Times' critic know about the vacuity of my exchequer? Did he ever lend me any money? Did he not himself write for money? If he finds no disgrace in being paid, why should I? If he has ever been poor, why should he joke at my empty exchequer ? . . . Let us have truth before all. I would rather have a good word than a bad one from any person; but if a critic abuses me from a high place, and it is worth my while, I will appeal. If I can show that the judge who is delivering sentence against me, and laying down the law and making a pretence of learning, has no learning and no law, and is neither more nor less than a pompous noodle, who ought not to be heard in any respectable court, I will do so." Poor "Jupiter Jeames!" his was a sorry plight by the time the satirist had done with him. The flagellation was provoked; it was good-temperedly given, but it was terribly effective. All England laughed at the luckless wight, but he was comparatively safe in his anonymity, though the cognoscenti shrugged their shoulders and whispered the name of Samuel Phillips.

CHAPTER V.

CRITICISM IN RELATION TO THE LAW.

B

critics.

ESORT has not infrequently been had to the law by those who have considered themselves unfairly dealt with by the

There is, however, one disadvantage about legal retaliation which does not apply to literary retaliation, and that is, it is uncertain. What the subject of an adverse criticism may regard as unfair and libellous does not always appear so to a jury. From the summaries of a few interesting trials which are appended it will be seen that an appeal to the law does not invariably result in a turning of the tables on the critic. The law of criticism is now tolerably clear. Ridicule and condemnation are allowable if they are bonâ fide and confined strictly to the work criticised, without any personal animus or

a reckless exhibition of smart writing. The keynote of the existing law, as regards the use of ridicule in criticism, was sounded by Lord Ellenborough when he was Lord Chief-Justice, and the passage in which he deals with this point is worth noting. A certain Sir John Carr wrote a foolish book of travels called "A Tour in Scotland," which was held up to ridicule in a publication of the time, against the publishers of which he brought an action for the recovery of damages. In giving judgment, Lord Ellenborough said, "One writer, in exposing the absurdities and errors of another, may make use of ridicule, however poignant. Ridicule is often the fittest instrument which can be employed for such a purpose. If the reputation or pecuniary interests of the party ridiculed suffer, it is damnur absque injuria. Perhaps the plaintiff's 'Tour in Scotland' is now unsaleable; but is he to be indemnified by receiving a compensation in damages from the person who may have opened the eyes of the public to the bad taste and inanity of his composition? Who prized the works of Sir Robert Filmer after he had been refuted by Mr. Locke? But shall it be said that he might have maintained an action for defamation

against the great philosopher, who was labouring to enlighten and ameliorate mankind? We really must not cramp observations upon authors and their works. Every man who publishes a book commits himself to the judgment of the public, and any one may comment upon his performance. He may not only be refuted, but turned into ridicule, if his blunders are ridiculous. Reflection on personal character is another thing. Show me any attack upon the plaintiff's character, unconnected with his authorship, and I shall be as ready to protect him; but I cannot hear of malice from merely laughing at his works. The works may be very valuable for anything I know to the contrary, but others have a right to pass judgment upon them. The critic does a great service to society who exposes vapid as well as mischievous publications. He checks the dissemination of bad taste, and saves his fellowsubjects from wasting their time and their money upon trash. If a loss arises to the author, it is a loss without injury; it is a loss which the party ought to sustain; it is the loss of fame and profit to which he never was entitled. Nothing can be conceived more threatening to the liberty of the press than the species of action before the court.

We ought to resist an attempt against fair and free criticism at the threshold."

In the following cases other points of law will appear, and where the judge's remarks seem to be worthy of preservation, as enlightening critics and authors with regard to the legal limits of criticism, they will be briefly epitomised.

In 1867 was tried in the Court of Queen's Bench the action of Strauss v. "The Athenæum." The plaintiff had written a novel entitled "The Old Ledger," which the critic of the "Athenæum " described as being characterised by "vulgarity, profanity, and indelicacy, bad French, bad German, and bad English, and abuse of persons, living and dead." An action for libel was brought at the Kingston Assizes; but after the reading of several extracts from the book, Mr. Serjeant Ballantine, the plaintiff's own counsel, consented to the withdrawal of a juror, each party paying his own costs. The "Athenæum" of 7th April 1866 contained an article written by Mr. Hepworth Dixon, its editor, justifying the original criticism, and explaining the reason why the defendant had consented to a termination of the trial without a verdict. "We found the book," it was said, "abominable, and we said so. We cannot

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