fider whether any fuch thing be poffible or conceivable, as that Freedom of Will which Arminians infift on; and shall enquire, whether any fuch fort of Liberty be necessary to moral agency, &c. in the next Part.

And first of all, I fhall confider the notion of a felf-determining Power in the will: wherein, according to the Arminians, does moft effentially confift the Will's Freedom; and fhall particularly enquire, whether it be not plainly abfurd, and a manifeft inconfiftence, to fuppofe that the will itfelf determines all the free acts of the Will.

Here I fhall not infift on the great impropriety of fuch phrases and ways of speaking as the Will's determining itself; because actions are to be afcribed to agents, and not properly to the powers of agents; which improper way of speaking leads to many miftakes, and much confufion, as Mr. Locke observes. But I fhall fuppofe that the Arminians, when they speak of the Will's determining itself, do by the Will mean the foul willing. I fhall take it for granted, that when they speak of the Will, as the determiner, they mean the foul in the exercife of a power of willing, or acting voluntarily. I fhall fuppofe this to be their meaning, because nothing else can be meant, without the groffeft and plaineft abfurdity. In all cafes when we fpeak of the powers or principles of acting, as doing fuch things, we mean that the agents which have these Powers of acting, do them in the exercise of those Powers. So when we fay, valour fights courageoufly, we mean, the man who is under the influence of valour fights courageously. When we fay, love feeks the object loved, we mean, the perfon loving feeks that object. When we fay, the understanding difcerns, we mean the foul in the exercife of that faculty. So when it is faid, the will decides or determines, the meaning muft be, that the person in

the exercise of a Power of willing and choofing, or the foul acting voluntarily, determines.

Therefore, if the Will determines all its own free acts, the foul determines all the free acts of the Will in the exercife of a Power of willing and choofing ; or, which is the fame thing, it determines them of choice; it determines its own acts by choosing its own acts. If the Will determines the Will, then choice orders and determines the choice and acts of choice are subject to the decifion, and follow the conduct of other acts of choice. And therefore if the Will determines all its own free acts, then every free act of choice is determined by a preceding act of choice, choosing that act. And if that preceding act of the Will or choice be also a free act, then by thefe principles, in this act too, the Will is felf-determined that is, this, in like manner, is an act that the foul voluntarily chooses; or, which is the fame thing, it is an act determined still by a preceding act of the Will, choofing that. And the like may again be observed of the laft mentioned act; which brings us directly to a contradiction: for it fuppofes an act of the Will preceding the first act in the whole train, directing and determining the reft; or a free act of the Will, before the firft free act of the Will. elfe we must come at laft to an act of the Will, determining the consequent acts, wherein the Will is not self-determined, and fo is not a free act, in this notion of freedom: but if the firft act in the train, determining and fixing the reft, be not free, none of them all can be free; as is manifest at first view, but fhall be demonftrated presently.

Or

If the Will, which we find governs the members of the body and determines and commands their motions and actions, does alfo govern itself, and determine its own motions and actions, it doubtless determines them the fame way, even by antecedent

volitions. The Will determines which way the hands and feet shall move, by an act of volition or choice and there is no other way of the Will's determining, directing or commanding any thing at all. Whatsoever the Will commands, it commands by an act of the Will. And if it has itself under its command, and determines itself in its own actions, it doubtlefs does it the fame way that it determines other things which are under its command. So that if the freedom of the Will confists in this, that it has itfelf and its own actions under its command and direction, and its own volitions are determined by itself, it will follow, that every free volition arises from another antecedent volition, directing and commanding that and if that directing volition be also free, in that alfo the Will is determined: that is to fay, that directing volition is determined by another going before that; and fo on, until we come to the firft volition in the whole feries: and if that first volition be free, and the Will felf-determined in it, then that is determined by another volition préceding that which is a contradiction; because by the fuppofition, it can have none before it to direct or determine it, being the firft in the train. But if that firft volition is not determined by any preceding act of the Will, then that act is not determined by the Will, and fo is not free in the Arminian notion of freedom, which confifts in the Will's felf-determination. And if that first act of the Will, which determines and fixes the fubfequent acts, be not free,. none of the following acts, which are determined by it, can be free. If we fuppofe there are five acts in the train, the fifth and laft determined by the fourth, and the fourth by the third, the third by the second, and the second by the firft; if the firft is not determined by the Will, and fo not free, then none of them are truly determined by the Will: that is, that

each of them are as they are, and not otherwife, is not first owing to the Will, but to the determination of the first in the feries, which is not dependent on the Will, and is that which the Will has no hand in the determination of. And this being that which decides what the reft shall be, and determines their existence; therefore the first determination of their existence is not from the Will. The cafe is juft the fame, if instead of a chain of five acts of the Will, we should fuppofe a fucceffion of ten, or an hundred, or ten thousand. If the firft a&t be not free, being determined by fomething out of the Will, and this determines the next to be agreeable to itself, and that the next, and so on; they are none of them free, but all originally depend on, and are determined by fome cause out of the Will: and so all freedom in the cafe is excluded, and no act of the Will can be free, according to this notion of freedom. If we fhould suppose a long chain of ten thousand links, fo connected, that if the firft link moves, it will move the next, and that the next; and fo the whole chain must be determined to motion, and in the direction of its motion, by the motion of the first link; and that is moved by fomething else: in this cafe, though all the links, but one, are moved by other parts of the fame chain; yet it appears that the motion of no one, nor the direction of its motion, is from any felf-moving or felf-determining Power in the chain, any more than if every link were immediately moved by fomething that did not belong to the chain. If the Will be not free in the first act, which caufes the next, then neither is it free in the next, which is caused by that first act: for though indeed the Will caufed it, yet it did not cause it freely; because the preceding a, by which it was caufed, was not free. And again, if the will be not free in the fecond act, fo neither can it be in the third, which is caused by

that; because in like manner, that third was determined by an act of the Will that was not free. And fo we may go on to the next act, and from that to the next; and how long foever the fucceffion of acts is, it is all one; if the firft on which the whole chain depends, and which determines all the reft, be not a free act, the will is not free in caufing or determining any one of those acts; because the act by which it determines them all, is not a free act; and therefore the Will is no more free in determining them than if it did not cause them at all. Thus, this Arminian notion of Liberty of the Will, confifting in the Will's Self-determination, is repugnant to itself, and shuts itself wholly out of the world.

SECTION II.

Several fuppofed Ways of Evading the foregoing Reafoning confidered.

Ir to evade the force of what has been observed, it fhould be faid, that when the Arminians speak of the Will's determining its own acts, they do not mean that the Will determines its acts by any preceding act, or that one act of the Will determines another; but only that the faculty or power of Will, or the foul in the ufe of that power, determines its own volitions; and that it does it without any act going before the act determined; fuch an evafion would be full of the most grofs absurdity.—I confess, it is an evafion of my own inventing; and I do not know but I fhould wrong the Arminians, in fuppofing that any of them would make use of it. But it being as good a one as I can invent, I would obferve upon it a few things.