I am far from entertaining prejudice in favour of the privileges of the clergy; but I fhould be glad their jurifdiction were once fixed. The question is not, Whether their jurifdiction was juftly established? but, Whether it be really eftablished; whether it conftitutes a part of the laws of the country, and is in every refpect relative to those laws; whether between two powers acknowledged independent, the conditions ought not to be reciprocal; and whether it is not equally the duty of a good fubject to defend the prerogative of the prince, as to maintain the limits which from time immemorial he has prefcribed to his authority?

Though the ecclefiaftic power is so dangerous in a republic, yet it is extremely proper in a monarchy,/ especially of the abfolute kind. What would become of Spain and Portugal fince the fubverfion of their laws, were it not for this only barrier against the incurfions of arbitrary power? a barrier that is always ufeful when there is no other; for, as a defpotic government is productive of the moft frightful calamities to human nature, the very evil that reftrains it is beneficial to the fubject.

As the ocean, which seems to threaten to overflow the whole earth, is ftopped by weeds and by little pebbles that lie scattered along the fhore, fo monarchs whofe power feems unbounded are reftrained by the smallest obftacles, and fuffer their natural pride to be fubdued by fupplication and prayer.

The English, to favour their liberty, have abolished all the intermediate powers of which their monarchy was compofed. They have a great deal of reason to be jealous of this liberty; were they ever to be fo unhappy as to lofe it, they would be one of the most fervile nations upon earth.

Mr. Law, through ignorance both of a republican and monarchical conftitution, was one of the greatest promoters of abfolute power that ever was known in Europe. Befides the violent and extraordinary changes owing to his direction, he wanted to fupprefs all the

intermediate ranks, and to abolish the political communities. He was diffolving the monarchy by his chimerical reimbursements, and feemed as if he wanted to buy again even the very conftitution.

It is not enough to have intermediate powers in a monarchy; there must be also a depofitary of the laws. This depofitary can be only the political bodies who promulge the new laws, and revive the obfolete. The natural ignorance of the nobility, their indolence and contempt of civil government, require there fhould be a body invefted with a power of reviving the laws which would be otherwise buried in oblivion. The prince's council are not a proper depofitary. They are naturally the depofitary of the momentary will of the prince, and not of the fundamental laws. Befides, the prince's council is continually changing; it is neither permanent nor numerous; neither has it a fufficient share of the confidence of the people; confequently it is incapable to fet them right in difficult conjunctures, or to reduce them to proper obedience.

Defpotic governments, where there are no fundamental laws, have no fuch kind of depofitary. Hence it is that religion has generally fo much influence in thofe countries, because it forms a kind of permanent depofitary; and, if this cannot be faid of religion, it may of the customs that are refpected instead of laws.

* Ferdinand King of Arragon made himself grand-master of the orders, and that alone changed the conftitution.

CHA P. V.

Of the laws relative to the nature of a defpotic government.

FROM the nature of defpotic power it follows, that the fingle perfon invefted with this power commits the execution of it alfo to a fingle perfon. A man, to whom his fenfes continually fuggeft that he himself is every thing and his fubjects nothing, is naturally lazy, voluptuous and ignorant. In confequence of this he neglects the management of public affairs. But, were he to commit the adminiftration to many, there would be continual difputes among them; each would form intrigues to be his first flave, and he would be obliged to take the reins into his own hands. It is therefore more natural for him to refign it to a vizir *, and to invest him with the fame power as himself. The creation of a vizir is a fundamental law of this government.

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It is related of a pope, that he had raised an infinite number of difficulties against his election from a thorough conviction of his incapacity. At length he was prevailed on to accept the pontificate, and refigned the administration entirely to his nephew. He was foon ftruck with furprise, and faid, "I fhould never have thought that these things were fo eafy." The fame may be said of the princes of the Eaft, who being bred in that prison where their eunuchs enervate both their hearts and understandings, and where they are frequently kept ignorant even of their high rank, when drawn forth in order to be placed upon the throne, they are at first amazed; but, as foon as they have chosen a vizir, they abandon themselves in their feraglio to the moft brutal paffions, pursuing, in the midst of a proftituted court, the moft capricious extravagancies; they could then never have dreamed to find matters fo eafy.

* The eastern kings are never without vizirs, fays Sir J. Chardin.

The greater the extent of an empire, the greater is the feraglio, and confequently fo much the more is the prince intoxicated with pleafure. Hence the more nations fuch a prince has to govern, the lefs he attends to the government; the greater his affairs, the lefs he makes them the fubject of his deliberations.

BOOK III.

Of the Principles of the three Kinds of Government.

CHAP. I.

Difference between the nature and principle of government.

A

FTER having examined the laws relative to the nature of each government, we must investigate those that relate to its principle.

There is this difference between the nature and principle of government; its nature is that by which it is conftituted, and its principle that by which it is made to act. One is its particular structure, and the other the human paffions which fet it in motion.

Now, laws ought to be no lefs relative to the principle than to the nature of each government. We muft therefore enquire into this principle, which fhall be the fubject of this third book.

This is a very important diftinction, from whence I fhall draw a great many confequences; for it is the key of an infinite number of laws.

I

CHA P. II.

Of the principle of different governments.

HAVE already obferved that it is the nature of a republican government, that either the collective body of the people, or particular families, fhould be poffeffed of the fovereign power; of a monarchy, that the prince should have this fovereign power, but in the execution of it should be directed by eftablished laws; of a defpotic government, that a single person should rule according to his own will and caprice. I require no more to enable me to discover their three principles: these are from thence moft naturally derived. I fhall begin with a republican government, and in particular with that of democracy.

THEI

CHA P. III.

Of the principle of Democracy.

HERE is no great fhare of probity neceffary to fupport a monarchical or defpotic government. The force of laws in one, and the prince's arm in the other, are fufficient to direct and maintain the whole. But in a popular ftate, one fpring more is neceffary, namely VIRTUE.

What I have here advanced is confirmed by the unanimous teftimony of hiftorians, and is extremely agreeable to the nature of things; for it is clear, that in a monarchy, where he who commands the execution of the laws generally thinks himself above them, there is less need of virtue than in a popular government, where the person intrufted with the execution of the laws is fenfible of being fubject himself to their direction.

Clear it is also, that a monarch, who through bad advice or indolence ceases to enforce the execution of the

laws, may easily repair the evil; he has only to follow