thing is neceffary, is the fame thing as to fay, that it is impoffible, it should not be: But the word impoffible is manifeftly a relative term, and has refer, ence to fuppofed power exerted to bring a thing to pafs, which is infufficient for the effect; as the word unable is relative, and has relation to ability or en, deavour which is infufficient; and as the word irrefiftible is relative, and has always reference to refiftance which is made, or may be made to fome force or power tending to an effect, and is infufficient to withstand the power, or hinder the effect. The common notion of Neceffity and Impoffibility implies fomething that fruftrates endeavour or defire. Here several things are to be noted.

1. Things are faid to be neceffary in general, which are or will be notwithstanding any fuppofa, ble oppofition from us or others, or from whatever quarter. But things are faid to be neceffary to us, which are or will be notwithstanding all oppofition fuppofable in the cafe from us. The fame may be observed of the word impoffible, and other such like

terms.

2. These terms neceffary, impoffible, irrefiftible, & do especially belong to controversy about liberty and moral agency, as used in the latter of the two fenfes now mentioned, viz. as neceffary or impoffible to us, and with relation to any fuppofable oppofition or endeavour of ours.

3. As the word Neceffity, in its vulgar and common use, is relative, and has always reference to some supposable infufficient oppofition; fo when we speak of any thing as neceffary to us, it is with relation to fome fuppofable oppofition of our Wills, or fome voluntary exertion or effort of ours to the contrary For we do not properly make oppofition to an event, any otherwife than as we voluntarily oppose it. Things are faid to be what must be, or

neceffarily are, as to us, when they are, or will be, though we defire or endeavour the contrary, or try to prevent or remove their existence: but fuch oppofition of ours always either confifts in, or implies oppofition of our Wills.

It is manifeft that all fuch like words and phrafes, as vulgarly used, are used and accepted in this manner. A thing is faid to be neceffary, when we cannot help it, let us do what we will. So any thing is faid to be impoffible to us, when we would do it, or would have it brought to pass, and endeavour it; or at least may be fuppofed to defire and seek it; but all our defires and endeavours are, or would be vain. And that is said to be irrefiftible, which overcomes all our oppofition, refiftance, and endeavour to the contrary. And we are to be faid unable to do a thing, when our fuppofable defires and endeavours to do it are infufficient.

We are accuftomed, in the common ufe of language, to apply and understand these phrafes in this fense: we grow up with such a habit; which by the daily use of these terms, in such a sense, from our childhood, becomes fixed and fettled; fo that the idea of a relation to a supposed will, defire and endeavour of ours, is ftrongly connected with these terms, and naturally excited in our minds, whenever we hear the words ufed. Such ideas, and these words, are fo united and affociated, that they unavoidable go together; one fuggefts the other, and carries the other with it, and never can be feparated as long as we live. And if we ufe the words, as terms of art, in another sense, yet, unless we are exceeding circumfpect and wary, we fhall infenfibly flide into the vulgar ufe of them, and fo apply the words in a very inconfiftent manner: this habitual connexion of ideas will deceive and confound us in our reasonings and difcourfes, wherein we pre

tend to use these terms in that manner, as terms of art.

vour.

4. It follows from what has been obferved, that when these terms neceffary, impoffible, irrefiftible, unable, &c. are used in cafes wherein no oppofition, or infufficient will or endeavour, is fuppofed, or can be supposed, but the very nature of the fuppofed cafe itself excludes and denies any fuch oppofition, will or endeavour, these terms are then not used in their proper fignification, but quite befide their ufe in common speech. The reason is manifeft; namely, that in fuch cases we cannot use the words with reference to a fuppofable oppofition, will or endeaAnd therefore if any man ufes these terms in fuch cases, he either ufes them nonfenfically, or in some new sense, diverse from their original and proper meaning. As for inftance; if a man fhould affirm after this manner, That it is neceffary for a man, and what muft be, that a man fhould choose virtue rather than vice, during the time that he prefers virtue to vice; and that it is a thing impoffible and irresistible, that it should be otherwise than that he fhould have this choice, fo long as this choice continues; fuch a man would use the terms must, irrefiftible, &c. with perfect infignificance and nonfense; or in fome new sense, diverse from their common ufe; which is with reference, as has been obferved, to fuppofable oppofition, unwillingness and refiftance; whereas, here, the very fuppofition excludes and denies any fuch thing for the case suppofed is that of being willing and choofing.

It

5. appears from what has been faid, that these terms neceffary, impoffible, &c. are often ufed by philofophers and metaphyficians in a fenfe quite diverse from their common ufe and original fignification: For they apply them to many cafes in which no oppofition is fuppofed or fuppofable. Thus they use

them with respect to God's exiflence before the creation of the world, when there was no other being but He fo with regard to many of the difpofitions and acts of the Divine Being. Such as his loving himself, his loving righteousness, hating fin, &c. So they apply these terms to many cafes of the inclinations and actions of created intelligent beings, angels and men; wherein all oppofition of the Will is fhut out and denied, in the very fuppofition of

the cafe.

Metaphyfical or Philofophical Neceffity is nothing different from their certainty. I fpeak not now of the certainty of knowledge, but the certainty that is in things themfelves, which is the foundation of the certainty of the knowledge of them; or that where in lies the ground of the infallibility of the propofition which affirms them.

What is fometimes given as the difinition of philofophical Neceffity, namely, That by which a thing cannot but be, or whereby it cannot be otherwife, fails of being a proper explanation of it, on two accounts : First, the words can, or cannot, need explanation as much as the word Neceffity; and the former may as well be explained by the latter, as the latter by the former. Thus, if any one afked us what we mean, when we fay, a thing cannot but be, we might explain ourselves by faying, we mean, it must neceffarily be fo; as well as explain Neceffity, by faying, it is that by which a thing cannot but be. And Secondly, this definition is liable to the forementioned great inconvience; the words cannot, or unable, are properly relative, and have relation to power exerted, or that may be exerted, in order to the thing. fpoken of; to which, as I have now obferved, the word Necefity, as ufed by philofophers, has no reference.

Philofophical Neceflity is really nothing else than

the full and fixed connexion between the things fignified by the fubject and predicate of a propofition, which affirms fomething to be true. When there is fuch a connexion, then the thing affirmed in the propofition is necessary, in a philosophical fenfe; whether any oppofition, or contrary effort be supposed, or fuppofable in the cafe, or no. When the fubject and predicate of the propofition, which affirms the exiftence of any thing, either fubftance, quality, act or circumftance, have a full and certain connexion, then the existence or being of that thing is faid to be neceffary in a metaphyfical fense. And in this fense I use the word Neceffity, in the following discourse, when I endeavour to prove that Neceffity is not inconfiftent with liberty.

The fubject and predicate of a propofition, which affirms existence of fomething, may have a full, fixed, and certain connexion feveral ways.

(1.) They may have a full and perfect connexion in and of themfelves; because it may imply a contradiction, or grofs absurdity, to suppose them not connected. Thus many things are neceffary in their own nature. So the external exiftence of being generally confidered, is neceffary in itfelf: becaufe it would be in itself the greatest abfurdity, to deny the existence of being in general, or to fay there was abfolute and univerfal nothing; and is as it were the fum of all contradictions; as might be fhewn, if this were a proper place for it. So God's infinity, and other attributes are neceffary. So it is neceffary in its own nature, that two and two fhould be four; and it is neceffary, that all right lines drawn from the centre of a circle to the circumference fhould be equal. It is neceffary, fit and suitable, that men fhould do to others, as they would that they should do to them. So innumerable metaphyfical and mathematical truths are neceffary in