What is the mischief attending this theory of Paine? That there can be no settled government? Certainly nothing was ever more unfair than this deduction, nor more false in fact. Paine's meaning is so obvious, that it must be something worse than dulness which can misunderstand it. It is clearly this, that no generation is so far bound by a precedent one, as not to be able, when circumstances require, to break the tie. The acts of our ancestors are binding, not by their authority, but by our acquiescence, which gives them a sanction; we adopt and make them our own by our voluntary act; and let it not be imagined that laws will therefore want effect, or governments permanency. The people will no more sacrifice good ones to a mere theory, than they will be bound, irrevocably, to bad ones, by the magic of a tacit consent, which they never heard, nor were conscious of. It is a common, yet a very gross falsehood, to say the people are prone to change. They are not. They always bear oppression as long, and longer, than they ought; and he who maintains the contrary, advances an old and idle common place, unsupported by argument, by experience, by history, and by human nature.

But why all this bustle about mere right, on one side, and tacit consent, on the other? The Catholics have been actually in bonds for one hundred years; and, whatever the original violence or injustice of their deprivation might have been, they have adopted a line of conduct which settles the dispute at once. They come, with at least sufficient humility, to petition the legislature, and they advance no right; they request, only; they claim nothing. It is, therefore, unnecessary for any purpose, unless to supply food for ingenious argument, longer to debate the question of right. It is, however, too convenient for the author, in that point of view, readily to part with it. He therefore goes on, (p. 28,) The Roman Catholics are persons possessing pro"perty under Government. They, therefore, have given their "consent, and are bound to obedience to the present Govern❝ment, and ought to obey the legislature, as it exists, composed of King, Lords, and Commons, in all matters of public concern. They can, therefore, have no right to dictate to, or command them. Their present application, therefore, cannot “be the demand of a right." They are bound, not merely by this constructive consent, but by their own admission, in applying to the legislature for relief. But, perhaps, the best proof

that they are bound is their political slavery for one hundred years; for this is matter of fact. But the deduction of this argument is as fallacious as all the premises are at this day unnecessary. The author confounds right to demand, with right to seize, or mere right. The Catholics have neither demanded nor seized-they have sued. If I have an estate unjustly withheld from me, it is my right, but I must recover it by law. If I lend a man my watch, and he refuses to return it, it is still my right, and I may demand it, but I may not knock him down and take it by force; I must apply to the country. Apply this principle to the Catholics.

The author at last admits, (page 28) after having sufficiently shown his ability on the question of right, that it is plain the Catholics themselves do not consider their claims as matter of right; their language, though bold, is still rather that of solicitation than of demand; but in a note he subjoins that, since the writing of that pamphlet, they had betrayed a swelling and menacing spirit. To this the only answer that can be given is a direct contradiction. It is on him to support the fact, we have the negative, which, perhaps, in the equitable spirit of those penal laws which he supports, he may call upon us to prove. It is a vile calumny, and, considering their suppliant state, a cruel and unmanly one to charge the unfortunate Catholics with holding the language of hostility and intimidation. When have they done so? Who has heard it? Who has seen it? One good Protestant after another picks up the cry till it becomes a general chorus; yet not one individual of the pack can shew where he hit off the scent. Once more, I deny the fact; let our calumniators prove it if they can.

Again: I am reluctantly compelled, I hope for the last time, to return to the question of right. "The Catholics," says he, (page 29) declare that their exertions shall be consistent with their duty "to the Civil Magistrate, therefore, they acknowledge the obli"gation of submission to the Magistrate, and, of course, to the "Government constituting him. They cannot, therefore, demand, "as a right, principles which go to the infringement of that Go"vernment."

In the first place, on behalf of the Catholics, I protest against the possibility of suspicion of want of attachment to the constitution. In the next place, what does the author mean by this argument? Is a dutiful submission to the laws in being, incom

patible with a peaceable endeavor to procure the repeal of one obnoxious statute? Are the citizens of Dublin disloyal in seeking the abrogation of the infamous police law? If the principle laid down in the last sentence be right, then a Government, however unjust or tyrannical, which is once established, is established forever, for every alteration for the better would be a principle which would go to the infringement of that Government, and the subject could, therefore, never demand it sa aright. Usurpation becomes immortal; the Barons who extorted Magna Charta traitors; the Parliament under Charles I. rebels, and all declaratory laws nonsense. Was not our Revolution in 1782 an infringement on the principles of the British Government? yet who among us hesitated to demand it as a right?

The author admits, at last, that, if the Catholics have not mere right, they have, at least, a tolerable case in equity, (page 30.) "It is their strong ground, and had it not been for their "own infatuated intemperance, might have been capable of an"swering most of their purposes. But they have passed all

bounds of discretion and decency; and the failure of their "projects will be owing to the extravagance of their folly.” This is more of that unfounded calumny from which the Catholics have already endured so much, and to which it is impossible to reply but by direct negation. How very oddly do we denominate the feelings of Catholics! In them, a wish to educate and advance their children is "infatuated intemperance;" to intermarry with Protestants is "breaking through the sacred bounds of discretion and decency;" but to seek a part, however subordinate in the administration of that Government to which they so largely contribute, is "the wildest extravagance of folly."

The whole equity of their case, says the author, will be found reducible to three points: "1st. They claim the natural rights "of men;""2d. There is no reason why these rights should ❝ now be withholden from them, for the causes of the infliction ❝of their disabilities has ceased, and they have shown them"selves deserving of every indulgence;" "sd. To this indul66 gence, the numbers of the sufferers is an additional equitable

inducement." To the first it is only necessary to say, that it is not the natural rights of man, but the political rights of citizens, that we are to argue upon; to the last, the point of num

bers, the author says, "it is clearly but a collateral and a de"pendent consideration. If their case be not good in its merits, "no strength of numbers can make it so; and I hope it is not ❝intended to rest the matter on an argument of force; if it be, "it must be answered in kind. But till I hear it asserted that "number and justice are synonimous terms, I shall follow the "old way of estimating the rectitude of the former, by the "principles of the latter." To this I answer, that, though numbers should prove nothing as to the merits, which is allowing too much, yet, if their case should prove founded in justice, it makes a very material difference as to the expediency of attending to their complaints. I am far from wishing to bully the Legislature, yet I cannot help often thinking that perhaps three millions of people, now in Ireland, are discontented, and, with reason, with many of our laws. To warn, says Burke, is not to

menace.

We are now arrived at the second division of the author's argument I mean the question of policy. The penal laws are admitted, after a very short discussion, (page 35) to have originated in self-preservation, and the necessity of the case; in a word, they were built on a very bad foundation, the right of conquest, or, in other words, the law of the stronger. If the author meant his statement as a kind of excuse for the wicked policy of our ancestors in framing those laws, and not as an argument for their continuance, I for one should readily allow him all liberty, but he seems inclined to push it much farther. "Here, "says he, we have the origin of the penal laws. The barbarities "which gave rise to them must undoubtedly excite our horror "and disgust. But in the infliction of the laws themselves, we "find cause of regret rather than of censure. They appear to "have been the melancholy result of an indispensable necessity,

and, if we do condemn, (and surely we cannot too much con"demn) it ought to be the fatal spirit which was the cause, not "the cautionary policy which was the necessary effect. Has "this cause then entirely ceased? And may we consequently ❝entirely remove the effects? What proof have we of this? "What proof have we that the Roman Catholics have relinquish"ed that spirit of bigotry, all those obnoxious principles of "their religion which formerly made them such inveterate foes "to our establishment?" To this I answer, What necessity

compels she undoubtedly justifies, but certainly nothing short of an invincible necessity should induce us to continue laws of which truth compels even the advocate for their existence, to speak in such terms. In the second place, as to the proofs required by the author of the decease of Roman bigotry, I know not what proofs can possibly be given. What can the Catholics say? What can they do that will be satisfactory? Their oath of allegiance, is that satisfactory? The opinions of seven learned Catholic universities, are they satisfactory? Their peaceable demeanor through one hundred years of slavery, is that satisfactory? Their unshaken loyalty during two rebellions and one revolution, is that satisfactory? What mode can be devised which will remove the doubts of all? The men who grudge them political existence, and, among these men, the author, well know that it is a question, in its nature, incapable of proof, and, therefore, it is, that they press it with such vehemence, not to have their fears removed, or their doubts satisfied. Satisfaction to them would be calamity, for it must be followed by justice.

The author (pages 38, 39, 40,) will not take their words, nor their actions, nor their oaths. Words prove nothing, actions are but negative proof, and oaths are liable to equivocation. And, yet, he requires some security distinct from words and actions and oaths. Will he take the immense property of the Catholics as a security? No, (page 41.) "Property in their

hands is an extremely weak tie, which we see men every day "break through, to gratify any darling passion, and it can, at "any rate, apply but to a very inconsiderable part of their "community."

I congratulate with the author in his discovery in the theory of human feeling, that "property is an extremely weak tie.” It has been thought by many, not indeed so much to the credit of our species, that it was one of the strongest. Certainly the Protestants of Ireland do not think so contemptuously of property, nor are they of opinion that the Catholics are so disregardful of it; otherwise, why should they feel, or affect to feel such terror, on the score of the forfeited estates? And, if they feel the force of such impressions, in common justice they should suppose, that the Catholics are, in that respect, neither better nor worse than themselves.

VOL. I.-51