comes conclusive. The facts testified to must be, in their nature, possible. The witnesses must be sufficient in point of numbers, and competent as to understanding and means of knowledge. Their characters must be in general fair, and their motives disinterested. Their testimony must be plainly, explicitly given, and the different parts of it must be mutually consistent and corroborative. While of a nature, if untrue, to admit of contradiction, it must be, not contradicted, but confirmed, by other evidence. It must also be followed out, on the part of witnesses, by a correspondent course of action and life.

I would not be understood to say, that these laws of testimony are all of them of equal value; or that a testimony which does not conform to them all is, of course, to be rejected. But I do say, that testimony which does conform to them all is in every case to be received. Such testimony is fully entitled to credit. It is sufficient, of itself, to establish truth. It is such as the world receives and acts upon, without the least hesitation, in regard to all subjects. In short, it is incontestible and conclusive, and cannot be set aside, but upon principles which, so far as respects the wide field of testimony, would introduce a universal scepticism.

I am aware that I use strong language here, and I will illustrate the propriety of it by putting a strong case. There are some persons in this country-ignorant persons, to be surewho seriously doubt whether there is, on the coast of Africa, any such colony as Liberia. They have heard so many contradictory stories respecting the colony-some extolling it, and others condemning it-that they incline to the opinion that there is no colony there. Now what are my readers to think in regard to this matter? We have never been there. The question is to us, or certainly to the most of us, one of pure testimony. Is the testimony conclusive? Let us compare it with our canons, and see. It is certainly possible, in the first place, that that there should be such a colony. Then the witnesses who testify to its existence are numerous. They are capable of forming a judgment respecting it, and have had the requisite means of information. Their characters, in many instances, are good; and although some of them may be actuated by motives of interest, this certainly is not the case with them all. Not a few who tell us that there is such a colony, for they have seen it, would probably be glad if there was no colony there. The testimony on the point

in question has been given with abundant plainness; and so far as respects the fact of the colony, it is entirely consistent with itself. If untrue, it might long ago have been contradicted; but so far from being contradicted, it is continually confirmed. And besides, the authors of the testimony act in consistency with it. They sail to and from the colony, and manifest all that interest in regard to it-either in its favor or against it—which might be expected, on supposition of its real existence.

We see, therefore, that the testimony, as to the existence of Liberia, conforms to all the laws of valid testimony, and consequently is conclusive. There is such a colony. No intelligent person can doubt it. No intelligent person does doubt it, any more than he would, if he had seen it with his eyes.

Still further to illustrate the application of our rules, I may even put a stronger case. I never saw the city of London; and the same, I presume, may be said of the greater portion of my readers; still, we do not doubt that there is such a city, any more than if we had seen it. The fact of its existence has be-come as certain to us, on the evidence of testimony, as if we had derived it from the evidence of sense. And now if we reflect a moment, we shall perceive that the testimony on which we ground our faith as to the existence of London conforms to each and all of the laws of testimony above laid down. We shall perceive, too, that this is the reason, and the sole reason, why our faith in the existence of London is so strong. If the testimony in the case were different; if it failed to conform to some one, two, or three of the laws of valid testimony; if, for example, the witnesses were few, and incompetent, of bad character, and deeply interested; if their testimony had not been confirmed, as might be reasonably expected, and they did not themselves act as though they believed it;-under these circumstances, we might have our faith shaken as to the existence even of London. We might be constrained to disbelieve its existence altogether.

It is important to remark here, that where we can be satisfied as to the authenticity of testimony, the laws of testimony apply equally to facts of ancient date, as to those of recent or present occurrence. We have heard for example of such a city as Carthage. We are satisfied that the testimony as to the existence of this ancient city is authentic. We find, by comparison, that this testimony conforms to all the laws of valid testimony which have been considered. Under these circum

stances, we no more doubt that there was anciently such a city as Carthage, than we do that there is now such a city as London.

We have all heard of such a man as Cicero. The testimony respecting him, as recorded on the page of history, we deem authentic. This testimony we find conformable to all the laws which have been laid down. Hence, we as firmly believe that there lived, some two thousand years ago, such a man as Cicero, as we believe that there now live such men as Lord Brougham or O'Connell.

The only difference as to proof from testimony, between events of ancient and of recent date, relates to the authenticity of the testimony. The question of authenticity may not be so readily settled in the former case, as in the latter. But when settled, the laws of testimony are applicable to both alike, and so far as they apply to both, the proof from testimony will be equal.

The way is now prepared to apply these principles to a particular case, in which all my readers have a deep personal interest; I refer to the testimony in support of Christianity. The evidences of Christianity do not fall, all of them, under the head of testimony. By no means. But it will be seen, in the sequel, that if they did, there would be no room for doubt or hesitancy on the subject. The evidence in the case derived from testimony is of such a nature, and so strong, that it can never be set aside, without violating all the laws of testimony, and adopting principles which, if carried out, would introduce an almost universal skepticism.

The main facts alleged, which go to constitute the christian system, are familiar to all who read the Bible, and need not be repeated here. They rest materially, though (as I said) not wholly, on the evidence of testimony. The authenticity of this testimony, or of the records conveying it, is indubitable. No'one doubts the authenticity of the Orations of Cicero, or the Odes of Horace. Yet I hazard nothing in saying, that the evidence in favor of the authenticity of the four gospels is far greater in amount, and more satisfactory in kind, than that in support of either of the works above mentioned. Presuming then the question of authenticity as being settled, let us look at the testimony in support of Christianity, and compare it with the canons above laid down.

First, then, the facts of the christian system involve no im

possibility. Some of them, to be sure, are marvellous and miraculous, above our comprehension and our power. Still, they are not impossible. They may be true.

Then the witnesses in the case are sufficiently numerous. We have four separate, independent histories of the life, teachings, actions, sufferings, death and resurrection of our Lord Jesus Christ. And in these histories, reference is had to a far greater number of witnesses, amounting in all to hundreds, if not to thousands.

These witnesses generally had the best means of information, and were capable of forming an intelligent judgment, in regard to the facts about which they testified. They were men living at the time, and on the ground. They were eye and ear witnesses of the events which they relate. And these events were of such a nature, that intelligent men in common life were fully competent to judge of their reality.

Again; the writers of the gospels, so far as we can judge from their works, and from other sources of information which have come to us, were men of good moral character. Certainly, the authors of such works, evincing and inculcating the strictest honesty of purpose, and disapproving and condemning every kind of deception, should not be suspected on slight grounds, of an intention to deceive.

Especially should they not be suspected, since they had no motive of interest to induce them to fabricate a deception, and pass it off upon the world, but every consideration of a worldly nature was impelling them the other way. The price of proclaiming and publishing the gospel message was to them the loss of all things; and they had every reason to expect beforehand that it would be so.

Again, the testimony of these men is given in the plainest and most direct terms. It is altogether an explicit testimony, without any attempt at evasion, or equivocation.

And not only so, it is throughout a concurrent testimonyconsistent with itself. There are differences, indeed, in the gospels. The witnesses do not tell precisely the same story. Nor could it be reasonably expected that they would. It would be a serious objection to them, if they did. Still, their testimony is, on the whole, concurrent. It is a united testimony, going to establish, as with one voice, the main facts of the case.

It should be further considered, that the story of these wit

nesses, if not true, admitted of a ready and easy contradiction. If, for example, Christ did not feed thousands of people with a few loaves and fishes; if he did not heal the sick and raise the dead; if he was not tried, condemned, crucified, and buried; and if he did not rise from the dead on the third day; how easy to have effectually contradicted these stories, when they were first published. Yet they were not contradicted. They could not be. So far from this, they received confirmation from a thousand sources. The enemies of Christ, as well as his friends, admitted the reality of his miracles, the former ascribing them to magic and Beelzebub, the latter to the power of God. Great numbers, who were actually concerned in the crucifixion of Christ, were soon found among his followers, and united their testimony with that of his previous followers, in confirmation of the gospel history. The main facts of this history have been receiving continual confirmation, coming from all quarters, from the times of their occurrence to the present day.

And to crown the whole, the original witnesses in this most important case lived and acted as though their testimony was true. They certainly knew whether it was true or not; and they proclaimed aloud, and everywhere, in their future livesin their toils and perils, their sacrifices and sufferings, and under the bloody hand of the executioner-that it was true. They sealed their testimony, in most cases, with their lives. As I have said before, men will not act without motives. Indeed, they cannot, more than they can without faculties or members. Now if the testimony of the original witnesses to the gospel history was true, they had motives enough to just that course of life which they pursued. But if their testimony was not true, and they knew it was not, under what possible motive or influence could they have acted? What could have sustained them, amid all their persecutions and sufferings, in prison, in exile, and in the most terrible forms of death?

I affirm therefore, in conclusion, and I feel authorized to do it with the utmost assurance, that the testimony in support of the gospel history conforms to all the laws of valid testimony, and consequently is conclusive. Hence, the gospel history, and with it the entire system of Christianity, is true. It is supported. If there were no evidence in support of it but that of testimony, this alone would be, on all reasonable grounds, incontestible, resistless.

SECOND SERIES, VOL. II. NO. III.

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