it determines it voluntarily; it chooses, on fome confideration, to fufpend it. And this choice or determination, is an act of the Will: And indeed it is supposed to be fo in the very hypothefis; for it is fuppofed that the Liberty of the Will confifts in its Power to do this, and that its doing it is the very thing wherein the Will exercifes its Liberty. But how can the Will exercise Liberty in it, if it be not an act of the Will? The Liberty of the Will is not exercised in any thing but what the Will does.

2. This determining to fufpend acting is not only an act of the Will, but it is fuppofed to be the only free act of the Will; becaufe it is faid, that this is the thing wherein the Liberty of the Will confifts. -Now if this be fo, then this is all the act of will that we have to confider in this controversy, about the Liberty of Will, and in our enquiries, wherein the Liberty of man confifts. And now the forementioned difficulties remain the former queftion returns upon us, viz. Wherein confifts the freedom of the Will in thofe acts wherein it is free? And if this act of determining a fufpenfion be the only act in which the Will is free, then wherein confifts the Will's freedom with respect to this act of fufpenfion? And how is Indifference effential to this act? The answer must be, according to what is supposed in the evasion under confideration, that the Liberty of the Will in this act of fufpenfion, confifts in a Power to fufpend even this act, until there has been opportunity for thorough deliberation. But this will be to plunge directly into the groffeft nonfense for it is the act of fufpenfion itself that we are speaking of; and there is no room for a space of deliberation and fufpenfion in order to determine whether we will fufpend or no. For that fuppofes, that even fufpenfion itfelf may be deferred; which is abfurd; for the very deferring

the determination of fufpenfion to confider whether we will fufpend or no, will be actually suspending. For during the space of fufpenfion, to confider, whether to fufpend, the act is ipfo facto sufpended. There is no medium between fufpending to act, and immediately acting; and therefore no poffibility of avoiding either the one or the other

one moment.

And befides, this is attended with ridiculous ab-, furdity another way for now it is come to that, that Liberty confifts wholly in the mind's having Power to fufpend its determination whether to fufpend or no; that there may be time for confideration, whether it be beft to fufpend. And if Liberty confifts in this only, then this is the Liberty under confideration: we have to enquire now, how Liberty with respect to this act of fufpending a determination of fuspension, confifts in Indifference, or how Indifference is effential to it. The answer, according to the hypothefis we are upon, muft be, that it confifts in a Power of fufpending even this laft mentioned act, to have time to confider whether to fufpend that. And then the fame difficulties and enquires return over again with respect to that; and fo on for ever. Which, if it would fhew any thing, would fhew only that there is no fuch thing as a free act. It drives the exercise of freedom back in infinitum; and that is to drive it out of the world.

And befides all this, there is a delufion, and a latent grofs contradiction in the affair another way; in as much as in explaining how, or in what refpect the Will is free with regard to a particular act of Volition, it is faid that its Liberty confifts in a Power to determine to fufpend that act, which places Liberty not in that act of Volition which the enquiry is about, but altogether in another antecedent

act. Which contradicts the thing supposed in both the question and answer. The question is, wherein confifts the mind's Liberty in any particular act of Volition? And the answer, in pretending to fhew wherein lies the mind's Liberty in that act, in effect fays, it does not lie in that act at all, but in another, viz. a Volition to fufpend that act. And therefore the answer is both contradictory, and altogether impertinent and befide the purpose. For it does not fhew wherein the Liberty of the Will confifts in the act in question; instead of that, it supposes it does not confift in that act at all, but in another diftin&t from it, even a Volition to suspend that act, and take time to confider of it. And no account is pretended to be given wherein the mind is free with respect to that act, wherein this answer fuppofes the Liberty of the mind indeed confists, viz. the act of fufpenfion, or of determining the fufpenfion.

On the whole, it is exceeding manifeft, that the Liberty of the mind does not confift in Indifference, and that Indifference is not effential or neceffary to it, or at all belonging to it, as the Arminians fuppofe; that opinion being full of nothing but absurdity and felf-contradiction.

SECTION VIII.

Concerning the fuppofed Liberty of the Will, as oppofite to all Neceffity.

Ir

r is a thing chiefly infifted on by Arminians, in this controverfy, as a thing moft important and effential in human Liberty, that volitions, or the acts of the Will, are contingent events; understanding contingence as oppofite, not only to constraint, but

to all Neceffity. Therefore I would particularly confider this matter. And

1. I would enquire, whether there is, or can be any fuch thing, as a volition which is contingent in fuch a fenfe, as not only to come to pafs without any Neceffity of constraint or co-action, but alfo without a Neceffity of confequence, or an infallible connexion with any thing foregoing.

2. Whether, if it were fo, this would at all help the cause of Liberty.

I. I would confider whether volition is a thing that ever does, or can come to pass, in this manner, contingently.

And here it must be remembered, that it has been already fhewn, that nothing can never come to pafs without a cause, or reason why it exifts in this manner rather than another; and the evidence of this has been particularly applied to the acts of the Will. Now if this be fo, it will demonftrably follow, that the acts of the Will are never contingent, or without neceffity in the fense spoken of; in as much as those things which have a cause, or reafon of their existence, must be connected with their cause. This appears by the following confiderations.

1. For an event to have a cause and ground of its existence, and yet not be connected with its caufe, is an inconfiftence. For if the event be not connected with the caufe, it is not dependent on the caufe; its exiftence is as it were loose from its influence, and may attend it or may not; it being a mere contingence, whether it follows or attends the influence of the cause, or not: And that is the same thing as not to be dependent on it. And to fay the event is not dependent on its caufe is abfurd: It is the fame thing as to fay, it is not its caufe, nor the event the effect of it: For dependence on the influence of a caufe is the very notion of an effect.

If there be no fuch relation between one thing and another, confifting in the connexion and dependence of one thing on the influence of another, then it is certain there is no fuch relation between them as is fignified by the terms caufe and effect. So far as an event is dependent on a cause and connected with it, so much caufality is there in the cafe, and no more. The caufe does, or brings to pass no more in any event, than is dependent on it. If we fay, the connexion and dependence is not total, but partial, and that the effect, though it has fome connexion and dependence, yet is not entirely dependent on it; that is the fame thing as to fay, that not all that is in the event is an effect of that caufe, but that only a part of it arifes from thence, and part fome other way.

2. If there are fome events which are not neceffarily connected with their causes, then it will follow, that there are fome things which come to pafs without any cause, contrary to the fuppofition. For if there be any event which was not neceffarily connected with the influence of the caufe under fuch circumstances, then it was contingent whether it would attend or follow the influence of the caufe, or no; it might have followed, and it might not, when the cause was the fame, its influence the fame, and under the fame circumftances. And if fo, why did it follow, rather than not follow? There is no cause or reafon of this. Therefore here is fomething without any cause or reason why it is, viz. the following of the effect on the influence of the cause, with which it was not neceffarily connected. If there be a neceffary connexion of the effect on any thing antecedent, then we may fuppofe that fometimes the event will follow the caufe, and fometimes not, when the cause is the fame, and in every refpect in

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