steps taken to prepare the same for sea; the proclamation and correspondence of our commanders at Copenhagen; and the substance of all the secret communications respecting the secret articles of the treaty of Tilsit.”

A lour and animated debate ensued, in which the arguments on both sides of the question, which have already been laid before our readers, were urged, with additional circumstances, and placed in a great variety of points of view. The duke of Norfolk's motion was supported by lord Hutchinson, lord Erskine, lord Buckingham shire, the earl of Moira, the earl of Jersey, the earl of St. Vincent, earl Grey, lord Darnley, and lord Sidmouth. It was opposed by the marquis Wellesley, lord Boringdon, lord Harrowby, lord Limerick, lord Hawkesbury, and lord Mulgrave.

The marquis of Wellesley, who immediately rose up when the duke of Norfolk sat down, took a survey of all the objections that had been urged against the expedition. He maintained, that the facts and circumstances already before the bouse, were abundantly sufficient to enable the house to form a judgment on the justice and policy of the measure; that it was the desieu of Buonaparte to employ the resources of Denmark among the other naval means which he meditated to wield against the maritime superiority of Great Britain. As it was the interest, so it was in the power of Buonaparte to accomplish this design, either by fraud and in trigue, or by open force and violence. In proof of this assertion, be entered into a minute detail of the navigation of the Belt. The VOL. L.

possibility of crossing the Belt in the ordinary season of the year, in spite of the utmost vigilance of our cruizers, was confirmed by the fact, that several bodies of the enemy's troops actually got over into Zealand, during the operations exerted to prevent it. And, as to the design of Buonaparte, who could doubt it? Had he hesitated, in his usual abrupt 'tone and manner, to enquire of the ministers of Portugal and Denmark, whether they had transmitted to their respective courts, his instructions, that their fleets should be equipped, and ready to unite with him in crushing the maritime tlespotism of England, and with that view to declare war, in concert with him, against England by the 1st of September?. But it was said Deumark could defend herself. Could Denmark defend Zealand after she was deprived of Holstein, from whence she drew provisions for the support of her insular dominions?-Nor was it the policy only of Denmark, that inclined her to lean towards France. Her commercial interests gave her the same bias, for they were founded on the principles of the armed neutrality. It might also be said, that the accession of the Danish fleet to the naval means of France, could not have created any serious danger to the safety of this country. But there was a wide difference between the present state of affairs, and that previous to the glorious battle of Trafalgar. Then almost all the great powers of the continent were in arms against France. But when the expedition was sent against Copenhagen, the whole of the continent was subdued, and subdued not merely for the purpose of conquest, but the [D] subjugation

subjugation of England, through the downfal of her naval supremacy. The necessity of the measure, he considered as clear. It only remained to inquire, whether the principles on which it was undertaken and executed, were contrary to the law of nations, as laid down and acted on in old times, before the bond by which it had united all civilized nations was burst by the French revolution. The first right that grew out of that law, as well as of the law of nature, was the right of security: a right which could not be limited by any of the rights of neutrality; but, it seemed, on account of the expedition to Copenhagen, a general cry was raised against England. The voice of Europe was said to condemn us. Was the voice of Europe now free? Or did any power or individual on the continent venture to breathe a sentiment hostile to the views of Buonaparte? He implored their lordships not, in the bosom of present security, to look back on past dangers, with a view to censure those by whose services they had been avoided, lest future ministers, in cases of similar urgency and danger, should be deterred from emulating the preseut glorious example, under the apprehension of being stigmatized as the violators of neutral rights, and the imitators of the injustice of the enemy.

Lord Hutchinson was of opinion, that even supposing the French to have been in possession of Holstein and Jutland, still Zealand might have been defended with effect against the French arms. Ilaving been employed on a very important mission, which gave him an opportunity of having some conversations with the emperor of Rus

sia; from these conversations, of which he gave a circumstantial account to the house, he was convinced, that the emperor was sincere in his desire to mediate, if possible, a peace between this country and France: but at all events, lord Hutchinson believed that the relations of peace and amity might then have been preserved between Great Britain and Russia. He had never said, nor did he now mean to say,, that if the attack on Copenhagen had never been made, there would have been no war with Russia; but he would say, that the result of that expedition did materially change the relations between Great Britain and Russia, and give rise to sentiments of a very hostile nature, at the court of Petersburgh. At the last interview he had with the emperor, which was on the 4th of September, his imperial majesty closed the conversation, by repeating with much emphasis, that he would have satisfaction for Denmark. Lord W. had treated lightly the opinion expressed in Europe respecting the expedition to Copenhagen; but that opinion was highly unfavourable to this country: nor had that expedition, as he conceived, been justified by the arguments used by the noble lord.

Lord Erskine expressed his satisfaction, that lord W. had endeavoured to rest his arguments on the law of nations, and not on the monstrous doctrine, that the law of nations was at an end, and that we were justified in resorting to any measure that might suit our convenience. This was copying that conduct of revolutionary France, which was the origin of the war with that country. He had rather that France had taken the fleet, and that we

had

had met it boldly on the ocean. If ministers said, they had information to prove the necessity of the expedition in question, he, as a member of that house, in the exercise of his parliamentary duty, had a right to say, that no such information existed. He was perfectly aware, that in public law, provision was made for a case of necessity, but then the necessity must be made clearly manifest.

Lord Boringdon did not see on what ground, the noble lords on the other side of the house, could condemn the expedition to Copenhagen, without also condemning the expedition to Constantinople, and the instructions alledged to have been issued in 1806, to a squadron sent to the Tagus.

The earl of Buckinghamshire, shewed by dates, that the expedition against Copenhagen had actually sailed before there was a possibility of any account, even of the existence of the treaty of Til sit, being received in this country. Even if the constant practice of parliament did not warrant the expectation of official documents being laid upon the table, the attack of a power in perfect amity with as, against whom no act of hostility bad been alledged, was in itself so questionable a proceeding, that it talled for every explanation that could be possibly produced in its Justification. Under circumstances somewhat similar, what was the conduct of the great king of Prussia? During the seven years war, be had suddenly marched an army into Saxony, and taken possession of Dresden, the capital of the elector. But he had not felt, that he had done enough to satisfy the world, by declaring, that he had

procured copies of the treaty entered into by the elector of Saxony, then king of Poland, for the partition of his dominions; for, having afterwards obtained possession of the original treaty, he published it at every court in Europe, in order to render his justification complete. In opposition to what had fallen from his noble friend, the marquis of Wellesley, respecting the practicability of an army equal to the capture of such a place as Copenhagen, passing the Belt from Holstein to Zealand, he opposed the opinion of the highest naval authority, (lord St. Vincent) in this or any other country. And upon that authority he would venture to assert, that so far from cruizers not being able to keep their station in the Belt in ordinary seasons, the anchorage was perfectly good; and, that by placing gun boats upon the coast, ready to put off, any armament, unsupported by a superior force, might be effectually resisted. He was aware, that during the late attack on the isle of Zealand, some few vessels had got over, notwithstanding the vigilance of our cruizers; but the number was so small as to furnish an argument in favour of his statement rather than against it. His noble friend had stated, that Buonaparte had declared at his levee, that the fleets of both Portugal and Denmark should be united against this country. But bad he succeeded in the case of Portugal? And he was persuaded, that he would have equally failed in that of Denmark, though the custody of their own ships had been left to the Danes themselves. The idea of a northern confederacy combining all the naval force of the Baltic, had indeed been held out [D2]

to

to the country, to magnify the danger which the measure adopted was intended to avert; whilst the real fact was, that of this supposed combination of naval force, Sweden was with us, the Baltic fleet of Russia completely in our power, and therefore the Danish fleet, even if at the disposal of France, which was at least questionable, the only danger against which we had to provide. But this was thought so great and imminent as to justify measures, which, but for the French revolution, would be without precedent. Why, his lordship asked, under the circumstances of danger under which alone our conduct towards Denmark was defend ed, were the Russian ships of war that passed through our fleet in the Baltic, and the Russian squadron in the Mediterranean, suffered to escape? By taking possession of the latter, we should have facilitated the negociation then depending with the Turks; and with such an instrument in our hand, we might have trusted to the mediation of the court of Petersburgh, whilst, at the same time, by a strong naval force in the Baltic, we should have protected, and enabled Denmark to maintain her neutrality, kept open the Sound, and thus effectually have disappointed the expectations Buouaparte had formed, from the influence he had gained over the emperor of Russia. But above all, we should have avoided the abandonment of those sacred principles of justice and honour, by which the conduct of our government had been so advantageously contrasted with that of France.

Lord Harrowby contended, that if we had not seized the Danish

fleet, the Danes would have taken the first opportunity of entering into the maritime confederacy against this country, as in the former instance, which led to one of the greatest naval achievements recorded in our annals. It was impossible to suppose that Buonaparte, after having annihilated the armies of the continent, would have suffered isolated Denniark to retain her independence. We had trusted to the declaration of Denmark too long. Her conduct had not merited such confidence. She had not made preparations for her defence, nor shewn any inclination to resistance. It was only when the English and Hanoverians were advancing to the rescue of the north, that she had assembled her troops in Holstein. He was surprized to find such horror expressed at the expedition to Copenhagen, by those who had approved that against Constantinople. He could conceive that a person might condemn both; but he could scarcely think it possible for one to approve the attack on Constantinople, where there was no obvious necessity, and condemu that against Copenhagen, which was so necessary for our security. This country had been acting on such grounds, as would justify an individual in aggression. The enemy had departed from the law of nations, and we, consequently, were not bound to adhere to it. If we had adhered to the principles of the noble lords, on the other side, in the late disturbances in Ireland, we should have been going to law with the rebels, whilst they were going to war with us.

The earl of Moira said, that of the hostile intentions of the present ruler

ruler of France no one doubted; but where was the evidence, that there was any collusion on the part of Denmark? Denmark had uniformly preserved a strict neutrality between the belligerent powers, and there was no reason to think, that on the present occasion she would have deviated from it. Her army had taken a strong position in Holstein, the moment the French troops entered Hanover, and he had not the smallest doubt that, had she been attacked, she would have defended herself with gallantry and perseverance. The Danes might not indeed have been able to save the provinces of Holstein and Jutland; but had they not the island of Zealand, to which to retire, and whither it was impossible for their enemy to follow them. The possibility of conveying an army across the Belt could not be inferred from the passage of a few individuals, particularly when it was considered that the Danes would have had the assistance of both a British and Swedish naval force to guard the passage. But in all events, he would rather have seen twice the number of ships composing the Danish fleets in the power of Buonaparte, than that we should have obtained it by the means through which it had come into our possession. As long as there was a power in Europe which, from its regard to the rights of other states, could form a rallying point to the oppressed, there was some hope, that the nations groaning under the yoke of a pitiless and inexorable tyrant, would have watched for some opportunity, and made some exertion, in common, to throw it off. Such a power was this country, before the late most

unjustifiable and unfortunate attack on Denmark. If the alledged spirit of hostility which actuated both the government and the people of Denmark against this country, was not to be cured by other means than bombarding their capital, why not also demolish those fortificatious which enabled them still to shut the Baltic against our navigation? Why leave their batteries, and the castle of Cronstadt standing? Why leave them in possession of their docks, in which they might soon build other ships? and had they not the same number of seamen they ever had, with which to man them?

Lord Limerick thought the expedition to Copenhagen fully justifiable, because he could shew, that from the commencement of the last war, the Danes had been hostilely disposed towards this country. They allowed and encouraged privateers and enemies' cruizers to carry their prizes into Bergen in Norway, and to sell them there, condemned in a court forined by the French consul at that port. His lordship mentioned other instances of their hostile disposition. If the sixteen ships of the line, in the ports of Russia, were added to the twenty belonging to Denmark,` there would be no doubt but the

thirty-six would have forced the twelve sail of the Swedish line to co-operate with them: not to be considered as an inconsiderable force; especially in a part so convenient for the invasion of Ireland, by the passage north about.

The earl of Jersey contended, that there was no reason whatever ` to believe that Denmark had entered into any alliance, or that she had even had any secret understand[D 3]

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