of several of these passages one might be tempted to speak of such nominatives of proper names as autobiographical nominatives of the first person; but such a designation would be too narrow. One naturally thinks of the familiar Latin "vita" form: Natus sum Iohannes Schmidt Berolini, where the prefixing of an "ego" by the writer is distinctly a wάpepyov. But this is in modern Latin; an instance or instances from the classical language may be found cited in a paragraph (1031) of the late Professor Lane's Latin Grammar, which might well, it should seem, find its parallel in Greek Grammars. (To the examples in Lane 1031, which includes both the first and the second person, might be added Virg. Aen. 2, 677 sq.; 9, 22; Hor. Carm. 3. 1, 3-4; 3.9,7-8; Ep.9.11; 16. 36; 17. 35.) But attention is to be drawn here to several passages of a different sort in Euripides, some of which may be corrupt, some of which are commonly misinterpreted. In Alc. 167 sq. we find μηδ', ὥσπερ αὐτῶν ἡ τεκοῦσ ̓ ἀπόλλυμαι, | θανεῖν ἀώρους παῖδας, κτέ. This is the commonly - and justly received text. But S (= L and P) reads not ¿ñóλλvμai, but ảñóλλural. On this variance in reading the late Mr. Hayley has an excellent note ad loc. cit., in which, however, I should be inclined to substitute the words could be in the emendator's opinion - directly the subject' for "could be directly the subject." In Alc. 317 sq. we read without variance in the verbs: où yip oε μýτηρ ovтe vuμþeú-' σει ποτὲ ¦ οὔτ ̓ ἐν τόκοισι σοῖσι θαρσυνεῖ, τέκνον (text of S in 318). Here Lenting alone seems to have taken offence and Lenting was no mean judge of Greek. In his Epistola Critica, p. 58, he writes: "Placeret mihi, vvuдevow-lapovvŵ. Vid. Musgrav. ad vs. 165." Musgrave's parallel is, I believe, that given by Monk on v. 167, viz. Androm. 413 sq. The latter passage is closely parallel to Alc. 167, but it may well be thought that both it and that passage are sufficiently close to Alc. 317 sq. to justify Lenting's suspicion that the first person is what Euripides wrote there. We shall then have three- or at least two cases of a designation of a parent used by that parent as subject of a verb in the first person. In Med. 926 Jason is made by Prinz to say of himself ev rà Tŵvde Ońσeтaι TaτИр. Here εὖ τὰ τῶνδε and πατήρ are very plausible; hardly so θήσεται. Why may we not keep nooμai, which has support in the Mss.? (See Dr. Wecklein's critical notes.) May we not also in Med. 915 fairly suspect that Euripides may have written not oŋke but 0ŋxa, and ibid. 918 épyášoμai? And in H. F. 1368 is not ἀπώλεσ' to be understood as ἀπώλεσα not ἀπώλεσε ? - We come now to several instances of what may be called the genuine first person plural subject. A good typical instance of this is Hip. 450 οὗ (sc. ̓́Ερου = Ερωτος) πάντες ἐσμὲν οἱ κατὰ χθόν' ἔκγονοι. (Like to this is τῶν ἐπὶ γῆς ἔργων τοῦ θεοῦ τὸ κάλλιστόν ¿σμev άν0рwπоt, we human beings are the fairest of God's works on earth,' Joseph. Ant. Iud. 1, 21.) The following two examples from the Medea are commonly misunderstood and misinterpreted: Med. 406-408 πpòs dè xal #epúкaμev | γυναῖκες ἐς μὲν ἔσθλ' ἀμηχανώταται, | κακῶν δὲ πάντων τέκτονες σοφώταται, ‘and besides by nature too we women are for good deeds most awkward, but of all evil deeds most skilful artisans.' (Here M. Weil rightly: "I'vvaîkes est le sujet, et non le complément, de πεφύκαμεν.") Med. 889 sq. ἀλλ' ἐσμὲν οἷόν ἐσμεν — οὐκ Épŵ kakóν | Yuvaîkes, but we women are what manner of thing we are — - I will not say out and out a bad thing.' As a parallel for the second person may be added in conclusion Med. 569-573-particularly 569 sq. άXX' ÉS TOσOÛTOV Žкeð' ὥστ ̓ ὀρθουμένης | εὐνῆς γυναῖκες πάντ' ἔχειν νομίζετε, but you women are come

to such a pass that you think that when wedlock goes smoothly you possess everything.'

22. As to Caesar's Personal Culture: his Affinity for Menander, by Professor E. G. Sihler, of New York University.

Ι.

The truth as to the more eminent characters of ancient history should be in the care and keeping of classical scholars. Still, our own generation is hardly affected by the direct contributions of professional or professed scholars notable exception being B. I. Wheeler's recent study of Alexander. We should more earnestly strive to write for the many. Froude, e.g., in a special plea Caesar, a Sketch, 1880 and since, has influenced the opinion of our time in the Englishspeaking world, about Caesar, more, probably, than all the minute research bestowed upon the tradition of the autocrat. The English historian says: "The vision on the Rubicon with the celebrated saying that 'the die is cast' (sic) is unauthenticated (sic) and not at all consistent with (sic) Caesar's character (c. xxi.). The tradition is in Plutarch, Caes., 32, and Appian, Bell. Civ., ii. 35. Their juxtaposition will render unnecessary any comment on their material consonance and on many elements of verbal resemblance :

Plutarch, l.c.: καὶ λογισμὸς αὐτὸν εἰσῄει μᾶλλον ἐγγίζοντα τῷ δεινῷ καὶ περιφερόμενον τῷ μεγέθει τῶν τολμωμέ νων ἔσχετο τοῦ δρόμου καὶ τὴν πορείαν ἐπιστήσας πολλὰ μὲν αὐτὸς ἐν ἑαυτῷ διήνεγκε σιγῇ τὴν γνώμην ἐπ' ἀμφότερα μεταλαμβάνων, καὶ τροπὰς ἔσχεν αὐτῷ τότε τὸ βούλευμα πλείστας, πολλὰ δὲ καὶ τῶν φίλων τοῖς παροῦσιν, ὧν ἦν καὶ Πωλίων ̓Ασίνιος, συνδιηπόρησεν, ἀναλογιζόμενος ἡλίκων κακῶν ἄρξει, ὅσον τέ λόγον αὐτῆς τοῖς αὖθις (ἀνθρώποις?) ἀπολείψουσι. τέλος δὲ μετὰ θυμοῦ τινὸς ὥσπερ ἀφεὶς ἑαυτὸν ἐκ τοῦ λογισμοῦ πρὸς τὸ μέλλον, καὶ τοῦτο δὴ τὸ κοινὸν τοῖς εἰς τύχας ἐμβαίνουσιν ἀπόρους καὶ τολμὰς προοίμιον (παροίμιον?) ὑπειπὼν “' ἀνερρίφθω κύβος, ὥρμησε πρὸς τὴν διάβασιν.

The briefer item of Plut. in Pompey, 60, seems to be essentially a restatement of the Caesar passage, with a slight elaboration of psychological Motivierung: we note the important specification Ελληνιστί: καὶ τοσοῦτον μόνον ἑλληνιστί πρὸς τοὺς παρόντας. . . Pollio's Historiae (Geschichte meiner Zeit) are palpably designated by the words τῶν φίλων τοῖς παροῦσιν ὧν ἦν καὶ Πωλίων ̓Ασίνιος. The young staff officer of twenty-six to twenty-eight was no historical

figure in February, 49 (December, 50, solar year). We, too, think it likely that he did not extend his periculosum plenum opus aleae (Hor. Carm. II. 1) beyond Philippi, 42: this would give substantially (60, or 59-42 B.C.) one year per book, meaning not a little detail. Why Peter has not reprinted the Plut. passage in his Fragmenta I fail to see, particularly when I look at the bulky transcriptions; eg. from Dionysius for "fragments" of Fabius Pictor. Kornemann (Die historische Schriftstellerei des C. Asinius Pollio, Jahrbb. Suppl. Bd. XXII., 1896, p. 601) not only considers this a Pollio fragment, but censures P. for emphasizing his presence on the occasion. We fail to see that this was ungeschickt as coming from the ex-consul and triumphator who was eminent enough to refuse himself to Octavianus Caesar for the Actium campaign. In 43, during the bellum Mutinense, he was propraetor of Hispania Ulterior, and a weighty piece on the chessboard of the political game, an advancement swift even in that era, due to Caesar's confidence. The instinct of self-preservation had urged him to become a partisan; his native disposition — love of letters, etc.— would have preferred peace. See the passage in Cic. Fam. X. 31, § 3, Caesarem vero, quod me in tanta fortuna modo cognitum vetustissimorum familiarium loco habuit, dilexi summa cum pietate et fide. This fits well into his own Rubicon narrative. Consider the modo. Now let us return to the Greek apophthegm. I marvelled for some years that neither Meineke nor Kock on Menander 'Appηpópos, fr. 1, had appended the parallel fr., Plut. Caes. 32. I learned, however, that Professor Gildersleeve had marked the matter in his copy of Meineke. Long ago Casaubon, in editing Sueton. Iulius, 32 (Geneva, 1595-6) [the question being as to iacta est (or esto) alea, the Mss. all reading est], suggested that Plutarch translated Caesar's dictum by availing himself of a Menandrian reminiscence. Casaubon very properly quoted the entire line Δεδογμένον τὸ πρᾶγμ', ἀνερρίφθω κύβος. The unprejudiced reader will notice, however, that Plutarch, though possessing a most intimate acquaintance with Menander's production, failed to realize the Menandrian reminiscence.

Pollio's narrative gives to Caesar the cadence of an iambic senarius (which Appian cites awry) perhaps as much as Pollio caught of it [Plut. Caes. vñ eɩжwv]: the entire line admirable fitted the situation. Leutsch's Paroemiographi have little of dice; I have found but this, I., p. 43, ἀεὶ γὰρ εὖ πίπτουσιν οἱ Διὸς κύβοι. The form ἀνερρίφθω [not ἀνέρριπται] is also strikingly suggested in Petronius' mock-epic, v. 174, iudice Fortuna cadat alea. As in Menander the speaker wishes to have the worry of irresolution at an end, so Caesar, anything but a Hamlet by natural disposition, had reached the point where doubt and calculation had become intolerable: thus the reminiscence from his favorite Menander, probably audible (Teiπwv) only to those very close to his person, forced itself to his lips with perhaps unconscious adaptation to the psychological moment. I emphatically disagree with Kornemann (p. 621) or Drumann (III. 420) who endeavor to resolve the matter into vapor; the latter particularly is full of his own subjective dogmatism as elsewhere.

II.

The familiarity of Caesar with Menander was not at all equally shared by all educated Romans of that generation, Wilamowitz (Hermes, XI, p. 498) and Ovid (Tristia, 370) notwithstanding. In the easy and direct utterances of

Cicero's literary sympathies, i.e. in his letters, Professor R. B. Steele (Am. Journ. of Philol. XXI., p. 394 sqq.) counts fifty-six passages of Homer-citation, with occurrence also of Hesiod, Pindar, Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides, but not one dictum of Menander, sententious though he was above all others. But for a Caesar, I believe the points of contact, nay affinity, were boundless. I refer to Caesar's fondness of ȧropéyμara: the practical politician well knew that, as Menander has it, ȧvôpòs xaрактǹρ ÈK Xóyoυ yvwpíšerai (cf. Suet. Jul. 56, Cic. Fam. 9, 16, 4). Above all, Menander is completely emancipated from any prejudices of any religious or philosophical nature in dealing with human society. The vous is the arbiter of the universe, and convenience is the supreme law of ethics: Epivov äπаvта, as Aristoph. said of his bête noire, Euripides (Ran. 956— the word is overlooked in Dunbar's Concordance), is a characteristic of his conscious follower, Menander, who equalled him in acumen, but infinitely surpassed him in the sunny temper of his genial nature. I must content myself here with merely alluding to Caesar's verses on Terence and Menander (critical edition of Suetonius' vita of T. in Ritschl's Opuscula, vol. III., p. 204 sqq.), a judgment in which the “fifty per cent Menander" fell so far short of the Comica virtus of the great Attic delineator. Caesar was entirely unburdened with any moral ideals (Mommsen and Froude notwithstanding), whether in political or social morality; I name Curio, Servilia, Cleopatra, and pass on. (Froude naïvely desires to substitute Arsinoë as the regina in Cicero's letters of 44.) All is concluded and determined by this life on earth: "eam (sc. mortem) cuncta mortalium mala dissolvere; ultra neque curae neque gaudio locum esse (Sall. Cat. 51), and so in Menander's 'EmTрÉTOVTES 5 (Mein.). Providence is denied exactly in the manner of his friend and συνέφηβος Epicurus :

οἴει τοσαύτην τοὺς θεοὺς ἄγειν σχολήν

ὥστε τὸ κακὸν καὶ τἀγαθὸν καθ ̓ ἡμέραν

νέμειν ἑκάστῳ, Σμικρίνη; cf. Ηνιόχος, fr. Ι.

Aeio.dalμwv fr. 1, also Onσavpós fr. 1, and particularly Kapívn fr. 2: Assurance and Force are the supreme deities:

ὦ μεγίστη τῶν θεῶν

νῦν οἶσ ̓ ̓Αναίδει, εἰ θεὸν καλεῖν σε δεῖ,

δεῖ δε· τὸ κρατοῦν γὰρ νῦν νομίζεται θεός.

And thus Caesar himself, in his political intoxication between the Munda-campaign and the Ides of March, clearly acted as one who knew of, and believed in, no other god but himself, Tò κpaтoûv. . . . See in Dio Cass. 44, capp. 3-7, the enumeration of the gradual deification of the autocrat-logical consequence, we admit, of pagan Weltanschauung- though even Suetonius and Dio (Livy?) suggest that he brought thus the catastrophe of March 15, 44, upon his own head. I conclude this note with an admirable observation by a former president of this association, Professor Perrin, Ethics and Amenities of Greek Historiography, 1897, "Periodical attempts will always be made to strip from historical tradition the accretions due to fancy and the desire for pleasant form. But each age must do its own work here. It will not be satisfied with the work of any previous age. Even the ultimate facts of history will be constantly restated."

Remarks were made by Dr. Sanders, and by the author in reply.

23. Notes on the Greek Oeopós and Oewpía, by Dr. Clarence P. Bill, of Western Reserve University.

This paper appears in full in the TRANSACTIONS.

Adjourned at 9.30 P.M.

MORNING SESSION.

CAMBRIDGE, July 11, 1901.

The Association assembled at 9.40 A.M.

The Secretary of the Association having been called away from Cambridge, Professor Harold N. Fowler, of Western Reserve University, was appointed Acting Secretary.

The reading of papers was then begun.

24. Irregular Forms of the Elegiac Distich, by Professor Kirby F. Smith, of the Johns Hopkins University.

This paper is published in full in the American Journal of Philology, XXII. (1901), 165-194.

25. The Metrical Reading of Latin Poetry, and The Treatment of Elided Syllables in Latin Verse, by Professor H. W. Magoun, of Redfield College.

For the sake of brevity these two papers were presented together.

The mechanical scansion of Latin poetry is happily passing away. The reac tion is toward a metrical reading, although this fact is but dimly recognized. On every side the two things are confused. Scansion, indeed, is even defined as 'a metrical reading.' Is it, in fact? An English stanza may be dealt with in three ways: it may be scanned, it may be read without regard to its metrical form, and it may be treated as poetry. The first makes it ridiculous; the second reduces it to prose; the third brings out its beauty. The last alone is a natural treatment, and the reading must be metrical. Cf. Lanier, Science of English Verse, Chap. III. Is it not time that these three things were clearly and sharply differentiated?

Lanier (l.c. pp. 107-117) correctly assumes that the difference in poetry observed in the reading of different persons is merely a difference in the distribution of the elements, the number of time units in the bar remaining the same. But he implies that the bar in question is determined by scansion; for that he obtains his results, with a few exceptions, on such a basis, even a casual examination of his book must show. Is the bar so determined? The great bulk of English poetry from Chaucer down is scanned in time. Cf. Lanier, .c. pp. 182184. Not a line of it can be read in time, however, unless it is given a scornful character. This fact is so significant that it deserves a paper by itself. The time used is not even ; it is or . Any one with a fair metrical ear can verify this statement if he can read with any expression, and has the patience to test the matter with the time beats.

Just here caution is needed. Three-time beats must follow the sides of an