purchased their redemption; and it is he, who sends his Spirit to sanctify them. Sanctification infants need; they have no actual holiness in them, and no germ which when developed will actually produce it. But positive holiness they must have, before they can see the Lord, i. e. be fitted for the employments and happiness of heaven.

I would hope, then, that views such as these may serve to satisfy thinking men, that those who reason as Vitringa does respecting the nature of sin itself, are not compelled in any measure to renounce the doctrine, that Christ is the Saviour of infants, in case they are saved. Indeed, to urge the question above stated in such a manner as has been done, with so much confidence, and with such a seeming conviction that it contains within itself a prostrating argument against those who believe with Vitringa in respect to the nature of sin, only shews how eager a disputant may be to lay hold of any sort of weapon for attack, even when the very hand that seizes it is wounded so as to be disabled. Consider, for a moment, whither such reasoning about infants may lead us. Christ says: "He that believeth, shall be saved; and he that believeth not, shall be damned." Now, in the spirit of the preceding questions, let me ask: Do infants believe? Can they believe? Belief is cordial assent to truth which has been proposed to the mind and comprehended by it. Has the proposition of gospel truth been made to infant minds, and have they first understood it, and then assented to it? To ask these questions-is to answer them in the negative. Then how can infants be saved? Can any be saved who do not believe?

What answer now would a reasonable man make to an argument like this, seemingly built altogether on a scriptural basis? An easy answer he may make, I would say. He has only to suggest, that a declaration like that in question can never be fairly and properly interpreted as extending to any case, excepting to the case of those who are physiologically and morally capable of believing. This is answer enough. It is well grounded in the very nature of reasonable requisition or legislation. Suppose a nation is invaded by a foreign and cruel enemy, and is in great danger. In this exigency the government call on all the male population between the age of twenty and forty years to enrol themselves as soldiers, and to come forth to the defence of the nation. Does this call oblige the sick, the lame, the halt, the blind, the maniac, and the non compos mentis, to go out to battle?

Let us apply these rational principles now to the other case. Does Christ make atonement for the actual sin of infants? No. And why not? For the simple reason that they have committed none; and atonement for a nonentity is impossible. When Christ is said to be the Saviour of sinners, I grant that the plain meaning of course is, of such as are actual sinners. But may not his grace be extended beyond the line of actual sin, and may he not in mercy sanctify and save those who have no holiness, and who, in a natural state of development, would become actual sinners? He may; and he is as truly their Saviour in such a case, as he is the Saviour of him "who was the chief of sinners," although not in every respect in the same sense. But why not? Because the condition of the saved in the two cases is so unlike, that the salvation adapted to it cannot (so to speak) be in all respects precisely the same. Neither is it in any two cases precisely the same, unless it can be made out that the amount of guilt, and the amount of carnal affections to be subdued, is precisely the same. Enough that all the help or salvation which is needed, is granted or bestowed; enough that all this is of grace, for it is unmerited and undeserved; enough that no infant, in its natural state, is prepared for the happiness of heaven. His salvation-his future actual holiness, must be all of grace.

My apology for dwelling so long on this subject is, first, its difficulty; but more especially, in the second place, the fact that the views of those who adopt such sentiments respecting sin as Vitringa defends, have been so often misunderstood, and sometimes greatly misrepresented.

But there are some other aspects of the matter before us, which we ought to contemplate before we lay it aside. I will develope them as briefly as I can.

It is asked: Whether, with such views of the nature of sin as Vitringa has developed, we can regard infants as sinners in any sense ?

The answer is easy: Not as sinners, in the sense that they have voluntarily transgressed a known law of God, and this as rational, moral, free agents. The advocates of original sin concede this, by the very definition which they give to it; for they tell us, that it is a sinfulness of nature itself, antecedent to all thought, voluntary affection, desire, or action. But after all, do they really differ from the views which I have already expressed? They do not-except in the special use of some particular words, and in some deductions made from such a use.

Is it things that separate us, then, or is it diction, costume, the manner of announcing or discussing our views? The latter, in the main, beyond all question. Let me here briefly state my creed on this point, and we shall then see whether I have not said this with good reason.

I believe that the susceptibility of impression from sinful and enticing objects, belongs to the tout ensemble of our nature; not to the body exclusively, nor to the soul exclusively, but from their essential and intimate and wonderful connection, to the tout ensemble of both, i. e. to man. I believe this susceptibility is innate, connate, original, natural, native, or whatever else one may please to call it by way of thus characterizing it; I believe that it commences with our very being, in a sense like to that in which an oak-tree commences with the acorn. I believe this susceptibility to be such, that just as soon as there is growth and maturity enough for development, it will develope itself in persuading or influencing men-all men-to sin. I believe this to be the natural state of fallen man; while, in bis original state before the fall, the predominant tendency of his susceptibilities was just the reverse of what it now is.

Now what more or less than this does the sober and discreet advocate of the doctrine of original sin contend for? Nothing as to matter of fact; for he makes a wide difference between original and actual sin, and a difference of the same nature (although not called by the same names) that I do. I am as strong an advocate for native depravity, in the sense that I have now explained, as he is, or as he can be. Nor would I desert the ground in this case of its being connate and innate, and make it only supervenient, as Turretin and Edwards have both done, as soon as they come to account for it how the soul, being made by God, could become corrupt when united to the body. It would be easy to show, if time permitted, that they have in fact both abandoned the ground here of innate and connate depravity, such as is contemporaneous with our being, and thus been inconsistent with themselves. Not speculating, however, as they have both done about the formation of the soul, I see no good reason for abandoning the ground, that our susceptibilities of impression from enticing and evil objects or things, either external or internal, are coetaneous with the point of our being as human existences, let that point be when it may. Not that these susceptibilities are complete at first, or developed at the outset, any more than that reason, intelligence, or a power of distinguishing good and evil, are developed at the outset

of our existence. But the susceptibilities in question are nascent with our nascent being; they grow with our growth, they strengthen with our strength; and since the fall, the balance of them is on the wrong side; and this is the specific thing, in which I suppose Adam, by his transgression, to have made or constituted all men sinners. This sin occasioned a degradation of his original state, and that degradation, the natural or rather the appointed consequence of the evil of sin, has come down upon all his posterity.

Do the advocates of original sin go further than this? Setting the subject of the imputation of Adam's sin out of the account, I believe they do not, except, as I have more than once said, in regard to certain names and deductions made from them. I can truly say, that if I am not a believer in the native, original depravity of man, in the only sense in which this is an intelligible proposition, then there is not one in our land.

Man, in his native state, has no holiness which can fit him for heaven; man, in his native state and from the origin of his being, has the germ of nascent susceptibilities of impression by objects that entice to sin; and these will with certainty lead him to sin, as soon as he is capable of knowing a divine law and of voluntarily disobeying it.

This is at least far enough, I suppose, from Pelagianism. However, I have no anxiety to defend myself as to any charge of this nature. My only object is, to avow and explain my sentiments.

Many of our Brethren call the native state of man sinful, and speak familiarly of original sin. Now if what they mean is this, viz., that man's native state is such, that it will certainly lead to actual sin, and lead to nothing but sin in all his moral acts until he is renewed, then there is no difference between my views and theirs, as to any thing which is important. In such a sense I acknowledge and fully believe, that man has a native disposition, taste, or inclination to sin, or whatever else one may please to call it. But I do not believe in the expediency or propriety of making two sorts of sin, or even three, viz., imputed sin, inherent sin, and actual sin. Sin is a transgression of the law. It is better to accept this definition and to abide by it. But if we prefer to say, that sinful disposition, taste, bias, or inclination, is such a susceptibility as to the enticements of sin, as will lead us to the commission of actual sin, when there shall be sufficient maturity to commit it, I object

SECOND SERIES, VOL. II. NO. III.

7

not at all to the thing, for I fully believe it to be true. The only objection, moreover, which I have to the language is, that it is adapted to mislead, and to make men believe, that sin consists in our susceptibilities, and not in voluntary affection or action.

How can we maintain with any proper consistency and regard to the real nature of man and the character of God, that our native susceptibilities are sins? Or that all susceptibility to impression by enticements to sin, is itself a sin? We cannot do this, with any consistency. Adam had at first a susceptibility to impressions from sinfully enticing objects; else he had never felt the enticing power of them, nor sinned, nor fallen. He had this susceptibility even in his original state of primaeval innocence. How then can such a susceptibility be called of itself a sin?

The fallen angels had the same susceptibilty, in their originally pure and holy state; otherwise they had never felt the power of enticement to sin, and never would have fallen.

With the deepest reverence I say it, the Lord Jesus Christ himself had a susceptibility of feeling the power of enticement to sin; like to that which Adam had before his fall. If not, then he did not really and truly take on him a human nature. The fact that such a susceptibility belonged to Adam in his primitive state, shews that it belongs to human nature in its perfect probationary state. The blessed Saviour then might have had it he did and must have it-in order to be truly man. If not, how could he be tempted to sin? Above all-how could he be tempted in all points as we are?"

Indeed, can we conceive of a nature truly human, without such a susceptibility? But if Adam in his original state had a measure of this susceptibility; if the Saviour himself, as possessing our nature, had a measure of this; how are we going to make out a susceptibility of this kind to be in itself sin? Was Adam a sinner before his fall? Is he "who knew no sin," to be reputed a sinner, because he could feel the power of enticement to sin? These questions do not need a specific answer. Why then should we not be consistent here in theologizing? That which Adam possessed as a constituent of his very nature before his fall; that which the Saviour himself possessed when he was "tempted in all points as we are," should not be called sin. How can we deem it safe and discreet and proper thus to employ language? And if it is not, then why should the same