ARTICLE VIÍ.

AN ESSAY ON CAUSE AND EFFECT, IN CONNEXION WITH THE DOCTRINES OF FATALISM AND FREE AGENCY.*

It is believed that the most agitating points of theological discussion, are connected with certain first principles, which as yet have never been analyzed and investigated with sufficient accuracy. The consequence has been, that men have differed in many cases, not so much from wrong feeling, as from misty conceptions.

It is believed, also, that if certain leading minds will go back to the investigation and discussion of these first principles, until their own conceptions of them shall become clear and definite, they will then be able to make them intelligible to others, and thus much needless discussion will be ended. The object of this essay is, to stimulate such minds to this investigation and discussion.

The doctrines of fatalism, free-agency, accountability, regeneration, divine influence, and their connected topics, all lead back to the question of cause and effect, as will be somewhat illustrated in the following pages.

The axiom, or first principle, which is the foundation of

man

*On account of circumstances quite peculiar the name of the writer of this article is withheld. The ability with which it is written and the interest which has, of late, been awakened on the subject of which it treats, cannot fail to secure for it many attentive readers. Should any be inclined to dissent from the positions here maintained, it is believed they will find evidence in the article itself that its author is not a of straw," and to such as desire a thorough investigation of the subject, the opening of this discussion without the authority of any name, may appear to be favorable to the candor and unbiassed freedom of future writers in the Repository on the same topics. Our object is truth, and should it hereafter appear that truth may be promoted by disclosing the name now withheld, we shall feel no reluctance to make it known. At present we yield to the request of the writer in view of the circumstances above alluded to. EDITOR.

SECOND SERIES, VOL. II. NO. IV.

16

our reasonings on these subjects, is thus stated by Presi dent Day.

"The axiom, that every change implies an adequate cause, is a primary element of human thought. It has all the characteristics of a fundamental truth. It is intuitive, requiring no process of reasoning to prove it; it is irresistible, no force of reasoning can overthrow it ;-it is universal, compelling the belief of all men in all ages of the world."

Here Pres. Day, like most philosophers, assumes that there are certain implanted truths, which all men believe, which reasoning does not establish and cannot destroy, and that these fundamental truths are the basis of all reasoning.

Now if it should appear that the above, which is one of the most important of these axioms, may be applied to different cases, and that in one case it is true in one sense and false in another sense, we shall gain one of the causes of the perplexity that has attended reasonings based on this principle.

The word "cause," in its widest sense signifies "some antecedent on which existence or change depends." Any circumstance which is so connected with a change, that it would not have taken place without this circumstance, or one of a similar nature, is called the cause of that change. For example, in the ignition of gun-powder, several circumstances are indispensable. There must be circumambient atmosphere, the fire and powder must be in contact, and there must be a hand or some other agent to bring them in contact. If the fire and powder were in a vacuum, and atmosphere should be introduced to produce explosion, the air would be called the cause of the explosion. The contact of the two bodies would also be assigned as a cause, and the hand that secured the contact would be called a cause. If the powder was wet, the water would be called the cause of the non-explosion, and if the dampness were removed this circumstance would be called the cause of the consequent effect. Every kind of circumstance that has any influence in inducing a change, is called a cause of that change. This is the generic use of the term, but there is a specific use, which, though it includes this general idea, includes also a specific difference.

To illustrate before defining, let salt be taken as an example. When it is applied to the tongue, a change is produced, called a sensation, and the salt is the cause of this change.

But in order to secure this effect, it was indispensable that some other thing should act as a cause, in bringing the tongue and salt into contact; it may be the hand of some one of twenty different persons, and one hand would do as well as another. In this case the hand is called the cause of the sensation as much as the salt. But it is manifest that the salt is a cause, in a different sense from the hand. The distinctive difference is this. The salt has a peculiar power given by the Creator, as a part of its nature, which enables that, and no other thing, to produce a given effect, so that if any other thing produced this effect, or if this effect did not follow the contact of the salt and tongue, in the usual manner, the constitution of things would be altered. It would be a miracle, for miracles are a suspension or change in the ordinary operations of causes.

But the other circumstances might have been substituted and the effect still follow. Various agencies might be employed instead of a hand, to bring the salt and tongue in contact. The salt is the only thing, which in all cases, is indispensable, which always does produce the given effect, while no other thing can do it. Other circumstances are indispensable in order to enable the salt to exercise its constitutional powers.

The following then, are the definitions which need to be recognised in all discussions on the subject:

1. Cause (in the generic sense) any antecedent on which existence or change in any manner depends.

2. Producing cause, that peculiar power possessed by each individual existence, which enables it to produce changes so that in given circumstances it could not have been otherwise, without implying an alteration in the nature of things.

3. Occasional Cause. That circumstance which enables a producing cause to act, and which is so far an indispensable antecedent, that either that, or some other thing, is necessary to secure the effect.

The writer prefers new terms, because though other writers vaguely recognise this distinction, the terms they employ have been used in various senses, and this serves to perplex. It is hoped that something will be gained, by adopting new terms, that will convey only the idea which the writer wishes should be attached to them.

In examining the language of common life, we shall find that the word "cause," is indiscriminately applied to every kind of circumstance on which any event depends. For example, a bowl is full of water, a little more is added, and it overflows. The cause of this is asked, and a great variety are assigned. The person who poured the water would be one-that the bowl was already filled, another-that too much water was added, another the attraction of gravity, another-the volition of the person who poured the water, another, and so on. Any thing, which in any manner tended to produce this result would be assigned as a cause. Sometimes causes are sought for no change. Thus why did not the water which was remaining in the bowl run out? But this language always is in the generic sense of the term cause. The inquiry is not for the producing cause, but for any of the circumstances which led to the particular strange event mentioned.

Now there are only two kinds of existences in which changes can be made, viz. matter and mind. Matter is so constituted by the Creator, that it has no inherent power of change. Inertia is one of the properties of matter, which signifies, that it has no constitutional power to change itself, but that it depends on some ab extra cause for every change. Matter can produce changes in matter, according to certain constitutional laws. Thus the magnet moves iron, and a row of bricks may be so placed, that each one shall cause the fall of its next neighbor. But none of these are changes, which arise from any inherent power of action in the matter itself. Every change in matter, must be produced by some other thing which is ab extra. God has formed material things with such properties and laws, as that when they are once put in motion by himself, their changes are perpetuated by a chain of secondary causes, which run back to the Creator as the great first cause of all. And God has so formed our minds, that nothing can strike us as more absurd and impossible, than that any portion of matter, without any foreign ab extra cause, should begin to move itself,

The axiom then, which is allowed by all to be an intuitive, self evident, and universal truth, in reference to matter has this signification. "Every change implies an ab extra

cause."

But is this axiom true in reference to mind? Can no change in mind take place, which is not caused by some other thing ab extra?

That this is not an intuitive, self-evident, universal truth in respect to mind, is demonstrated, by the universal belief in a First Cause, which was the Creator of all other causes. Of course, before any thing else existed, the Eternal Mind did act without any ab extra cause, for there was none in existence. This settles the question that one mind at least, has inherent powers of action. And as this mind is almighty, others may have been formed in the same likeness. This supposition does not contradict the general fundamental axiom of causation. If it be said, that before creation, all things, to God, were as if already in existence, and that when he willed to create, he acted in view of motives, it is replied, that these motives must have been conceptions of what might be, and that these must have originated in the mind itself, for there was no other cause. All the conceptions, desires, and volitions of Deity, before creation, must have arisen from inherent powers of action, and not from foreign causes. This settles the point, that mind differs from matter in being a producing cause of its own actions.

But in analyzing and classifying the changes of mind, we find the following classes :

1. Changes which are produced by ab extra causes. These are all the sensations, which are caused by material objects acting through the senses.

2. Changes which depend for existence on some previous state of mind. For example, fear, is a state of mind which depends for existence on a previous conception of danger. Desire, also, is a state of mind, that depends on a previous conception of some good. These previous states of mind are causes of following effects, in the same sense in which loadstone is the cause of certain effects on iron. Those states of mind which are causes of succeeding states of Inind may be termed constitutional producing causes. They arise, not from any cause ab extra, but from the constitution of mind itself. They are effects which must follow, unless there were a change in the nature of mind.

From this it appears, that mind is formed not only with inherent powers of action, but also so that one state of mind is a producing cause of another state.