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cuftom, have become natural for them to use the word in this fenfe (if that may be called a sense or meaning, which is inconfiftent with itfelf) yet this does not prove, that it is agreeable to the natural notions men have of things, or that there can be any thing in the creation that should answer such a meaning. And though they appeal to experience, yet the truth is, that men are fo far from experiencing any fuch thing, that it is impoffible for them to have any. conception of it.

If it fhould be objected, that Action and Paffion are doubtless words of a contrary fignification; but to fuppofe that the agent, in its Action, is under the power and influence of fomething intrinfic, is to confound Action and paffion, and make them the fame thing.

I answer, that Action and paffion are doubtless, as they are sometimes used, words of oppofite fignification; but not as fignifying oppofite existences, but only oppofite relations. The words caufe and effect, are terms of oppofite fignification; but, nevertheless, if I affert, that the fame thing may, at the fame time, in different respects and relations, be both caufe and effect, this will not prove that I confound the terms. The foul may be both active and passive in the fame thing in different respects; active with relation to one thing, and paffive with relation to another. The word paffion, when fet in oppofition to Action, or rather Activeness, is merely a relative; it fignifies no effect or cause, nor any proper exiftence; but is the fame with paffiveness, or a being paffive, or a being acted upon by fome thing. Which is a mere relation of a thing to fome power or force exerted by fome cause, producing fome effect in it, or upon it. And Action, when fet properly in oppofition to paffion, or paffiveness, is no real existence; it is not the fame with AN Action, but is a mere relation: it is

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the activeness of fomething on another thing, being the oppofite relation to the other, viz. a relation of power, or force, exerted by fome caufe, towards another thing, which is the fubject of the effect of that power. Indeed, the word Action is frequently used to fignify fomething not merely relative, but more abfolute, and a real exiftence; as when we fay an Action; when the word is not used tranfitively, but abfolutely, for fome motion or exercise of body or mind, without any relation to any object or effect: and as used thus, it is not properly the oppofite of paffion; which ordinarily fignifies nothing abfolute, but merely the relation of being acted upon. And therefore, if the word Action be used in the like relative fenfe, then Action and paffion are only two contrary relations. And it is no abfurdity to suppose, that contrary relations may belong to the fame thing, at the fame time, with refpect to different things. So to fuppofe, that there are acts of the foul by which a man voluntarily moves, and acts upon objects, and produces effects, which yet themselves are effects of fomething elfe, and wherein the foul itself is the object of fomething acting upon, and influencing that, do not at all confound Action and paffion. The words may neverthelefs be properly of oppofite fignification: there may be as true and real a difference between acting and being caufed to act, though we should suppose the foul to be both in the fame volition, as there is between living and being quickened, or made to live. It is no more a contradiction to fuppofe that Action may be the effect of fome other cause, befides the agent, or being that acts, than to fuppole, that life may be the effect of fome other caufe, befides the liver, or the being that lives, in whom life is caused to be.

The thing which has led men into this inconfiftent notion of Action, when applied to volition, as

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though it were effential to this internal Action, that the agent fhould be felf-determined in it, and that the Will fhould be the caufe of it, was probably this; that according to the fenfe of mankind, and the cominon use of language, it is fo with respect to men's external actions; which are what originally, and according to the vulgar use and most proper sense of the word, called Adions. Men in these are selfdirected, felf-determined, and their Wills are the caufe of the motions of their bodies, and the external things that are done; fo that unlefs men do them voluntarily, and of choice, and the Action be determined by their antecedent volition, it is no Action or doing of theirs. Hence fome metaphyficians have been led unwarily, but exceeding abfurdly, to fuppofe the fame concerning volition itself, that that allo must be determined by the Will; which is to be deterinined by antecedent volition, as the motion of the body is; not confidering the contradiction it implies.

But it is very evident, that in the metaphyfical diftinction between Action and paffion, (though long fince become common and the general vogue) due care has not been taken to conform language to the nature of things, or to any diftin&t clear ideas.

it is in innumerable other philofophical, metaphilical terms, used in these disputes; which has occafioned inexpreffible difficulty, contention, error and confufion.

And thus probably it came to be thought, that neceffity was inconfiftent with Action, as thefe terms are applied to volition. First, these terms Action and Neceffity, are changed from their original meaning, as fignifying external voluntary Action and constraint, (in which meaning they are evidently inconfiftent) to fignify quite other things, viz. volition itfelf, and certainty of exiflence. And when the

change of fignification is made, care is not taken to make proper allowances and abatements for the difference of sense; but ftill the fame things are unwarily attributed to Alion and Neceffity, in the new meaning of the words, which plainly belonged to them in their firft fenfe; and on this ground, maxims are established without any real foundation, as though they were the most certain truths, and the most evident dictates of reason.

But however ftrenuously it is maintained, that what is neceffary cannot be properly called Action, and that a neceffary Action is a contradiction, yet it is probable there are few Arminian divines, who, if thoroughly tried, would ftand to these principles. They will allow, that God is, in the highest sense, an active Being, and the highest Fountain of Life and Action; and they would not probably deny, that those, that are called God's acts of righteousness, holiness and faithfulness, are truly and properly God's acts, and God is really a holy Agent in them; and yet, I truft, they will not deny, that God neceffarily acts juftly and faithfully, and that it is impoffible for Him to act unrighteously and unholily.

SECTION III.

The Reafons why fome think it contrary to common Senfe, to fuppofe thofe Things which are neceffary, to be worthy of either Praise or Blame.

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Ir is abundantly affirmed and urged by Arminian writers, that it is contrary to common Senfe, and the natural notions and apprenhenfions of mankind, to suppose otherwise than that neceffity (making no diftinction between natural and moral neceffity) is in

confiftent with Virtue and Vice, Praife and Blame, Reward and Punishment. And their arguments from hence have been greatly triumphed in; and have been not a little perplexing to many, who have been friendly to the truth, as clearly revealed in the holy Scriptures: it has feemed to them indeed difficult, to reconcile Calvinistic doctrines with the notions men commonly have of juftice and equity. And the true reafons of it feem to be these that follow.

I. It is indeed a very plain dictate of common Senfe, that natural neceffity is wholly inconfiftent with juft Praise or Blame. If men do things which in themselves are very good, fit to be brought to pass, and very happy effects, properly against their Wills, and cannot help it; or do them from a neceffity that is without their Wills, or with which their Wills have no concern or connexion; then it is a plain dictate of common Senfe, that it is none of their virtue, nor any moral good in them; and that they are not worthy to be rewarded or praised; or at all esteemed, honored or loved on that account. And, on the other hand, that if, from like neceffity, they do those things which in themselves are very unhappy and pernicious, and do them because they cannot help it; the neceffity is fuch, that it is all one whether they Will them, or no; and the reason why they are done, is from neceffity only, and not from their Wills; it is a very plain dictate of common Sense, that they are not at all to blame; there is no vice, fault, or moral evil at all in the effect done; nor are they, who are thus neceffitated, in any wife worthy to be punished, hated, or in the leaft difrefpected, on that account.

In like manner, if things, in themselves good and defirable, are abfolutely impoffible, with a natural impoffibility, the univerfal reason of mankind teaches,

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