There were even particular reasons against transferring the judiciary power to the equestrian order. The conftitution of Rome was founded on this principle, that none fhould be enlifted as foldiers, but fuch as were men of fufficient property to answer for their conduct to the republic. The knights, as perfons of the greatest property, formed the cavalry of the legions. But when their dignity increafed, they refufed to ferve any longer in that capacity; and another kind of cavalry was obliged to be raised: thus Marius enlisted all forts of people into his army, and foon after the republic was loft *. Befides, the knights were the farmers of the public revenues; a fet of rapacious men, who fowed new miferies amongst a miferable people, and made a fport of the public calamity. Inftead of giving to fuch men as thofe the power of judging, they ought to have been conftantly under the eye of the judges. This we muft fay in commendation of the ancient French laws; they have ftipulated with the officers of the revenues with as great a diffidence as would be observed between enemies. When the judiciary power at Rome was transferred to the farmers of the revenues, there was then an end of virtue, policy, laws, magiftracy, and magiftrates. Of this we find a very ingenious defcription in fome fragments of Diodorus Siculus and Dio. "Mucius "Scævola, (fays Diodorus ‡), wanted to revive the an"cient morals, and the laudable cuftom of fober and "frugal living: for his predeceffors having entered into "a contract with the farmers of the revenue, who at "that time were poffeffed of the judiciary power at "Rome, they had filled the province with all manner "of crimes. But Scævola made an example of the "publicans, and imprisoned those who had fent others to "prifon." * Capitæ cenfos plerofque. Salluft de bello Jug. Fragment of this author, book 36. in the Collection of Conftantine Porphyrogenitus of virtues and vices. Dio informs us*, that Publius Rutilius, his Lieutenant, was equally obnoxious to the equeftrian order, and that upon his return, they accused him of having received fome prefents, and condemned him to a fine, upon which he inftantly made a ceffion of his goods. His innocence appeared in this, that he was found to be worth a great deal lefs than what he was charged with having extorted, and that he fhewed a juft title to what he poffeffed; but he would not live any longer in the fame city with fuch profligate wretches. The Italians +, fays Diodorus again, bought up whole droves of flaves in Sicily to till their lands, and to take care of their cattle, but refufed them a neceffary subfiftence. These wretches were then forced to go and rob on the high-ways, armed with lances and clubs, covered with beafts fkins, and followed by large mastiffdogs. Thus the whole province was laid wafte, and the inhabitants could not call any thing their own but what was fecured within the walls of towns. There was neither proconful nor prætor, that could or would oppofe this diforder, or that prefumed to punish these flaves, because they belonged to the knights, who at Rome were poffeffed of the judiciary power ‡. And yet this was one of the causes of the war of the slaves. But I fhall add only one word more. A profeffion that neither has, nor can have any other view than lucre; a profeffion that was always forming fresh demands, without ever granting any; a deaf and inexorable profeffion, that impoverished the rich, and increased even the mifery of the poor; fuch a profeffion, I say, should never have been intrufted with the judiciary power at Rome. Fragment of his hiftory, taken from the extract of virtues and vices. † Fragment of the 34th book, in the extract of virtues and vices. "Penes quos Romæ tum judicia erant, atque ex`equestri "ordine folerent fortito judices eligi in caufa prætorum et pro"confulum, quibus poft adminiftratam provinciam dies dicta "crat," CHA P. XIX. Of the government of the Roman provinces. SUCH was the diftribution of the three powers in Rome. But they were far from being thus diftributed in the provinces: Liberty was at the centre, and tyranny in the extreme parts. While Rome extended her dominions no farther than Italy, the people were governed as confederates, and the laws of each republic were preserved. But, as foon as fhe enlarged her conquefts, and the fenate had no longer an immediate infpection over the provinces, nor the magiftrates refiding at Rome were any longer capable of governing the empire, they were obliged to fend prætors and proconfuls. Then it was that the harmony of the three powers was loft. Those who were sent on that errand were intrufted with a power which comprehended that of all the Roman magiftracies, nay even that of the fenate and of the people *. They were defpotic magiftrates, extremely proper for the distance of the places to which they were fent. They exercifed the three powers, being, if I may prefume to use the expreffion, the bashaws of the republic. We have elsewhere obferved, that in a commonwealth the fame magiftrate ought to be poffeffed of the executive power, as well civil as military. To this it is owing that a conquering republic can hardly communi. cate her government, and rule the conquered ftate according to the form of her own conftitution. In fact, as the magiftrate fhe fends to govern is invested with the executive power, both civil and military, he must also have the legiflative; for who is it that could make laws without him? He muft likewife have the judiciary power; for who could pretend to judge independently of him? It is neceffary, therefore, that the governor fhe * They made their edicts upon coming into the provinces, fends be intrusted with the three powers, as was practifed in the Roman provinces. It is more eafy for a monarchy to communicate its government, because the officers it fends have some the civil executive, and others the military executive power, which does not neceffarily imply a defpotic authority. It was a privilege of the utmost confequence to a Roman citizen to have none but the people for his judges. Were it not for this, he would have been fubject in the provinces to the arbitrary power of a proconful or of a proprætor. The city never felt the tyranny, which was exercifed only on conquered nations. Thus in the Roman world, as at Sparta, those who were free were extremely fo, while those who were flaves laboured under the extremity of flavery. While the citizens paid taxes, they were raifed with great juftice and equality. The regulation of Servius Tullius was obferved, who had diftributed the people into fix claffes according to their difference of property, and fixed the feveral shares of the public taxes in proportion to that which each person had in the government. Hence they bore with the greatness of the tax, because of their proportionable greatnefs of credit, and confoled themselves for the smallness of their credit, because of the fmallness of the tax. There was also another thing worthy of admiration, which is, that, as Servius Tullius's divifion into claffes was in fome measure the fundamental principle of the conftitution, it thence followed that an equal levying of the taxes was so connected with this fundamental principle, that the one could not be abolished without the other. But, while the city paid the taxes without trouble, or paid none at all *, the provinces were plundered by the knights, who were the farmers of the public revenues. We have already made mention of their oppreffive extortions, with which all history abounds. * After the conquest of Macedonia the Romans paid no taxes. VOL. I. T "All Afia, (fays Mithridates *), expects me as its "deliverer; fo great is the hatred which the rapa"cioufness of the proconfuls †, the confifcations made "by the officers of the revenue, and the quirks and "cavils of judicial proceedings ‡, have excited against "the Romans.” Hence it was that the ftrength of the provinces made no addition to, but rather weakened the strength of the republic. Hence it was that the provinces looked upon the lofs of the liberty of Rome as the epocha of their own freedom. CHAP. XX. End of this book. SHOULD be glad to enquire into the distribution of the three powers, in all the moderate governments we are acquainted with, and to calculate thereby the degrees of liberty which each may enjoy. But we muft not always exhaust a subject so far, as to leave no work at all for the reader. My bufinefs is not to make people read, but to make them think. * Speech taken from Trogus Pompeius, and related by Justin, book xxxviii. + See the orations against Verres. It is well known what fort of a tribunal was that of Var which provoked the Germans to revolt. 豬豬 |