CHAPTER XX

THE RECENT YEARS

The first years of the parliament which was elected in January, 1906, seemed to promise the opening of a new epoch in English constitutional history, or at least a time of reversion to an earlier type. Two of the tendencies noticeable during the previous half century appeared to be declining: the cabinet seemed to be returning to a dependence upon the house of commons, and the house of lords seemed about to resume its older place in legislation. It is now possible to say that the apparent change was not a real one, but the deviation from the straight line of development is worthy of note.

It is true that in some respects, down to the outbreak of the war, the cabinet was obliged to defer to the opinion of the house, as many in 1905 thought it would never do again. This at least is the way in which the fact would have been described by a mid-Victorian writer, who would have seen it particularly after the second election of 1910. A study of details, however, shows that the dependence was more apparent than real. In the first place, what it affected was not the general policy of the ministry, nor the chief features of the legislation which the cabinet proposed. In these respects the cabinet was as supreme as it had been during the past dozen years, and the house had as little power of alteration. It was comparatively minor details which were affected. In the second place, such dependence as the cabinet showed was not upon the house of commons as a whole, as an organized body, but it was dependence upon the party subdivisions, the more or less independent groups, among its own supporters.

LIBERAL PARTY DIVISIONS

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In continental states having parliamentary government, the tendency of liberal parties, of parties of the general left, to split up into groups has long been manifest. Subdivision seems to be a natural characteristic of parties whose chief programme is change and reform. Some groups wish to go faster than others do; some groups emphasize strongly a particular change in which others are not as interested. In all these parties it is difficult to maintain a common programme and united voting strength except by concession and compromise, and compromise is usually not upon the main items of the party programme, upon which all divisions are apt to agree, but upon subordinate details. The more divided the party is, the greater is the necessity of compromise, and the greater the opportunity to obtain its demands which is offered to the subordinate group, more devoted, as is often true, to its own peculiar reform than to the programme of the party as a whole.

Down to the end of the nineteenth century, while a tendency in the liberal party to divide into groups was not wanting in England, it had no effect upon actual legislation. During most of the last quarter of the century the party was out of office, and had no opportunity to write its policy in the statute book. The one question which brings out most clearly the evidence and influence of subordinate groups, the Irish home rule question, the party failed to settle while in power. In the house of commons elected in January, 1906, the liberal party had so overwhelming a majority, well over 300, and more than 150 even if the Irish nationalists voted against them, and subdivision into groups was still so incomplete, that it was not necessary to carry the policy of compromise very far. Still the ministry did not always feel secure of its position, and the party showed an independence and a spirit of criticism not unlike a return to earlier times. After the elections of January and December, 1910, the strength of the independent element was greatly increased. In both those elections the liberal party proper

lost heavily, as compared with 1906, and the unionists, the term now coming into use as the common name for the united conservatives and liberal unionists, gained, so that these two parties stood in the house in almost equal numbers, the unionists at times even having two or three votes more than the liberals. The liberal cabinet remained in office, but it was entirely dependent upon the subordinate groups, now stronger and better organized than before, not merely to maintain itself in office, but to carry its measures into law.

This is the period, then, from February, 1910, to the summer of 1914, which is to be studied in recent English history for present tendencies, especially for the effect of party subdivision upon cabinet government. Apparently it is not possible to say that there was a return to the position in which the cabinet stood in relation to the house in 1870. Its real power of dictation to the house was not modified. There was more effective criticism of government measures in matters of detail than there had been during the ten years of the conservative government which followed 1895; but the really effective criticism was not that of the house, nor of the opposition, in the sense of the writers of fifty years ago, but of the government's own party, or of the groups in general alliance with it. At the same time it was made clear that the ultimate controlling power was the opinion in the constituencies, now well supplied with means of expressing itself. If we may judge by the opinions voiced in the reviews and leading political weeklies between 1906 and 1914, English students of their own political life saw no slackening of the tendencies noticed in the last chapter as modifying cabinet government. On the contrary, a recognition of these tendencies and of the probable constitutional results was more general than it had been at any time in the nineteenth century.

The resumption of its legislative position by the house of lords, after the election of 1906, was more real. After ten years' possession of power, the unionist conservative

THE LORDS RESUME POWER

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party had been overwhelmingly defeated. The house of lords, however, seemed to take the ground that the great popular victory did not give the liberal party authority to carry into immediate effect their whole programme. The upper house resumed in full force its right of suspensive veto, and demanded in effect that the will of the nation should be conclusively shown on the more important contentious measures of reform which were proposed. While it cannot be asserted that the house of lords went beyond the function of a brake upon the wheel assigned to it in the preceding half century, it can be said that it seemed to be trying to find out what limit there was upon its action in that direction. The matter must not be numerically exaggerated. Out of 213 government bills between 1906 and 1910, eighteen failed to pass. The lords rejected only a part of these, but they amended others in such essential respects that they were dropped. Five acts which the majority in the house of commons regarded as of prime importance were among these: an education bill, a plural voting bill, a Scotch landholding bill, a licensing bill, and the government budget of the year 1909. So that in substance the action of the lords was more of an interference with liberal plans of legislation than it appears to be when measured numerically.

It was the rejection of the government's finance bill in 1909 that led to a constitutional settlement of the question raised by the house of lords. The budget involved a reassessment of land values, a taxation of the unearned increment, and in general a heavier taxation of wealth. It excited intense opposition among the classes naturally belonging to the conservative party. The right of the house of lords to amend a money bill had been lost, but the right to reject was recognized. It was generally felt, however, that to reject the bill, leaving the national finances of the year in confusion, was an extreme act and almost a direct challenge to the house of commons to define its own power and the power of the lords as well. It was also pointed out by some that

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in this rejection the lords were really claiming new powers, If the government, in consequence of their action, reintroduced the budget without the clauses to which they objected, the upper house would have established a right of indirectly amending a money bill; and, if the government chose to ap peal to a new general election, it would have gained the right of forcing a dissolution of parliament. The assertion of the lords that some of the clauses of the bill were legislative and so cases of " tacking," which gave them a right to reject, was not convincing to many. Almost from the beginning of this parliament the proposal had been heard in the commons, and more frequently outside, that a definite limit ought to be placed upon the veto right of the upper chamber, and in June, 1907, the necessity was affirmed by a large majority of the house of commons in a formal resolution proposed by the prime minister, but no further action was taken at the time.

The lords rejected the bill on November 30, 1909. Two days later the house of commons declared the action to be a breach of the constitution and a usurpation of privilege. Parliament was speedily dissolved, and a general election held in January, 1910. The election reduced the number of liberals proper in the house to 274, and increased the unionist vote to 272, leaving the balance of power in the hands of the 41 labor members and the 82 Irish nationalists. These groups were, however, equally determined with the liberals that the veto power of the lords should be limited, and even more insistent that this question should be dealt with in advance of the financial difficulty. To meet this demand, resolutions embodying the points of their proposed bill were introduced by the government and adopted on April 14. With these resolutions and a statement by Mr. Asquith of what the ministry would do if the lords refused to accept the plan proposed, the groups supporting the government were satisfied, and the finance bill, the same as that of 1909, was voted, and was now immediately agreed to by the lords. The