CHAP. XII.

Relation between the greatness of taxes and liberty.

IT is a general rule, that taxes may be heavier in proportion to the liberty of the fubject, and that there is a neceffity for reducing them in proportion to the increase of flavery. This has always been, and always will be, the cafe. It is a rule derived from nature, that never varies. We find it in all parts, in England, in Holland, and in every ftate where liberty gradually declines, till we come to Turkey. Switzerland seems to be an exception to this rule, because they pay no taxes; but the particular reafon for that exemption is well known, and even confirms what I have advanced. In those barren mountains provifions are fo dear, and the country is fo populous, that a Swifs pays four times more to nature, than a Turk does to the Sultan.

A conquering people, fuch as were formerly the Athenians and the Romans, may rid themselves of all taxes, as they reign over vanquished nations. Then indeed they do not pay in proportion to their liberty, because in this refpect they are no longer a people, but a monarch.

But the general rule ftill holds good. In moderate governments there is an indemnity for the weight of the taxes which is liberty. In defpotic countries* there is an edivalent for liberty, which is the lightnefs of the

taxes.

In fome monarchies in Europe, there are † particular provinces, which, from the very nature of their civil government, are in a more flourishing condition than the reft. It is pretended, that these provinces are not fufficiently taxed, becaufe through the goodness of their

* In Ruffia the taxes are but fmall; they have been increased fince the defpotic power of the prince is exercifed with more moderation. See the hiftory of the Tartars, part ii.

The Pais d'etats, where the ftates of the province assemble to deliberate on public affairs.

government they are able to be taxed higher. Hence the minifters feem conftantly to aim at depriving them. of this very government, from whence a diffufive bleffing is derived; a bleffing which spreads its influence to diftant parts, and redounds even to the prince's advantage.

CHA P. XIII.

"In what governments taxes are capable of increafe.

TAXES may be increafed in moft republics, because the citizen who thinks he is paying himself willingly fubmits to them, and moreover is generally able to bear their weight through an effect of the nature of the government.

In a monarchy taxes may be increased, because the moderation of the government is capable of procuring riches: it is a recompence, as it were, of the prince for the refpe&t he fhews to the laws. In defpotic governments they cannot be increased, because there can be no increase of the extremity of flavery.

CHA P. XIV.

That the nature of the taxes is relative to the

government.

A CAPITATION is more natural to flavery; a

duty on merchandises is more natural to liberty, because it has not fo direct a relation to the perfon.

It is natural, in a defpotic government, for the prince not to give money to his foldiers, or to thofe belonging to his court, but to diftribute lands amongst them, and of course that there fhould be very few taxes. But, if the prince gives money, the most natural tax he can raife is a capitation, which can never be confiderable: For, as it is impoffible to make different claffes of the contributors, because of the abuses that might arife from thence, confidering the injuftice and violence of the

government, they are under an abfolute neceffity of regulating themselves by the rate of what even the pooreft and moft wretched are able to pay.

The natural tax of moderate governments is the duty laid on merchandifes. As this is really paid by the confumer, though advanced by the merchant, it is a loan which the merchant has already made to the confumer. Hence the merchant must be confidered on the one fide, as the general vender for the ftate, and on the other, as the creditor of every individual. He advances to the ftate the duty which the confumer will fome time or other refund, and he has paid for the confumer the duty which he has paid for the merchandise. It is therefore obvious, that, in proportion to the moderation of the government, to the prevalence of the fpirit of liberty, and to the fecurity of private fortunes, the more a merchant has it in his power to advance money to the state, and to pay confiderable duties for individuals. In England a merchant lends really to the government fifty or fixty pounds Sterling for every tun of wine he imports. Where is the merchant that would dare do any such thing in a country like Turkey? And were he fo courageous, how could he do it with a dubious or shattered fortune?

T

CHA P. XV.

Abufe of liberty.

O thefe great advantages of liberty it is owing, that liberty itself has been abufed. Becaufe a moderate government has been productive of admirable effects, this moderation has been laid afide: becaufe great taxes have been raifed, they wanted to raise them to excefs, and, ungrateful to the hand of liberty of whom they re ceived this prefent, they acdreffed themfelves to flavery, who never grants the icait favour.

Liberty produces exceffive taxes; but the effect of exceflive taxes is to produce flavery in their turn, and flavery produces a diminution of tribute.

Moil of the edicts of the Ealtern monarchies are to Exempt every year foine province of their empire from

government they are able to be taxed higher. Hence the minifters feem conftantly to aim at depriving them of this very government, from whence a diffufive bleffing is derived; a bleffing which spreads its influence to diftant parts, and redounds even to the prince's advantage.

CHAP. XIII.

"In what governments taxes are capable of increafe.

TAXES may be increafed in moft republics, because the citizen who thinks he is paying himfelf willingly fubmits to them, and moreover is generally able to bear their weight through an effect of the nature of the government.

In a monarchy taxes may be increased, because the moderation of the government is capable of procuring riches: it is a recompence, as it were, of the prince for the refpect he fhews to the laws. In defpotic governments they cannot be increased, because there can be no increase of the extremity of flavery.

CHAP. XIV.

That the nature of the taxes is relative to the

A

government.

CAPITATION is more natural to flavery; a duty on merchandises is more natural to liberty, because it has not fo direct a relation to the perfon.

It is natural, in a defpotic government, for the prince not to give money to his foldiers, or to those belonging to his court, but to diftribute lands amongst them, and of course that there fhould be very few taxes. But, if the prince gives money, the moft natural tax he can raife is a capitation, which can never be confiderable: For, as it is impoffible to make different claffes of the contributors, because of the abuses that might arife from thence, confidering the injuftice and violence of the

government, they are under an abfolute neceffity of regulating themselves by the rate of what even the pooreft and moft wretched are able to pay.

The natural tax of moderate governments is the duty laid on merchandifes. As this is really paid by the confumer, though advanced by the merchant, it is a loan which the merchant has already made to the confumer. Hence the merchant must be confidered on the one fide, as the general vender for the ftate, and on the other, as the creditor of every individual. He advances to the ftate the duty which the confumer will fome time or other refund, and he has paid for the consumer the duty which he has paid for the merchandise. It is therefore obvious, that, in proportion to the moderation of the government, to the prevalence of the fpirit of liberty, and to the fecurity of private fortunes, the more a merchant has it in his power to advance money to the flate, and to pay confiderable duties for individuals. In England a merchant lends really to the government fifty or fixty pounds Sterling for every tun of wine he imports. Where is the merchant that would dare do any fuch thing in a country like Turkey? And were he fo courageous, how could he do it with a dubious or shattered fortune?

CHA P. XV.

Abufe of liberty.

T O thefe great advantages of liberty it is owing, that

liberty itfelf has been abufed. Becaufe a moderate government has been productive of admirable effects, this moderation has been laid afide: becaufe great taxes have been raifed, they wanted to raife them to excefs, and, ungrateful to the hand of liberty of whom they re. ceived this prefent, they addreffed themselves to flavery, who never grants the lesil favour.

Liberty produces exceffive taxes; but the effect of exceflive taxes is to produce flavery in their turn, and flavery produces a diminution of tribute.

Moll of the edicts of the Eattern monarchies are to Exempt every year fome province of their empire from