a Medufa's head on his breaft+; and when he affumes that menacing and terrible air which Commodus ordered to be given to his ftatues ‡.

Again, it is corrupted, when mean and abject fouls grow vain of the pomp attending their fervitude; and imagine that the motive which induces them to be entirely devoted to their prince, exempts them from all duty to their country.

But if it be true, (and indeed the experience of all ages have fhewn it), that in proportion as the power of the monarch becomes boundless and immense, his fecurity diminishes; is the corrupting this power, and the altering its very nature, a lefs crime than that of high treafon against the prince?

CHAP. VIII.

Danger of the corruption of the principle of monarchical government.

THE danger is not when the ftate paffes from one moderate to another moderate government, as from a republic to a monarchy, or from a monarchy to a republic; but when it precipitates from a moderate to a defpotic government.

Moft of the European nations are ftill governed by principles of morality. But if, by a long abufe of power, or the fury of conqueft, defpotic fway should prevail to a certain degree; neither morals nor climate would be able to withstand its baneful influence: And then human nature would be expofed, for fome time at leaft, even in this beautiful part of the world, to the infults with which he has been abused in the other three.

In this ftate, the prince knew extremely well the principle of his government.

Herodian

CHA P. IX.

How ready the nobility are to defend the throne.

THE English nobility buried themselves with Charles I.

under the ruins of the throne; and before that time, when Philip II. endeavoured to tempt the French with the allurement of liberty, the crown was conftantly fupported by a nobility, who think it an honour to obey a king, but confider it as the loweft infamy to share the power with the people.

The house of Auftria has ufed her conftant endeavours to opprefs the Hungarian nobility; little thinking how ferviceable that very nobility. would be one day to her. She wanted money from their country, which it had not; but took no notice of the men with which it abounded. When a multitude of princes fell to dif membering of her dominions, the several pieces of her monarchy fell motionless, as it were, one upon another. No life was then to be feen but in that very nobility, who refenting the injuries done to their fovereign, and forgetting those done to themselves, took up arms to avenge her caufe, and confidered it as the highest glory. bravely to die, and to forgive.

CHAP. X.

Of the corruption of the principle of defpotic government.

THE principle of defpotic government is fubject to

a continual corruption, because it is even in its nature corrupt. Other governments are deftroyed by particular accidents, which do violence to the principles of ́ each constitution; this is ruined by its own intrinfic imperfection, when no accidental caufes impede or corrupt. the principles on which it is founded. It maintains itfelf therefore only when circumftances drawn from the climate, religion, fituation, or genius of the people,

oblige it to follow fome order, and to admit of fome rule. By these things, its nature is forced without being changed; its ferocity remains; and it is made tame and tractable only for a time.

CHA P. XI.

Natural effects of the integrity and corruption of the principles of government.

WHEN

once the principles of government are corrupted, the very beft laws become bad, and turn against the ftate: But when the principles are found, even bad laws have the fame effect as good; the force of the principle draws every thing to it.

The inhabitants of Crete ufed a very fingular method to keep the principle magiftrates dependent on the laws; which was that of infurrection. Part of the citizens *rofe up in arms*, put the magiftrates to flight, and obliged them to return to a private condition. This was supposed to be done in confequence of the law. One would have imagined that an inftitution of this nature, which eftablished fedition in order to hinder the abuse of power, would have fubverted any republic whatsoever, and yet it did not fubvert that of Crete. The reason follows t.

When the ancients wanted to exprefs a people that had the ftrongest love for their country, they always mentioned the inhabitants of Crete: "Our country, (faid Plato ), a name fo dear to the Cretans." They called it by a name which fignifies the love of a mother for her children . Now, the love of our country fets every thing right.

Ariftot. Polit. Book ii. chap. 10.

They always united immediately against foreign enemies, which was called Synocretifm. Plut. Mor. p. 88.

Repub. lib. ix.

|| Plutarch's morals, treatise, "Whether men advanced in r years ought to meddle with public affairs?"

The laws of Poland have likewise their infurrection : But the inconveniences thence arifing, plainly fhew that the people of Crete alone were capable of employing fuch a remedy with fucccefs.

The gymnaftic exercises eftablifhed among the Greeks, had the fame dependence on the goodness of the principle of government. It was the Lacedæ"monians and Cretans, (faid Platoll,) that opened those "celebrated academies which gave them fo eminent "a rank in the world. Modefty at firft was alarmed; "but it yielded to the public utility." In Plato's time thefe inftitutions were admirable f, as they had a relation to a very important object, which was the military art. But when virtue fled from Greece, the military art was destroyed by these inftitutions; people appeared then on the arena, not for improvement but for debauch.

Plutarch informs us*, that the Romans in his time were of opinion that those games had been the principle cause of the flavery into which the Greeks were fallen. On the contrary, it was the flavery of the Greeks that had corrupted thefe exercises. In Plutarch's time t their fighting naked in the parks, and their wrestling, infected the young people with the spirit of cowardice, inclined them to infamous paffions, and made them mere dancers. But, in Epaminondas's time, the exercise of wrestling made the Thebans win the famous battle of Leuctra t

Repub. lib. v.

The gymnaftic art was divided into two parts, dancing and wrestling. In Crete they had the armed dances of the Curetes; at Sparta they had thofe of Caftor and Pollux: at Athens the armed dances of Pallas. Which were extremely proper for those that were not yet of age for military fervice. Wrestling is the image of war, faid Plato, Of laws, Book vi. He commends antiquity for having established only two dances, the Pacific and the Pyrrhic. See how the latter dance was applied to the military art. Plato, ibid.

* Plutarch's Morals, in the treatife, Intitled, "Questions concerning the affairs of the Romans."

+ Ibid.

Plutarch's Morals, Table-propofitions, Book ii.

There are very few laws which are not good, while the ftate retains its principles: here I may apply what Epicurus fays of riches; "It is not the liquor, but the "veffel that is corrupted."

CHAP. XII.

The Jame fubject continued.

IN Rome the judges were chofen at firft from the order of fenators. This privilege the Gracchi transferred to the knights: Drufus gave it to the fenators and knights: Sylla to the fenators only; Cotta to the fenators, knights, and public treasurers; Cæfar excluded the latter; Antony made decuries of fenators, knights, and centurions.

1

When once a republic is corrupted, there is no poffibility of remedying any of the rifing evils, but by removing the corruption, and reftoring its loft principles; every other correction is either ufelefs or a new evil. While Rome preserved its principles entire, the power of judging might without any abuse be lodged in the hands of the fenators: But as foon as this city was corrupted, let the judicial authority be transferred to whatfoever body, whether to the fenate, to the knights, to the treasurers, to two of these bodies, to all three together, or to any other, matters ftill went always wrong. The knights had no more virtue than the fenate, the treasurers no more than the knights, and these as little as the centurions.

When the people of Rome had obtained the privilege of fharing the magiftracy with the patricians, it was natural to think that their flatterers would immediately become arbiters of the government. But no fuch thing ever happened. It was obfervable, that the very people who had rendered the plebians capable of public offices, conftantly fixed their choice upon the patricians. Because they were virtuous, they were magnanimous; and because they were free, they had a contempt of power. But when their morals were corrupted, the more power they were