paying tribute *. The manifeftations of their will are favours. But in Europe the edicts of princes are difagreeable even before they are feen, because they always make mention of their own wants, but not a word of

ours.

From an unpardonable indolence in the minifters of thofe countries, owing to the nature of the government, and frequently to the climate, the people derive this advantage, that they are not inceffantly plagued with new demands. The public expence does not increase, because the minifters do not form new projects; and, if fome by chance are formed, they are fuch as are soon executed. The governors of the ftate do not perpetually torment the people, because they do not perpetually torment themselves. But it is impoffible there fhould be any fixed rule in our finances, because we always know that we shall have fomething or other to do, without ever knowing what it is.

It is no longer cuftomary with us to give the appellation of a great minister to a wife dispenser of the public revenues, but to a person of dexterity and cunning, whe is clever at finding out what we call ways and means.

IT

CHAP. XVI.

Of the conquefts of the Mahometans.

T was this excefs of taxes + that occafioned the prodigious facility with which the Mahometans carried on their conqueft. Inftead of a continual feries of extortions devised by the fubtile avarice of the emperors, the people were fubjected to a fimple tribute, which was paid and collected with ease. Thus they were far happier in obeying a barbarous nation than a corrupt government, in which they fuffered every inconveniency of a loft liberty, with all the horrors of a prefent flavery.

*This is the practice of the emperors of China.

See in the history the greatness, the oddity, and even the folly of thofe taxes. Anaftafius invented a tax for breathing ut quifque pro hauftu aeris penderet.

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CHAP. XVII.

Of the augmentation of troops.

NEW diftemper has spread itself over Europe; it has infected our princes, and induces them to keep up an exorbitant number of troops. It has its redoublings, and of neceffity becomes contagious: for, as foon as one prince augments what he calls his troops, the reft of course do the fame; fo that nothing is gained thereby but the public ruin. Each monarch keeps as many armies on foot as if his people were in danger of being exterminated, and they give the name of * peace to this general effort of all againft all. Thus Europe is ruined to that degree, that were private people to be in the fame fituation as the three moft opulent powers of this part of the world, they would not have neceffary fubfiftence. We are poor with the riches and commerce of the whole univerfe; and foon, by thus augmenting our troops, we fhall have nothing but foldiers, and be reduced to the very fame fituation as the Tartars †.

Great princes, not fatisfied with hiring or buying troops of petty ftates, make it their business on all fides to pay fubfidies for alliances, that is, almoft generally, to throw away their money.

The confequence of fuch a fituation is the perpetual augmentation of taxes; and the mifchief which prevents all future remedy is, that they reckon no more upon their revenues, but go to war with their whole capital. It is no unufual thing to fee government mortgage their funds even in the time of peace, and to employ what they call extraordinary means to ruin themselves; means fo extraordinary indeed, that fuch are hardly thought on by the most extravagant young spendthrift.

* All that is wanting for this is, to improve the new invention of the militia eftablished almoft over all Europe, and carry it to the fame excess as they do the regular troops.

True it is that this ftate of effort is the chief fupport of the balance, because it checks the great powers.

CHAP. XVIII.

Of an exemption from taxes.

ΤΗ HE maxim of the great eastern empires, of exempting fuch provinces as have very much fuffered from taxes, ought to be extended to monarchical ftates. There are fome indeed where this maxim is established; yet the country is more oppreffed than if no fuch rule took place; because, as the prince levies ftill neither more nor lefs, the ftate becomes bound for the whole. In order to ease a village that pays badly, they load another that pays better; the former is not relieved, and the latter is ruined. The people grow defperate between the neceffity of paying, for fear of exactions, and the danger of paying for fear of new charges.

A well regulated government ought to set aside for the first article of its expence, a determinate fum for contin gencies. It is with the public as with individuals, who are ruined when they live up exactly to their income.

With regard to an obligation for the whole amongst the inhabitants of the fame village, fome pretend *, that it is but reasonable, because there is a poffibility of a fraudulent combination on their fide: but who ever heard, that upon mere fuppofitions we are to establish a thing in itself unjuft and ruinous to the ftate?

CHAP. XIX.

Which is moft fuitable to the prince and to the people, the letting out to farm, or the adminiftration of the revenues?

THE adminiftration of the revenues is like the con

duct of a good father of a family, who collects his own rents himself with economy and order.

See a treatise on the Roman finances, chap. 2.

By the administration of the revenues the prince is at liberty to prefs or to retard the levy of the taxes, according to his own wants, or to those of his people. By this he faves to the ftate the immenfe profits of the farmers, who impoverish it a thoufand ways. By this he fpares the people the mortifying view of fudden fortunes. By this the money collected paffes through few hands, and goes directly to the treasury, and confequently makes a quicker return to the people. By this the prince avoids an infinite number of bad laws, extorted from him continually by the importunate avarice of the farmers, who pretend to offer a present advantage for regulations pernicious to pofterity.

As the moneyed man is always the most powerful, the farmer renders himself arbitrary even over the prince himself; he is not the legislator, but he obliges the legiflator to give laws.

In republics, the revenues of the ftate are generally under administration. The contrary practice was a great defect in the Roman government*. In defpotic governments, the people are infinitely happier where this administration is established; witness Perfia and China †. The unhappiest of all are those where the prince farms out his fea-ports and trading cities. The hiftories of monarchies abounds with mischiefs done by the farmers of the revenues.

Nero, incensed at the oppreffive extortions of the publicans, formed a magnanimous, but impoffible project, of abolishing all kinds of impofts. He did not think of an administration of the revenues, but made four edicts: that the laws enacted against publicans, which had hitherto been kept fecret, fhould be made public; that they should not pretend to any thing which they had omitted to

Cæfar was obliged to remove the Publicans from the province of Afia, and to establish there another kind of administration, as we learn from Dio; and Tacitus informs us, that Macedonia and Achaia, provinces left by Augustus to the people of Rome, and confequently governed pursuant to the ancient plan, obtained to be of the number of those which the emperor governed by his officers ↑ See Sir John Chardin's travels through Persia, tom. vią

demand in the term of a year; that there fhould be a prætor established to judge their pretenfions without any formality; and that the merchants fhould pay no duty for their veffels. These were the bright days of that emperor.

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CHAP. XX.

Of the farmers of the revenues.

LL is loft when the lucrative profeffion of tax-gatherers becomes likewife, by means of the riches with

which it is attended, a post of honour. This may do well enough in defpotic flates, where their employment is oftentimes a part of the functions of the governors themfelves. But it is by no means proper in a republic; fince a custom of the like nature deftroyed the people of Rome. Nor is it better in monarchies; nothing being more oppofite to the fpirit of this government. All the other orders of the ftate are diffatisfied; honour lofes its whole value; the flow and natural means of diftinction are no longer regarded; and the very principle of the government is fubverted.

It is true, indeed, that enormous fortunes were raised in former times; but this was one of the calamities of the fifty years war. Thefe riches were then confidered as fcandalous; now we admire them.

Every profeffion has its particular lot. The lot of those who levy the taxes is wealth, and the recompenfe of wealth, is wealth itfelf. Glory and honour fall to the fhare of that nobility, who neither know, fee, nor feel any other happiness than honour and glory. Refpect and efteem are for those minifters and magiftrates, whose whole life is a continued fucceffion of labour, and who watch day and night over the happiness of the empire.

茶味