gents not to be neceffary events; or, which is the fame thing, events which it is not impoffible but that they may not come to pass; and yet to fuppofe" that God certainly foreknows them, and knows all things; is to fuppofe God's knowledge to be inconfiftent with itself. For to fay, that God certainly,' and without all conjecture, knows that a thing will infallibly be, which at the fame time he knows to be fo contingent, that it may poffibly not be, is to fuppofe his knowledge inconfiftent with itself; or that one thing, that he knows, is utterly inconfiftent with another thing, that he knows. It is the fame thing as to fay, he now knows a propofition to be of certain infallible truth, which he knows to be of contingent uncertain truth. If a future volition is fo without all Neceffity, that there is nothing hinders but that it may not be, then the propofition, which afferts its future existence, is fo uncertain, that there is nothing hinders, but that the truth of it may en tirely fail. And if God knows all things, he knows this propofition to be thus uncertain. And that is inconfiftent with his knowing that it is infallibly true; and fo inconfiftent with his infallibly knowing that it is true. If the thing be indeed contingent, God views it fo, and judges it to be contingent, if he views,things as they are. If the event be not neceffary, then it is poffible it may never be; and if it be poffible it may never be, God knows it may poffibly never be; and that is to know that the propofition, which affirms its existence, may poffibly not be true; and that is to know that the truth of it is uncertain; which furely is inconfiftent with his knowing it as a certain truth. If volitions are in themselves contingent events, without all Neceffity, then it is no argument of perefection of knowledge in any being to determine peremptorily that they will be; but on the contrary, an argument of ignorance and miftake;

because it would argue, that he supposes that propofition to be certain, which in its own nature, and all things confidered, is uncertain and contingent. To fay, in fuch a cafe, that God may have ways of knowing contingent events which we cannot conceive of, is ridiculous; as much fo, as to say, that God may know contradictions to be true, for ought we know, or that he may know a thing to be certain, and at the fame time know it not to be certain, though we cannot conceive how; because he has ways of knowing, which we cannot comprehend.

Corol. 1. From what has been obferved it is evident, that the abfolute decrees of God are no more inconfiftent with human liberty, on account of any Neceffity of the event, which follows from fuch decrees, than the abfolute Foreknowledge of God. Because the connexion between the event and certain Foreknowledge, is as infallible and indiffoluble, as between the event and an abfolute decree. That is, it is no more impoffible, that the event and decree fhould not agree together, than that the event and abfolute knowledge fhould disagree. The connexion between the event and Foreknowledge is abfolutely.perfect, by the fuppofition: because it is fuppofed, that the certainty and infallibility of the knowledge is abfolutely perfect. And it being fo, the certainty cannot be increased; and therefore the connexion between the knowledge and thing known, cannot be increased; so that if a decree be added to the Foreknowledge, it does not at all increase the connexion, or make it more infallible or indiffoluble. If it were not fo, the certainty of knowledge might be increased by the addition of a decree; which is contrary to the fuppofition, which is, that the knowledge is abfolutely perfect, or perfect to the highest poffible degree.

There is as much of an impoffibility but that the

things which are infallibly foreknown, fhould be, or (which is the fame thing) as great a neceffity of their future existence, as if the event were already written down, and was known and read by all mankind, through all preceding ages, and there was the most indiffoluble and perfect connexion poffible, between the writing, and the thing written. In fuch a case, it would be as impoffible the event should fail of existence, as if it had exifted already; and a decree cannot make an event furer or more neceffary than this.

And therefore, if there be any fuch Foreknowledge, as it has been proved there is, then Neceffity of connexion and confequence, is not at all inconfiftent with any liberty which man, or any other creature enjoys. And from hence it may be inferred, that abfolute decrees of God, which does not at all increase the Neceffity, are not at all inconfiftent with the liberty which man enjoys, on any fuch account, as that they make the event decreed neceffary, and render it utterly impoffible but that it should come to pass. Therefore, if abfolute decrees are inconfiftent with man's liberty as a moral agent, or his liberty in a state of probation, or any liberty whatsoever that he enjoys, it is not on account of any Neceffity which abfolute decrees infer.

Dr. Whitby supposes, there is a great difference between God's Foreknowledge, and his decrees, with regard to Neceffity of future events. In his Difcourse on the five Points, p. 474, &c. he says, "God's prescience has no influence at all on our "actions-fhould God, (fays he) by immediate "revelation, give me the knowledge of the event of

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any man's ftate or actions, would my knowledge "of them have any influence upon his actions? "Surely none at all. Our knowledge doth not af*fect the things we know, to make them more cer

"tain, or more future, than they would be without "it. Now, Foreknowledge in God is knowledge. "As therefore knowledge has no influence on things "that are, fo neither has Foreknowledge on things "that shall be. And confequently, the Foreknowl"edge of any action that would be otherwife free, ❝ cannot alter or diminish that freedom. Whereas "God's decree of election is powerful and active, "and comprehends the preparation and exhibition "of fuch means, as shall unfruftrably produce the "end. Hence God's prefcience renders no actions neceffary." And to this purpose, p. 473, he cites Origen, where he fays, God's prefcience is not the caufe of things future, but their being future is the caufe of God's prefcience that they will be: and Le Blanc, where he fays, This is the trueft refolution of this difficulty, that prefcience is not the caufe that things are future; but their being future is the caufe they are forefeen. In like manner, Dr. Clark, in his Demonftration of the Being and Attributes of God, p. 95-99. And the author of the Freedom of Will, in God and the Creature, fpeaking to the like purpose with Dr. Whitby, reprefents Foreknowledge as having no more influence on things known, to make them neceffary, than after-knowledge, or to that purpose.

To all which I would fay, that what is faid about knowledge, its not having influence on the thing known to make it neceffary, is nothing to the purpose, nor does it in the leaft affect the foregoing reasoning. Whether prefcience be the thing that makes the event neceffary or no, it alters not the cafe. Infallible Foreknowledge may prove the Neceffity of the event foreknown, and yet not be the thing which caufes the Neceffity. If the Foreknowledge be abfolute, this proves the event known to be neceffary, or proves that it is impoffible but that the event fhould be, by fome means or other, either by a de

cree, or fome other way, if there be any other way: because, as was said before, it is abfurd to say, that a propofition is known to be certainly and infallibly true, which yet may poffibly prove not true.

The whole of the feeming force of this evafion lies in this; that, in as much as certain Foreknowl edge does not caufe an event to be neceffary, as a decree does; therefore it does not prove it to be neceffary, as a decree does. But there is no force in this arguing; for it is built wholly on this fuppofition, that nothing can prove, or be an evidence of a thing's being neceffary, but that which has a causal influence to make it fo. But this can never be main. tained. If certain Foreknowledge of the future existing of an event, be not the thing, which firft makes it impoffible that it fhould fail of exiftence; yet it may, and certainly does, demonftrate, that it is impoffible it should fail of it, however that impoffibility comes. If Foreknowledge be not the cause, but the effect of this impoffibility, it may prove that there is such an impoffibility, as much as if it were the cause. It is as ftrong arguing from the effect to the cause, as from the caufe to the effect. It is enough, that an exiftence, which is infallibly foreknown, cannot fail, whether that impoffibility arifes from the Foreknowledge, or is prior to it. It is as evident, as it is poffible any thing fhould be, that it is impoffible a thing, which is infallibly known to be true, should prove not to be true: therefore there is a Neceffity that it should be otherwife; whe ther the knowledge be the cause of this Neceffity, or the Neceffity the cause of the knowledge.

All certain knowledge, whether it be Foreknowledge or after-knowledge, or concomitant knowledge, proves the thing known now to be neceffary, by fome means or other; or proves that it is impoffible it should now be otherwife than true. I