with susceptibilities that will certainly lead to sin whenever they are voluntarily developed, (which is just the reverse of Adam's original state), God has testified to all our race his displeasure against sin, and thus proclaimed, as it were with the voice of a thousand thunders, the mischievous consequences of it to the creatures of his power. But,

(2) Even in this inferior, fallen, degraded condition, sin, in the proper sense of this word, viz. a voluntary transgression of divine law by a rational, moral, and free agent, is not a thing in its own nature necessary, nor strictly inevitable. It can be committed only by an actual choice; and choice implies of course the power of doing or not doing, of preferring or not preferring. It cannot well be denied that the soul, if made with respect to its principal and natural attributes or faculties in the image of God himself, has such a power. It appears to belong essentially to its nature as a soul. The fact that we choose, of

course implies that we have the power to choose; and the power to choose, implies that the choice we make is not a necessary and inevitable choice (which is no choice), but that we might have made a different choice, i. e. we might have gone in a different direction, had we been pleased so to do.

(3) God has provided adequate redemption from this fallen and degraded condition; he has even more than provided for repairing the evils occasioned by the fall. So the whole tenor of Rom. 5: 12-19 teaches us; and evidently it is true teaching. In Adam's original state one sin was in itself the cause of endless ruin. Under a mere system of law, there could be no pardon of offences. But now all is reversed. "We are not under the law, but under grace." One sin, or ten thousand thousand sins do not cut off the hope of salvation. There is pardon for the penitent; there is grace to help in time of need; there is forgiveness that God may be feared.

Let him then, who is disposed to cast a doubting and despairing eye over our present prospect, or to indulge a repining temper of mind because of the terrible consequences of Adam's fall, learn to look on the bright as well as on the dark side of this question. Glad tidings of great joy are proclaimed the earth around, and a Saviour is born unto us who is Christ the Lord. God has shewed his hatred of sin in a manner which must be an awful admonition to all intelligent beings, who may come to the knowledge of his proceeding with our race; but he has shewn his clemency, too, in brighter colours still.

But I must desist from this course of remark, and turn the attention of the reader to some other considerations which ought not be kept out of sight on the present occasion.

What, after all that has been said and written on the subject of original sin, has been satisfactorily advanced to shew that the Scriptures recognize two sorts of sin? I have not been able to find the satisfaction which I desire. Still, I will not dispute about mere names; although it is lawful and proper to assign reasons, if we can, why certain names and phraseology should not be employed. Whenever these seem to be adapted to mislead the public mind, in their conceptions of any subject, they ought to be avoided.

The advocates for original sin, even the strenuous advocates, are by no means all agreed either as to the extent, or as to the exact nature, of the guilt contracted by it. Some important points in this respect, according to my view of the subject, they have failed to illustrate, or at any rate to clear up. Let me particularize a few things, which may serve to justify me in making these declarations.

(a) None of the advocates in question have yet been able to shew, that original sin is a sin which can be repented of.

Now evangelical repentance always implies two things; first, sincere sorrow for sin; secondly, forsaking it and turning to holiness of life.

Who then repents that his Maker has formed him as he has? I have heard of those who cursed the day of their birth; and of those who cursed their Maker for having made them as he has; and of those who repined and murmured against him, because he had so made them; but I have yet to learn that this is any part of evangelical repentance.

Then, in the next place, where, when, how, is this original sin to be forsaken, or got rid of? Do pious men beget godly children? It seems they do not. But of what avail then is their repentance, in respect to the sin in question? Not the least. The children of a David, of a John, a Baxter, an Edwards, or a Doddridge, have as much original sin, for aught we know, as the children of a Judas Iscariot would have.

What kind of a sin is it then, which admits of neither contrition nor amendment? At any rate, what kind of a sin is it, which cannot possibly be avoided by the most pious, who commit it (if I may be allowed such an expression) as fully as the most impious? And if such is the nature of what is called

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original sin, it seems to be a species of sin that it would be difficult to define, or to find exemplified in the Scriptures. Then,

(b) All that is properly sin, is forbidden. What then is the law which now forbids original sin? Or who is guilty of violating its precepts? Are parents? Then let them refrain from marriage and from progeny. Is it children? In what sense are they guilty of violating a law of which they had no knowledge, one which controlled the very elements of their original being before they had a will, affections, or even consciousness?

But it will be said here, for it often has been said, that sin inherent is a punishment for the sin of Adam, which is ours by imputation. But if the sin is merely putative, would not a common law of justice demand, that the punishment should be merely putative? How can we unite, as par cum pari, putative crime and veritable damnation ?

Besides; is it true that there is no evil in the world, except what is punishment? What then are the sufferings of brutes? What were the afflictions of Job? What are the trials of good men, whose sins are forgiven, and who are no longer obnoxious to the penalties of sin pronounced by the law? What was the permission to the tempter to go into paradise, and solicit Adam to ruin himself and involve all his race in degradation and ruin? What temporal evil or suffering can be compared to exposure to such an evil as this? And yet Adam was exposed to all this in his primaeval and holy state. How then can it be said, that all evil is to be regarded only in the light of punishment?

The fact is, that the abominable and horrible nature of sin consists in the very thing, that according to the arrangement of the universe it brings evil upon the innocent as well as the guilty. This we see exhibited every day in the social, civil, religious, and political state of man.

(c) Once more; the advocates of original sin are far from having ascertained, or from being agreed, what sort of punishment original sin requires or deserves.

One cannot wonder at this, when he considers the nature of the case. A sin to which we never gave consent and of which we never had any knowledge; a sin committed (if at all committed) in the very origination of our being-how shall we find an adequate punishment for such a sin? No wonder, therefore, that we find some of its advocates greatly embarrassed here, and at a loss to know whether to take the right, or the left, or

the middle path, or to stand still. Such we may easily shew to have been the real state of the case.

It cannot be denied, (although I cannot but wish it could be truly denied), that some of the leading early Reformers maintained the doctrine of the damnation of such as died in infancy. So Calvin in his Institutes, Lib. II. c. 1. § 6. Lib. III. c. 23.

7. Lib. IV. c. 15. § 10. But he was not always consistent here; or, at any rate, he admits in other parts of his writings, e. g. Comm. in Rom. 5: 12-19, the probable salvation of the children of the elect, who die during their infancy. Still, the general persuasion of his mind seems to have been, that infants, who die in their infancy, perish, and perish because they are included within the decree of reprobation. But as to the manner or degree of their punishment or in some respects of their guilt, he does not explain himself, as I apprehend, so that we can obtain his views fully and explicitly.

In like manner we shall find Piscator expressing himself, App. ad Tract. de Gratia Dei; and so also Joh. Scharpius, de Reprobatione; P. II. Arg. XI; Tilenus, Syntag. de Predest.; F. Gomar, Opp. II. p. 279; A. Polanus, Syntag. Lib. IV. c. 10, Thes. II. IV.; Dr. Twisse of England has intimated the like views.

The method of argument, however, by which these views were confirmed, or at least by which this class of theologians attempted to confirm them, was not such as the reader might naturally expect, considering what their mode of speaking was in-regard to the guilt of original sin. Polanus has given us a specimen of it, in his discussion respecting the efficient cause of reprobation. His argument runs thus: If sin is the efficient cause of the decree of reprobation, then it must be either original sin or actual sin. It cannot be original sin; for, inasmuch as all men are the subjects of this, all men must therefore be reprobates. It cannot be actual sin, because then all infants, even of the Turks and heathen, dying in that state, would be saved. Therefore the efficient cause of reprobation must be the mere good pleasure of God himself."

It is at least to be hoped, that there are not many in our day who are prepared to argue, that one third part of the human race are sentenced to everlasting misery, without any reference to their moral character, their sin either original or actual. If this be one of the standard doctrines of the Reformation, then, at least in one respect, there is a wide and general defection in modern times from the standard.

The method of argument here employed by Polanus, (in which, by the way, he is not singular and by no means stands alone), would exempt us from all solicitude as to any consequences or fruits of original sin, so far as the destiny of infants is concerned. All dispute or discussion about their sin or innocence, would indeed be worse than idle, if the views of Polanus, and of those who argue with him, are to be regarded as correct and scriptural.

But I do not take the matter to be thus. Few indeed, in our country, would venture on a sweeping sentence, that delivers over all infants to final and endless perdition, without any regard to sin either actual or original. How can any one peruse such an argument as that of Polanus, without feeling himself forced to exclaim: And are infants then the beings, to whom the Saviour says his disciples must be like, before they can enter the kingdom of heaven? Are these the beings, respecting whom the holy Redeemer exclaimed, "Of such is the kingdom of heaven?" The disciples of the blessed Saviour must be like -reprobates! And the kingdom of heaven is of such asreprobates!

But enough of this. It will be conceded by all who are acquainted with the doctrinal history of the Reformed Churches, that time has lopped off these excrescences of theology and school logic, and mellowed the tone in which matters of this kind are usually spoken of. The general persuasion has been, for many scores of years, and still is, that infants are probably the subjects of salvation, and that this is the purchase of redeeming blood. I have more than once already stated that my belief is such.

Some of the second generation of Reformers touched the subject of reprobation with a lighter hand than the first, and began to call in question the final perdition of infants, or to be silent respecting the subject. When final perdition came to be viewed as connected with sin, and regarded as a consequence of sin merely, then the question very naturally arose: Whether original sin was of itself an adequate ground of eternal perdition? Pictet, whose powers as a theologian were certainly of the first order, and not by any means inferior to those of Calvin himself; who, moreover, is one of the last men that can be accused of deficiency as to a high tone of orthodoxy; in his Theology (I. p. 429) puts the question: "Would God condemn a man who should be perfectly holy, because of Adam's sin only?" To this he answers; that "he does not believe he would." It may be said, perhaps, that he means only to declare here, that no one