will suffer eternal damnation, merely because of original sin imputed; and that he does not include, in his answer, original sin inherent. But still, as both stand on the same ground in one most important respect, viz. with regard to voluntary affection and action, these being entirely excluded from both, it would be difficult to point out any important difference as to moral desert between imputed and inherent sin; and what I suppose Pictet substantially aims at in his answer, is, that he does not believe any one will be eternally punished, who never committed any actual transgression of the divine law.

Dr. Doddridge (Lecture II. pp. 112. 113), in treating of the imputation of Adam's sin, which in his view includes its consequences also, i. e. it includes original sin inherent, says: "That one rational creature should be made finally and eternally miserable for the action of another, which it was in no way within his power to prevent, does so ill agree with our natural notions of divine justice and the repeated declarations of Scriptures, (e. g. Ezek. 18: 3, 4, 20. Jer. 31: 29, 30. Deut. 24: 16. 2 Kings, 14: 6), and with what God has been pleased to say concerning his compassion for infants (Jonah iv.), that we must at least wait for the plainest and fullest decision of the Scriptures, before we can admit it to be true." Again he says (p. 201. ib.), "if sin signify, (as it commonly does), an action contrary to the divine law, these evil propensities [viz. those which are in infants] are not sins." Still he seems inclined to believe, that if sin be defined, a want of conformity to the divine law, infants might then in a certain sense be called sinners. But if this be true, then why is not every lusus naturae a sinner in the kingdom of animals or of vegetables?

Dr. Watts, whose sentiments respecting original sin are sufficiently developed in his Psalms to be known to all, held still, that infants, not the progeny of beleivers, dying in their infancy, fall into a state of annihilation; and Dr. Ridgley, whose high tone of sentiment will not be questioned, maintains that they fall into a state of everlasting insensibility; see the references in Doddridge's Lect. ut supra, p. 217.

A large class of the Lutheran divines, as is well known, have maintained, that original sin is altogether removed, i. e. atoned for, by the death of Christ, so that none of the human race can incur final damnation on account of it. Some of them suppose the declarations in Rom. 5: 12-19 to have relation to this subject.

What now does all this, with the later and general admission of the salvation of infants, mean, except that the human mind cannot long be compelled, even by violence, to admit the idea of sin in any respect but that of voluntary offence against known law? This accords with the first spontaneous moral emotions of every man's conscience and judgment. It is consentaneous with the very elements of his moral being.

Si naturam furca expellas usque recurret. The reprobationtopic of the early Reformers, urged upon the Reformed Churches by the mighty powers of Calvin's mind, has been going by degrees out of the circle of topics in the later theology, or if handled at all, it is treated with much circumspection and moderation. Along with this, a sin which is no sin, i. e. no transgression of any law, has been gradually disappearing also. Both views, in due time, will, as I fully believe, disappear from the horizon of current theology, and be considered only as belonging to the history of the past. The progress of sentiment is a pledge of this.

In the mean time, it does not seem to be meet that a quarrel should exist in regard to a matter like the present, which never can be a practical one, i. e. the sentiment in question never can be deeply concerned with our practical duty. If the so called original sin be a sin, it is not one, as nearly all agree, in the sense which Vitringa gives to the word sin; nor does it appear to me to be one in accordance with the definition which the apostles have given of sin. It is plainly a sin, if it be one, which no effort, no prayer, no repentance, no amendments of life, no elevated piety, no conformity to God, can in any measure abate, change, or avoid. It is one, therefore, with which practical and experimental piety would seem to have little or nothing to do. If a thousand questions should be zealously agitated about it, this would not change the sin, nor abate the hold it has upon us, nor instruct us how in any way to avoid it. May we not well ask then: Why should the churches dispute respecting this topic, and become alienated as to their affection towards each other, because of differences of opinion respecting it? Our need of a Saviour is as certain without admitting the older technology respecting original sin, as it is in case we admit it. Our guilt as to actual sin, which is all that we are practically concerned with, is surely more apparent and striking, in case it can be shewn that we have sinned not by an absolute necessity of nature which Heaven gave us, but voluntarily and of our own free

choice. Rosenmueller, De Wette, and some others, maintain that David pleads his sinfulness from the womb (in Ps. 51: 5), in order to excuse or palliate the offences he had committed; and in this way they advocate an exegesis not unlike that of days gone by. This shews what kind of impression the idea, that we are sinners in and by the constitution of our nature itself, is likely to make on the human mind. Our guilt, in this way of viewing the subject, would naturally appear to be much palliated; at any rate, it would be deemed by multitudes to be

more excusable.

I would repeat the question, then, in order that the mind of the reader may not pass it by without special consideration: Why should we contend about the doctrine of original sin, either imputed or inherent, when all the contention that ever has existed or ever will, cannot modify or affect in the least degree the sin in question, provided it does really and truly exist? Against sin, considered as actual violation of the divine law, we may remonstrate, and lift up, like a trumpet, the voice of warning, with some hope that it will be heard and obeyed. But against original sin, as defined by Turretin, Edwards, and others, the Lord of glory himself, with the whole train of prophets, apostles, and evangelists, might preach, and no effect in the way of repentance, amendment, and forsaking of the sin, could be at all expected. Nothing is done or is to be done, which can in any degree modify or check it. It descends in the same manner and measure to the children of the elect and of reprobates. It begins before all active thought, affection, or voluntary desire; is in its own nature passive, and as inevitable to us as the essential attributes of our nature. What then have we to do in the way of preaching against it, or of exhorting men to repentance and reformation? Nothing. When we have told them, then, that their natural state is one in which they are destitute of all that positive holiness which is necessary to fit them for future happiness; when we explicitly teach that their susceptibilities of impression are such, that, in a world like this, they will not only sin, but do nothing of a moral character which is holy; when we have thus shown them that the renewing and sanctifying influences of the Spirit of God are absolutely necessary to their salvation; we have told them all with which they can be practically concerned. To urge on them a sin of which no one has in any sense an ability to repent; one of which conscience takes no cognizance; one in

regard to which there is no possible hope of amendment and reformation-what is this but to engage in a desperate business, and to waste our efforts on an undertaking which cannot be otherwise than fruitless?

I acknowledge to the reader, that it is time to bring these remarks to a close. But I cannot do this, and (after saying so much) I ought not to do this, without noticing in a very brief way some few things, that have not yet been brought to view, respecting the proper nature of sin.

It has been advanced, not only in times past, but recently and often by one class of theologians in our country, that a propensity to sin is not only sinful in itself, but is the only root and ground of all actual sin; and this propensity they aver to be natural, or connate with our being.

After what has already been said above, it will not require much time here to say all that needs now to be said. I have already stated, that so far as our disposition, propensity, bias, or inclination to sin, i. e. so far as an aptitude to receive excitement from objects enticing to sin, is concerned, all of this propensity which has been occasioned or formed by our voluntary acts of transgression, is, beyond reasonable doubt, a matter of guilt on our part. We are now concerned, therefore, only with the aptitude to receive these impressions which is native or contemporaneous with our nascent being.

If a predominant disposition to sin, as it is called, is absolutely necessary in order to sin, (which has often been asserted); and if, moreover, a disposition that may lead to sin is itself a sin in its first or native elements; then it is incumbent on those who defend these positions to tell us how it came to pass, that the once pure and holy angels sinned; and also how the once pure and holy Adam sinned. Had they originally a predominant native disposition to sin? If so, then they never were holy. Did they sin, then, without such a predominant disposition? If so, then such a disposition is of course not the real and only origin, nor a true account of the origin, of sin. It is impossible to proceed one step, therefore, in sound reasoning, by taking such a position, in respect to the origin, or at any rate the necessary origin, of sin.

In the next place, if a disposition to sin, is the cause, and only cause, of sin, and also is itself a sin, then what is the cause of this last sin? For this must have a cause, as well as any other sins. A disposition to sin is surely not without some

cause. And thus we come, at once, to an infinite series of causes; or if not, then we come to a series whose first link is quite as obscure and inexplicable as its last one would be, aside from this theory. Nothing at all, then, is gained by such a process.

Nor will it satisfy inquiring and intelligent minds here, to say that the first acts of sin were singular in their kind, and that no others can be like them. If by this be meant, that after the first act of sin is committed, there can be no other first act of sin-this, I suppose, need not be greatly contested. But if it be meant, that the sin of Adam differed as to its psychological or metaphysical nature or causes from other sins which are subsequent, this is neither more nor less than a petitio principii in respect to the whole matter in dispute; and one too which few, as I apprehend, will be ready to concede. There is another aspect, however, in which most men versed in the polemics of theology will be likely to view such a suggestion. They will consider it merely as an expedient, under a pressure, to get rid of a difficulty which cannot otherwise be well disposed of, and as an attempt rather to throw dust in the eyes of an antagonist, than manfully and fairly to meet him.

Besides; if this mode of reasoning be adopted, the conclusion that God is the author of sin, will at last appear to be logically inevitable. If the aptitude to receive excitement from enticing sinful objects, as it exists originally in our nature and unaugmented by any vicious habit, be of and in itself a sin, then does it inevitably follow of course, that the author of this aptitude must be the author of sin. It is not at all like the question: Whether God, who is the author of our being as free moral agents, must not be the author of our sins too? for in this case, our sins are the voluntary product of an agency which is free. Our sins, therefore, are properly our own, i. e. our own in the proper sense of these words. But in the first case stated above, sin is not an exercise of the mind, not a result of free will and choice, but an element of our physiological or psychological being-a something which came directly from the hand of the Creator, without any intervening thought, desire, or effort of our own which was in any way concerned with it. And although it would be doing injustice to most of those who advocate such a theory of sin as the one now under examination, to charge them with holding, and directly and avowedly maintaining, that God is the author of sin, I do not see how we can

SECOND SERIES, VOL. II. NO. III.

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