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SER M.highest interest is immediately concerned,) his character is moral, or in that refpect he is a, moral agent. Perhaps the clearest notion we can form of God's moral attributes is by refolving them into Benevolence, which in conjunction with infinite wisdom, will fully account for them all, As no principle of action can appear to our minds more amiable, more worthy of an abfolutely perfect Being, there is none more juftly attributed to the Deity, if we judge by the appearances of defign and final caufes in the conftitution of things, and the government of the world. Now if it be allowed that the Creator of the universe intended the most abfolute good in the whole of his works, and particularly in the creation. and government of rational beings, it will evidently follow that his administration must be moral, or it must be fo conducted as in the whole to encourage virtue, which tends to promote the most universal happiness, and discountenances vice, which is naturally productive of mifery. In other words, the fupreme Being is righteous in all his ways, and boly in all his works. But in whatsoever manner we endeavour to investigate a subject which is too high for our comprehenfion, and to range our thoughts concerning the order, connection, and dependence of the divinę

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inoral perfections, it is plain, that to the pur-SERM. poses of a practical application, they are to be confidered as difpofitions or principles, (I do not fay the fame as in us, but fomething analogous to them and which we conceive in that manner,) determining him to act according to moral differences, and with a regard to them. As inferior agents are called just, and good, and true, because their temper and their conduct are agreeable to the rules of righteousness, goodness, and veracity; the fame characters are ascribed to the fupreme Being, and on the fame account, tho' in a more exalted sense, and without any degree of imperfection. Our difpofition even of the virtuous kind have their weaknesses. They rise and fall according to the measure of our knowledge, and the diverfity of lights in which the objects appear. They are fometimes cooled by the influence of other affections and paffions in our nature; and fometimes attended with perturbation; from which and all other infirmities the abfolutely perfect divine nature is wholly free. But a conftant, uniform, and invariable rectitude, or a regard to right and moral goodness, and oppofition to evil or moral turpitude, is what we attribute to God, and have as clear and distinct ideas of it as of any perfections which belong to him.

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SERM. I have faid that God's moral attributes arë I. difpofitions or principles analogous to what we call difpofitions in our felves, determining him to act according to moral differences, that is, to act freely, but conftantly and invariably in the way which he approves, in oppo

fition to that which he does not approve. There must therefore be fomething in the divine mind which conftitutes this difference, Philofophers are not agreed in their opinions concerning the foundation upon which the distinction made by the mind of man between moral good and evil with approbation and disapprobation, is to be explained. Whether by reducing them to truth and falfhood; or by a moral fitness and unfitness arising from the invariable relations of things which neceffa rily appears to the understanding; or by an implanted moral sense which distinguishes its proper objects, as the external fenfes diftinguish theirs. How then shall we pretend to affign the cause of this difference in the fupreme mind which is fo little known to us? But how little foever we know of God, there are fome things which we are fure belong to him in common with other beings, tho' in a more perfect manner than as they are poffefs'd by them. We attribute existence to him as we do to the creatures, tho' his exift

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ence has the peculiar characters of eternal and SER M. necessary, of which we have but inadevery quate Ideas. We are conscious of intelligence in our felves, and the knowledge of fome truths; and we cannot help afcribing the fame to the Deity, notwithstanding the infinite difparity which there is between his knowledge and ours. And in like manner as moral powers and enjoyments are the greatest glory and happiness of our nature, we cannot avoid attributing them to him, tho' he poffeffes them in a manner which transcends our comprehenfion. If however, we conceive benevolence in the Deity to be the great, indeed the fole spring, of his Actions which terminate on other beings, this gives a plain reason why he has an invariable regard to moral rectitude in all his and works; name¬ ly, because his perfect understanding fees the neceffary connection it always has with the greatest Good in the whole, which is his ul timate end.

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Suppofing our neceffary difcernment of moral good with approbation, and moral evil with disapprobation, to be founded in a Sense,

This being the effect of a voluntarily divine Conftitution, may be alledged to furnish an objection against our inferring from fuch a fenfe in us, that the fame is in God himself;

SERM. as in a feemingly parallel cafe it must be I. acknowledged he has not fuch fenfible perceptions, nor pleasure and pain from them, as we have by the external fenfes, which are, equally with the moral fense, to be attributed to his appointment. But between these two cafes, however in fome refpects resembling each other, there is a great and manifeft difparity. The external senses have plain marks of infirmity upon them, whereby they evidently appear to be below the transcendent excellence and perfection of the fupreme Being: They ferve only the purposes of a weak condition: They convey the notices of things, (and by the frame of our bodily organs they must be very imperfect notices,) to a Spirit which is nearly allied to, and depends in the exercise of its power upon, a frail body, The ideas receiv'd by them are very inadequate; not true and full representations of the nature of things, but some of their qualities and effects, principally relative to the purposes of our animal constitution. And therefore they cannot, without grofs abfurdity, be attributed to the supreme most perfect mind, whose knowledge is independent on all occafions and events; who fees not causes by their effects, but effects in their causes; not the external appearances only, but by immediate