c.; Mr. Grey, Feb. 21st, 1794, &c.; Mr. Whitbread, March 6th, 1794; Mr. Wilberforce, May 27th, 1795; Mr, Sheridan, Dec. 8th, 1795. 2 Feb. 11th, 1793; May 22nd, 1815; March 27th, 1854, &c. 3 Dec. 8th, 1795; Oct. 29th, 1801; Jan. 31st, 1856. 4 Lords' Journ. xiii. 33; Lord Rockingham's Mem., ii. 139. Popular addresses preroga tive. been lately noticed.1 The address of the Commons, after the dismissal of the Coalition Ministry, praying the King not to dissolve Parliament, has been described elsewhere.2 Lord Wharncliffe's vain effort to arrest the dissolution of Parliament in 1831, has also been adverted to.3 But though the right of Parliament to address the Crown, on such occasions is unquestionable,-its exercise has been restrained by considerations of policy, and party tactics. The leaders of parties,-profiting by the experience of Mr. Fox and Lord North,-have since been too wise to risk the forfeiture of public esteem, by factiously opposing the right of ministers to appeal from the House of Commons to the people. Unless that right has been already exercised, the alternatives of resigning office or dissolving Parliament have been left,— by general consent,-to the judgment of ministers who cannot command the confidence of the House of Commons. In the exercise of their discretion, ministers have been met with remonstrances; but sullen acquiescence on the part of their opponents, has given place to violent addresses, and measures for stopping the supplies. As Parliament may tender its advice to the Crown, concerning regarding its own dissolution, so the people, in their turn, have claimed the right of praying the Crown to exercise its prerogative, in order to give them the means of condemning the conduct of Parliament. In 1701, during a fierce contest between the Whig and Tory parties, numerous petitions and addresses were presented to William III. at the instance of the Whigs, praying for the dissolution of the Parliament, which was soon afterwards dissolved. 1 Supra, p. 403, 404. 2 Supra, p. 62. 3 Supra, p. 118. The constitutional character 4 Burnet's Own Time, iv. 543. Rockingham Mem., ii. 105. |