may be otherwife, but that invincible neceffity ftands in the way. And many think thus concerning themfelves fome, that are wicked men, think they wish, that they were good, that they loved God and holinefs; but yet do not find that their wishes produce the effect. The reafons why men think, are as follow: (1.) They find what may be called an indirect willingness to have a better Will, in the manner be fore obferved. For it is impoffible, and a contradic tion to fuppofe the Will to be directly and properly against itself. And they do not confider, that this indirect willingnels is entirely a different thing from properly willing the thing that is the duty and virtue required; and that there is no virtue in that fort of willingness which they have. They do not confider, that the volitions, which a wicked man may have that he loved God, are no acts of the Will at all against the moral evil of not loving God; but only some disagreeable confequences. But the making the requifite diftinction requires more care of reflec tion and thought, than most men are used to. men, through a prejudice in their own favour, are disposed to think well of their own defires and difpofitions, and to account them good and virtuous, though their respect to virtue be only indirect and remote, and it is nothing at all that is virtuous that truly excites or terminates their inclinations. (2.) Another thing, that infenfibly leads and beguiles men into a fuppofition that this moral neceffity or impoffibility is, or may be, against men's Wills and true endeavours, is the derivation and formation of the terms themselves, that are often used to exprefs. it, which is fuch as feems directly to point to, and holds this forth. Such words, for inftance, as unable, unavoidable, impoffible, irrefiftible; which carry a plain reference to a fuppofable power exerted, endeavours used, refiftance made, in oppofition to the

And

neceffity and the perfons that hear them, not confidering nor fufpecting but that they are used in their proper fenfe that fenfe being therefore understood, there does naturally, and as it were neceffarily, arise in their minds a fuppofition, that it may be fo indeed, that true defires and endeavours may take place, but that invincible neceffity ftands in the way,

and renders them vain and to no effect.

V. Another thing, which makes perfons more ready to fuppofe it to be contrary to reason, that men fhould be exposed to the punishments threatened to fin, for doing those things which are morally neceffary, or not doing thofe things morally impoffible, is, that imagination ftrengthens the argument, and adds greatly to the power and influence of the feeming reasons against it, from the greatness of that punishment. To allow that they may be juftly expofed to a small punishment, would not be fo difficult. Whereas, if there were any good reafon in the cafe, if it were truly a dictate of reason, that fuch neceffity was inconfiftent with faultiness, or just punishment, the demonftration would be equally certain with respect to a small punishment, or any punishment at all, as a very great one: but it is not equally easy to the imagination. They that argue against the juftice of damning men for those things that are thus neceffary, feem to make their argument the ftronger, by fetting forth the greatness of the punishment in ftrong expreffions :-That a man fhould be caft into eternal burnings, that he fhould be made to fry in hell to all eternity for thofe things which he had no power to avoid, and was under a fatal, unfruftrable, invincible neceffity of doing.

It is agreeable to common Senfe, and the natural Notions of Mankind, to fuppofe moral Neceffity to be confiftent with Praife and Blame, Reward and Punifhment.

WHETHER the reasons that have been given, why it appears difficult to fome perfons, to reconcile with common Sense the praising or blaming, rewarding or punishing those things which are morally neceffary, are thought fatisfactory or not; yet it most evidently appears, by the following things, that if this matter be rightly understood, fetting afide all delufion arifing from the impropriety and ambiguity of terms, this is not at all inconfiftent with the natural apprehen fions of mankind, and that sense of things which is found every where in the common people; who are furtheft from having their thoughts perverted from their natural channel, by metaphyfical and philofophical fubtilties; but, on the contrary, altogether agreeable to, and the very voice and dictate of, this natural and vulgar Sense.

I. This will appear, if we confider what the vulgar Notion of blame-worthinefs is. The idea which the common people, through all ages and nations, have of faultinefs, I fuppofe to be plainly this; a perfon's being or doing wrong, with his own will and pleafure; containing thefe two things: 1. His doing wrong, when he does as he pleafes. 2. His pleafures being wrong. Or, in other words, perhaps more intelligibly expreffing their Notion; a perfon's having his heart wrong, and doing wrong from his heart. And this is the fum total of the matter.

The common people do not afcend up in their reflections and abftractions to the metaphyfical

fources, relations and dependencies of things, in order to form their Notion of faultinefs or blame-worthiness. They do not wait till they have decided by their refinings, what firft determines the Will'; whether it be determined by fomething extrinfic, or intrinfic; whether volition determines volition, or whether the understanding determines the Will; whether there be any fuch thing as metaphyficians mean by contingence (if they have any meaning ;) whether there be a fort of a strange unaccountable fovereignty in the Will, in the exercife of which, by its own fovereign acts, it brings to pafs all its own fovereign ads. They do not take any part of their Notion of fault or blame from the refolution of any fuch queftions. If this were the cafe, there are muĺtitudes, yea, the far greater part of mankind, nine hundred and ninety-nine out of a thousand, would live and die, without having any fuch Notion, as that of fault, ever entering into their heads, or without fo much as one having any conception that any body was to be either blamed or commended for any thing. To be fure, it would be a long time before men came to have fuch Notions. Whereas it is manifeft, they are fome of the firft Notions that appear in children; who difcover, as foon as they can think, or fpeak, or act at all as rational creatures, a sense of defert. And, certainly, in forming their Notion of it, they make no ufe of metaphysics. All the ground they go upon, confils in these two things; experience, and a natural fenfation of a certain fitnefs or agreeablenefs, which there is in uniting fuch moral evil as is above defcribed, viz. a being or doing wrong with the Will, and refentment in others, and pain inflicted on the perfon in whom this moral evil is. Which natural Senfe is what we call by the name of confcience.

It is true, the common people and children, in

their Notion of any faulty act or deed, of any perfon, do suppose that it is the perfon's own act and deed. But this is all that belongs to what they understand by a thing's being a perfon's own deed or action; even that it is fomething done by him of choice. That fome exercife or motion fhould begin of itself, does not belong to their Notion of an action, or doing. If fo, it would belong to their No. tion of it, that it is fomething, which is the cause of its own beginning and that is as much as to fay, that it is before it begins to be. Nor is their Notion of an action fome motion or exercife, that begins accidentally, without any cause or reafon; for that is contrary to one of the prime dictates of common Sense, namely, that every thing that begins to be, has fome cause or reason why it is.

The common people, in their Notion of a faulty or praise-worthy deed or work done by any one, do fuppofe, that the man does it in the exercise of liberty. But then their Notion of liberty is only a perfon's having opportunity of doing as he pleases. They have no Notion of liberty confifling in the Will's first acting, and so causing its own acts; and determining, and fo caufing its own determinations; or choofing, and fo caufing its own choice. Such a

Notion of liberty is what none have, but those that have darkened their own minds with confufed metaphyfical speculation, and abftrufe and ambiguous terms. If a man is not reftrained from acting as his Will determines, or constrained to act otherwife then he has liberty, according to common Notions of liberty, without taking into the idea that grand contradiction of all, the determinations of a man's free Will being the effects of the determinations of his free Will.-Nor have men commonly any Notion of freedom confifling in indifference. For if fo, then it would be agreeable to their No