plain cafe, that, when the conqueft is completed, the conqueror has no longer a right to kill, because he has no longer the plea of natural defence and self-prefervation.

What has led them into this mistake is, that they imagined a conqueror had a right to deftroy the fociety, from whence they inferred that he had a right to deftroy the men that compofe it, a wrong confequence from a falfe principle; for from the deftruction of the fociety it does not at all follow, that the people who compofe it ought to be alfo deftroyed. Society is the union of men, and not the men themfelves; the citizen may perish, and the man remain.

From the right of killing, in cafe of conqueft, politicians have drawn that of reducing to flavery, a confe quence as ill-grounded as the principle.

There is no fuch thing as a right of reducing people to flavery, but when it becomes neceffary for the prefervation of the conqueft. Prefervation, but never fervitude, is the end of conqueft, though fervitude may happen fometimes to be a neceffary means of prefervation.

Even in that cafe, it is contrary to the nature of things, that the flavery fhould be perpetual. The people enflaved ought to be rendered capable of becoming fubjects. Slavery in conquefts is an accidental thing When, after the expiration of a certain space of time, all the parts of the conquering ftate are connected with the conquered nation by cuftoms, marriages, laws, affociations, and by a certain conformity of fpirit, there ought to be an end of the flavery; for the rights of the conqueror are founded entirely on the want of those very things, and on the eftrangement between the two nations, which prevents their confiding in each other.

A conqueror, therefore, who reduces the conquered people to flavery, ought always to referve to himself the means (for means there are without number) of reftoring them to their liberty.

These are far from being vague and uncertain notions. Thus our ancestors acted, thofe ancestors who conquered the Roman empire. The laws they made in the heat of fire, action, impetuofity, and the pride

of victory, were afterwards foftened; thofe laws were fevere, but they rendered them impartial. The Burgundians, Goths and Lombards, would always have the Romans continue a conquered people; but the laws of Euric, Gundebald and Kotharis, made the Romans and Barbarians fellow-citizens *.

CHAP. IV.

Some advantages of a conquered people.

INSTEAD of inferring fuch fatal confequences from the right of conqueft, politicians would have done much better to mention the advantages which this very right may fometimes give to a conquered people; advantages which would be more fenfibly, more universally felt, were our law of nations exactly followed, and esta blished over all the earth.

Conquered countries are, generally fpeaking, degene rated from their original inftitution. Corruption has crept in, the execution of the laws has been neglected, and the government is grown oppreffive. Who can queftion but such a state would be a gainer, and derive fome advantages from the very conqueft itself, if it did not prove destructive? When a government is arrived to that degree of corruption, as to be incapable of reforming itself, it would not lofe much by being newmoulded. A conqueror that enters triumphant into a country, where the moneyed men have by a thousand wiles and artifices infenfibly practifed innumerable ways of ufurping; where the miserable people, who grieve to fee abuses grow into laws, live under oppreffion, and think they have no right to complain; a conqueror, I fay, may make a total change, and then the masked tyranny will be the firft thing expofed to his fury.

We have seen, for inftance, countries oppreffed by the farmers of the revenues, and eased afterwards by

See the code of Barbarian laws, and book 28.

the conqueror, who had neither the engagements nor wants of the legitimate prince. Even the abufes have been often redreffed without any interpofition of the conqueror.1

Sometimes the frugality of a conquering nation has enabled them to allow the conquered thofe neceffaries, of which they have been deprived under a lawful prince.

A conqueft may deftroy pernicious prejudices, and place, if I may prefume to make ufe of the expreffion, the nation under the influence of a better genius.

What good might not the Spaniards have done to the Mexicans? They had a mild religion to impart to them; but they gave them a mad fuperftition. They might have fet flaves at liberty; they made free men flaves. They might have undeceived them with regard to the abuse of human facrifices; instead of that they deftroyed them. Never fhould I have done, were I to recount all the good they did not, and all the mischief they did.

It is a conqueror's bufinefs to repair a part of the "mifchief he has committed. The right, therefore, of conqueft I define thus: A neceffary, lawful and unhappy right, which leaves always an immenfe debt to discharge, in order to clear the obligations of human nature.

THE

CHA P. V.

Gelon King of Syracufe.

HE nobleft treaty of peace ever mentioned in hiftory is, in my opinion, that which Gelon made with the Carthaginians. He infifted upon their abolifhing the custom of facrificing their children *. Glorious indeed! After having defeated 300,000, Carthaginians, he required a condition that was advantageous only to themselves, or rather he ftipulated in favour of

human nature.

See M. Barbeyrac's Collection, art. 11%.

IT is contrary to the nature of things, that, in a confederate government, one ftate fhould make any conqueft over another, as in our days we have seen in Swifferland *. In mixed confederate republics, where the affociation is between fmall republics and fmall momarchies, this is not fo abfurd.

It is also contrary to the nature of things, that a democratical republic should conquer towns, which cannot enter into the sphere of its democracy. It is neceffary that the conquered people should be capable of enjoying the privileges of fovereignty, as was fettled in the very beginning among the Romans. The conqueft ought to be limited to the number of citizens fixed for the democracy.

If a democratical republic fubdues a nation in order to govern them as fubjects, it expofes its own liberty, because it intrufts too great a power to the officers fent into the conquered provinces.

How great would have been the danger of the republic of Carthage had Hannibal made himself master of Rome? What would not he have done in his own country, had he been victorious, he who caused so many revolu, tions after his defeat †?

Hanno could never have diffuaded the fenate from fending fuccours to Hannibal, had he used no other argument than his own jealoufy. The Carthaginian fenate, whose wisdom is fo highly extolled by Ariftotle, (and which has been evidently proved by the profperity of that republic), could never have been determined by other than fenfible reafons. They must have been ftupid not to fee, that an army, at the diftance of three hundred leagues, would neceffarily be expofed to loffes that ought to be repaired.

* With regard to Tockenburgh.

He was at the head of a faction.

Hanno's party infifted that Hannibal should be delivered up to the Romans*. They could not at that time be afraid of the Romans; they were therefore afraid of Hannibal.

It was impoffible, fome will fay, for them to imagine that Hannibal had been fo fuccefsful. But how was it poffible for them to doubt of it? Could the Carthaginians, a people spread all over the earth, be ignorant of what was tranfacting in Italy? No; they were fufficiently acquainted with it, and for that reason they did not care to fend fupplies to Hannibal.

Hanno became more refolute after the battle of Trebia, after the battle of Thrafimenes, after that of Cannæ; it was not his incredulity that increased, but his fear.

THE

CHA P. VII.

The fame fubject continued.

'HERE is ftill another inconveniency in conquefts made by democracies: their government is always odious to the conquered ftate. It is apparently monarchical; but in reality it is much more oppreffive than monarchy, as the experience of all ages and countries evinces.

The conquered people are in a melancholy fituation; they neither enjoy the advantages of a republic, nor thofe of a monarchy.

What has been here faid of a popular ftate, is applica ble to aristocracy.

* Hanno wanted to deliver Hannibal up to the Romans, as Cato wanted to deliver up Cæfar to the Gauls.