that it is trefpaffing against the respect due to their prince, to speak to him in favour of a perfon in difgrace. These princes feem to use all their endeavours to deprive themfelves of the virtue of clemency.

Arcadius and Honorius, in a law ‡ which we have already defcanted upon |, pofitively declare that they will fhow no favour to thofe who fhall prefume to petition them in behalf of the guilty §. This was a very bad law indeed, fince it is bad even under a defpotic government.

The custom of Perfia, which permits every man that pleases to leave the kingdom, is excellent; and though the contrary practice derives its origin from defpotic power, which has always looked upon fubjects as flaves †, and thofe who quit the country as fugitives, yet the Perfian practice is ufeful even to a defpotic govern ment, because the apprehenfion of the flight, or of the withdrawing of debtors, puts a ftop to, or moderates the oppreffions of bafhaws and extortioners.

the caftle of oblivion. There is a law which forbids any one to speak of those who are shut up, or even to mention their name.

The 5th law in the code ad leg. Jul. mag.

In chapter viii. of this book.

§ Frederick copied this law in the conftitution of Naples, book i.

In monarchies there is generally a law which forbids thofe who are invested with public employments, to go out of the kingdom without the prince's leave. This law ought to be establishedalfo in republics. But, in thofe that have particular inftitutions, the prohibition ought to be general, in order to prevent the introduction of foreign manners.

BOOK XIII.

Of the relation which the levying of taxes and the greatness of the public revenues have to liberty.

THE

CHA P. I.

Of the revenues of the ftate.

HE revenues of the state are a portion that each fubje&t gives of his property, in order to fecure, or to have the agreeable enjoyment of the remainder. To fix thefe revenues in a proper manner, regard fhould be had both to the neceffities of the ftate and to thofe of the fubject. The real wants of the people ought never to give way to the imaginary wants of the ftate.

Imaginary wants are thofe, which flow from the paffions, and from the weakness of the governors, from the charms of an extraordinary project, from the diftempered defire of vain glory, and from a certain impotency of mind incapable of withstanding the attacks of fancy. Often has it happened, that minifters of a reftlefs difpofition have imagined that the wants of the state were thofe of their own little and ignoble fouls.

There is nothing requires more wisdom and prudence than the regulation of that portion whick is taken from, and of that which is left to the fubje&t!

The public revenues are not to be measured by what the people are able, but by what they ought to give; and, if they are measured by what they are able to give, it ought to be at least by what they are able to give conftantly.

CHA P. II.

That it is bad reafoning to say that the greatness of taxes is good in its own nature.

THERE have been inftances in particular monarchies of fmall ftates exempt from taxes, that have been as miferable as the circumjacent places which groaned under the weight of exactions. The chief reafon of this is, that the fmall furrounded ftate can hardly have any fuch thing as induftry, arts, or manufactures, because in this refpect it lies under a thousand restraints from the great flate in which it is inclofed. The great ftate that furrounds it is bleffed with induftry, manufactures, and arts, and establishes laws by which thofe several advantages are procured. The petty ftate becomes therefore neceffarily poor, let it pay ever fo few taxes.

And yet fome have concluded from the poverty of thofe petty ftates, that in order to render the people induftrious, they should be loaded with taxes. But it would be a much better conclufion to fay, that they ought to have no taxes at all. None live here but wretches who retire from the neighbouring parts to avoid working; wretches who, difheartened by pain and toil, make their whole felicity confift in idleness.

The effect of wealth in a country is to infpire every heart with ambition, the effect of poverty is to give birth to despair. The former is excited by labour, the latter is foothed by indolence.

Nature is just to all mankind; fhe rewards them for their industry, whilft she renders them industrious by annexing rewards in proportion to the greatness of their labour. But if an arbitrary power deprives people of the recompenfes of nature, they fall into a difrelish of industry, and then indolence and inaction feem to be their only happiness,

CHA P. III.

Of taxes in countries where part of the people are villains or bond-men

THE ftate of villainage is fometimes eftablished after a conqueft. In that cafe the bondman, or villain that tills the land, ought to have a kind of partnership with his mafter. Nothing but a communication of loss or profit can reconcile those who are doomed to labour, with those who are bleffed with a ftate of affluence.

CHAP. IV.

Of a republic in the like cafe.

WHEN a republic has reduced a nation to the drudgery of cultivating her lands, the ought never to fuffer the free fubject to have a power of increafing the tribute of the bond-man. This was not permitted at Sparta. Those brave people thought the Helotes + would be more induftrious in cultivating their lands, upon knowing that their fervitude was not to increafe; they imagined likewife that the mafters would be better citizens when they defired no more than what they were accustomed to enjoy.

W

CHA P. V.

Of a monarchy in the like cafe.

'HEN the nobles of a monarchical state cause the lands to be cultivated for their own ufe by a conquered people, they ought never to have a power

of

Gleba afcriptitios.

† Plutarch.

increafing the fervice of tribute *. Befides, it is right the prince fhould be satisfied with his own demefne and the military fervice. But if he wants to raise taxes on the bond-men of his nobility, the lords of the several diftricts ought to be anfwerable for the tax †, and be obliged to pay it for the bond-men, by whom they may be afterwards re-imburfed. But if this rule is not followed, the lord and the collectors of the prince's taxes will harrass the poor bond-man by turns, till he perishes with mifery, or flies into the woods.

CHAP. VI.

Of a defpotic government in the like cafe.

WHAT has been above faid is ftill more indifpenfa

The

bly neceffary in a defpotic government. lord, who is every moment liable to be ftripped of his lands and bond men, is not fo eager to preserve them.

When Peter I. thought proper to follow the custom of Germany, and to demand his taxes in money, he made a very prudent regulation which is ftill followed in Ruffia. The gentleman levies the tax on the peasants, and pays it to the Czar. If the number of peasants di minishes, he pays the fame; if it increase, he pays no more; fo that it is his intereft not to worry or oppress his vaffale.

CHAP. VII.

Of taxes in countries where villainage is not established.

WH

HEN the inhabitants of a state are all free subjects, and each man enjoys his property with as much right as the prince his fovereignty, taxes may then

This is what induced Charlemagne to make his excellent inftitutions upon this head. See the 5th book of the capitularies, art. 303.

†This is the practice in Germany.