be laid either on perfons, on lands, on merchandises, on two of thefe, or on all three together.

In the taxing of perfons, it would be an unjust proportion to conform exactly to that of property. At Athens the people were divided into four claffes. Those who drew five hundred measures of liquid or dry fruit from their eftates paid a talent † to the public; those who drew three hundred measures paid half a talent; those who had two hundred measures paid ten minæ; thofe of the fourth class paid nothing at all. The tax was fair, though it was not proportionable; if it did not follow the proportion of people's property, it followed that of their wants. It was judged that every man had an equal fhare of what was neceffary for nature; that whatsoever was neceffary for nature ought not to be taxed; that to this fucceeded the useful, which ought to be taxed, but lefs than the fuperfluous; and that the largeness of the taxes on what was fuperfluous prevented fuperfluity.

In the taxing of lands it is cuftomary to make lifts or registers in which the different claffes of eftates are ranged. But it is very difficult to know these differences, and till more fo to find people that are not interested in miftaking them. Here therefore are two sorts of injustice, that of the man, and that of the thing. But if in general the tax be not exorbitant, and the people continue to have plenty of neceffaries, these particular acts of injustice will do no harm. On the contrary, if the people are permitted to enjoy only just what is necessary for fubfiftence, the leaft difproportion will be of the greateft confequence. If fome fubjects do not pay enough, the mischief is not fo great; their convenience and ease turn always to the public advantage; if fome private people pay too much, their ruin redounds to the public detriment. If the government proportions its fortune to that of indivi duals, the eafe and conveniency of the latter will foon make its fortune rife. The whole depends upon a critical moment. Shall the ftate begin with impoverishing the

* Pollus, book viii. chap. 10. article 139.

+ Qr fixty mine.

fubjects to enrich itself? or had it better wait to be enriched by its wealthy fubjects? Is it more adviseable for it to have the first or fecond advantage? Which fhall it chufe? to begin, or to end, with being rich?

The duties felt left by the people are thofe on merchandise, because they are not demanded of them in form. They may be fo prudently managed, that the people themfelves fhall hardly know they pay them. For this pur pofe it is of the utmost confequence, that the person who fells the merchandise fhould pay the duty. He is very fenfible that he does not pay it for himself; and the confumer who pays it in the main confounds it with the price. Some authors have obferved that Nero had abolished the duty of the five and twentieth part arifing from the fale of flaves *; and yet he had only ordained, that it should be paid by the feller inftead of the purchafer. This regulation, which left the impoft entire, feemed nevertheless to suppress it.

There are two ftates in Europe where there are very heavy imposts upon liquors; in one the brewer alone pays the duty, in the other it is levied indifcriminately upon all the confumers; in the firft, nobody feels the rigour of the impoft, in the fecond it is looked upon as a griev ance. In the former the fubject is fenfible only of the liberty he has of not paying, in the latter he feels only the neceffity that compels him to pay.

Farther, the obliging the confumers to pay, requires a perpetual rummaging and fearching into their houfes. Now, nothing is more contrary than this to liberty; and those who eftablish these fort of duties have not surely been fo happy in this refpect, as to hit upon the best method of adminiftration.

"Vectigal quintæ et vicefimæ venalium mancipiorum remis"fum fpecie magis quam vi, quia cum venditor pendere juberetur, "in partem pretii emptoribus accrefcebat." Tacit. Annal, lib. 13.

CHAP. VIII.

In what manner the illufion is preferved.

IN N order to make the purchafer confound the price of the commodity with the impoft, there must be fome proportion between the impoft and the value of the commodity; wherefore there ought not to be an exceffive duty upon merchandifes of little value. There are countries in which the duty exceeds feventeen or eighteen times the value of the commodity. In this cafe the prince removes the illufion; his fubjects plainly fee they are dealt with in an unreasonable manner, which renders them moft exquifitely fenfible of their flavish fituation.

Befides, the prince, to be able to levy a duty fo difproportioned to the value of the commodity, must be himself the vender, and the people muft not have it in their power to purchase it elsewhere; a practice subject to a thousand inconveniencies.

Smuggling being in this cafe extremely lucrative, the natural and most reasonable penalty, namely the confifcation of the merchandise, becomes incapable of putting a ftop to it, efpecially as this very merchandise is intrin fically of an inconfiderable value. Recourfe muft therefore be had to extravagant punishments, fuch as those inflicted for capital crimes. All proportion then of punishment is at an end. People that cannot really be confidered as bad men are punished like villains, which, of all things in the world, is the most contrary to the fpirit of a moderate government.

I add, that the more the people are tempted to cheat the farmer of the revenues, the more the latter is enriched, and the former impoverished. To put a stop to fmuggling, the publican must be invefted with extraordinary means of oppreffing, and then the country is `ruined.

CHA P. IX.

Of a bad kind of impoft.

WE fhall here take fome curfory notice of an impost

laid in particular countries on the different articles of civil contracts. As thefe are things fubject to very nice difquifitions, a vaft deal of knowledge is necessary to make any tolerable defence against the farmer of the revenues, who interprets in that cafe the regulations of the prince, and exercises an arbitrary power over people's fortunes. Experience has demonstrated, that a duty on the paper on which the deeds are drawn would be of far greater fervice.

CHA P. X.

That the greatness of taxes depends on the nature of the government.

TAXES ought to be very light in defpotic govern

ments; otherwife who would bé at the trouble of tilling the land? Befides, how is it poffible to pay heavy taxes in a government that makes no manner of return to the different contributions of the fubje&t?

The exorbitant power of the prince, and the extreme depreffion of the people, require that there fhould not be even a poffibility of the leaft mistake between them. The taxes ought to be fo eafy to collect, and fo clearly fettled, as to leave no opportunity to the collectors to increase or diminish them. A portion of the fruits of the earth, a capitation, a duty of fo much per cent on merchandises, are the only taxes fuitable to that government.

Merchants in defpotic countries ought to have a perfonal fafeguard, to which all due refpect fhould be paid. Without this, they would ftand no chance in the disputes that might rife between them and the prince's officers.

CHAP. XI.

Of fifcal punishments.

WITH refpect to fifcal punishments, there is one

thing very particular, that, contrary to the general cuftom, they are more fevere in Europe than in Afia. In Europe, not only the merchandifes, but even sometimes the fhips and carriages, are confifcated; which is never practifed in Afia. This is because in Europe the merchant has judges, who are able to shelter him from oppreffion: in Afia the defpotic judges themselves would be the greateft oppreffors. What remedy could a merchant have against a bashaw, that was determined to confifcate his merchandifes?

The prince, therefore, reftrains his own power, finding himself under a neceffity of acting with some kind of lenity. In Turkey they raise only a single duty for the importation of goods, and afterwards the whole country is open to the merchant. Falfe entries are not attended with confifcation, or increase of duty. In China *, they never open the baggage of those who are not merchants. Defrauding the customs in the territory of the Mogul is not punished with confifcation, but with doubling the duty. The princes of Tartary †, who refide in towns, impofe fcarce any duty at all on the goods that pass through their country. In Japan, it is true, the defrauding of the customs is a capital came; but this is, because they have particular reafons for prohibiting all communication with foreigners; hence the fraud‡ is rather a contravention of the laws made for the fecurity of the government, than of thofe of commerce.

Father du Halde, tome ii. page 37.

+ Hiflory of the Tartars, part iii. page 290.

Being willing to trade with foreigners without having any communication with them, they have pitched upon two nations for that purpose, the Dutch for the commerce of Europe, and the Chinefe for that of Afia; they confine the factors and failors in a kind of prifon, and lay fuch a restraint upon them as tires their patience.