agreement was based on a limitation in number and size of the largest and most essentially aggressive type of warship-the battleship. It was not reached without considerable sacrifices on all sides, strong evidence of goodwill and of an honest desire on the part of the nations concerned to contribute to the peace and tranquillity of the world. Britain, for example, sacrificed her time-honoured place as the predominant naval power and gave up the principle of the 'two-power standard' in the main units of the fleet which at one time was regarded as the minimum for safety.

The United States scrapped a number of vessels, actually on the stocks and in some cases in an advanced stage of construction, when their completion would have placed her, for the time being, well ahead of this or any other country in modern capital ships. The other nations who took part in the conference definitely accepted a lower place amongst the Sea Powers; a surrender of national pride and ambitions by no means the smallest contribution to the general effort to further the causes of international peace and economic recovery.

The effect of the Washington Treaty was to establish confidence amongst the nations with regard to the naval position because it precluded to a great extent any nation inflating its navy with aggressive intent. It follows, therefore, that any new conference which imperilled this good understanding would have a detrimental effect, particularly if it raised new issues tending to disturb the present balance of sea power only to prove abortive in the end. Before any such conference is even contemplated, there should be a clear understanding between the contracting nations as to what are the essential naval requirements of their own and other countries and whether there is anything which they are prepared to give in the common cause, and if so what sacrifices they must ask in return.

It was largely due to the fact that such contributions were forthcoming at Washington that the present pact was made possible. It is a very great mistake, however, to imagine, as some people do, that it is only a matter of paring down the respective navies in an agreed proportion to effect great saving without lessening the degree of national security. As an hypothesis, however,

let us consider the following proposals for reducing the burden of armaments:

1. Abolition of battleships.

2. Limitation of warships to 10,000 tons.

3. Abolition of submarines.

4. Abolition of aircraft except for

purposes.

commercial

As regards the Capital Ship question, we have already seen that the basis of the Washington pact is the limitation of the number and size of capital ships. No battleship is to exceed 35,000 tons displacement or to carry a gun greater than 16 inch. Within these limitations the naval constructor is free to evolve the most heavily armed, fastest, and best protected ship that he can. Details of the total tonnage and number of battleships allotted to the respective nations for the next eighteen years are as follows:

As the other types of ships which go to make up a main fleet are more or less proportional in numbers to the battleship strength, the above figures (5; 5; 3; 2; 2) may be taken as fairly representative of the relative strength of the respective main fleets, exclusive of permanently detached squadrons or units. This further emphasises the fact that the battleship is at present the stabilising factor in determining the relative strength of the principal navies.

Now let us consider the position if the present type of capital ship is abolished and it is agreed to build no warships over 10,000 tons. The question will probably be asked at once-why draw the line at 10,000 tons, why not further limit the size and, therefore, the cost of warships to 5000 tons, say? The answer is that a vessel of less than 10,000 tons cannot carry the armament, the crew, and the fuel and have the sea-keeping qualities to Vol. 245.-No. 485.

D

enable her efficiently to perform the duty of protecting ocean-going shipping. Nearly all our cruisers to-day are of the fleet' type, a war product, built chiefly for the North Sea. They are ill-suited for commerce protection. The new type, the first five of which were laid down last year, are really long overdue replacements of the now extinct County' class. The latter were ships of approximately 10,000 tons, and, although badly designed in some ways, were much more suitable for high sea work than the present 'fleet type.'

The Washington Conference did not arrive at the 10,000-ton standard by haphazard, and it may be taken to represent the smallest displacement for a warship which can fulfil the duties of a commerce-protecting cruiser. It will be further observed that the present Treaty contains no clause restricting the number of these vessels which any nation may build. Britain, in any case, cannot be tied in the matter of cruisers. The Empire is dependent for its existence on unity, and unity means that the links of its sea communications must be kept inviolate. Moreover, as has already been emphasised, the mother-country depends for her daily existence on supplies brought to her shores by sea routes. It is for these reasons that British cruiser squadrons are and must remain dotted over the world with bases at the strategical centres of the Empire. They could not be withdrawn and concentrated with the main fleet without imperilling Imperial and national security.

Already these squadrons are too few and too weak. Great tracts of ocean where British shipping plies, and many ports in and out of which British trade is continually flowing, seldom see the white ensign. The cruiser force recently detached from the main fleet to do a tour round the world was like a stage army, making up by the brilliance of its entrances and its exits what is lacking in numerical strength. Such tours, admirable in themselves, are, nevertheless, clear evidence that our naval forces abroad are inadequate, and that the fleet has been reduced below the standard of this country's needs.

In spite, however, of the far wider range of duties our cruisers have to perform and the fact that the number we need is out of all proportion to those of any other Sea

Power, the abolition of the battleship would necessarily result in our naval strength being assessed by other Powers in the next largest type of warship, i.e. the cruiser. The present position, including ships launched and completing, but excluding obsolete vessels of low speed and little fighting value, is as follows:

In addition, five 10,000-ton cruisers were laid down in this country during the last financial year, but even if a similar number is laid down each successive year such new construction will only replace worn-out ships and our total numerical strength in cruisers will not be increased. Japan has laid down six new cruisers, two of 10,000 tons and four of 7100 tons; two more of 10,000 tons are projected. The United States has a programme of eight 10,000-ton cruisers; two of which are being laid down this year. France and Italy are each building two 10,000-ton cruisers, and have four and three more, respectively, projected but not yet authorised. If and when these ships materialise, the position will be, approximately :

These figures assume that obsolete ships will be scrapped when this new construction is completed, but the comparison is, at best, only a rough one as the rate of construction is bound to vary considerably in each country. Broadly, however, the relative strength of the five navies, measured in cruisers, may then be expressed by the figures 8, 4, 3, 1, 1; that is, supposing we build at least five new ships a year. Japan and the United States, it will be noticed, have changed places, as compared with the battleship ratios, and much to the latter's disadvantage. There can be very little doubt that such relative standards would not receive universal acclamation. The,

apparently, undue preponderance of the naval strength of the British Empire would doubtless be challenged by foreign representatives at any new Conference. To this we might well reply that the figures do not represent a fair comparison because a large proportion of our cruiser strength is necessarily dissipated in maintaining widely scattered foreign service squadrons while that of other nations can be concentrated in their home waters. Furthermore, the true comparison should then be in 10,000-cruisers, for, with the abolition of the battleship they will have become the real 'capital ships,' and, as a type, they are just as much the superiors of the older and smaller cruisers as the 'Dreadnoughts' were of the earlier battleships. The relative strength in this class, as at present laid down and projected, becomes :

United States
British Empire

France.
Italy
Japan

10,000-ton Cruisers. 8

7

At present, too, we are building 10,000-ton cruisers essentially for commerce protection and therefore mainly for service abroad. An entirely new situation, however, would be created if this class were to constitute the main fleet of the future. If the battleship is abolished and other countries build a main fleet of 10,000-ton cruisers, we could not possibly rely on a main fleet consisting mainly of the small fleet' type, and our construction programme would have to be augmented accordingly. As matters stand, therefore, naval strength is measured primarily in a type of warship which it has been found possible to limit both in size and numbers, while each country is free to build cruisers according to its needs without offending the susceptibilities of other countries. This arrangement has provided a considerable measure of harmony and good understanding between the Sea Powers. In seeking for a new, and less expensive, standard it will be seen that there is a grave risk of the whole situation being thrown

* Including two building for Australia and not including the three preWashington Hawkins' class.

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No new British construction programme has been announced at the time of writing.