"If," says he, "some learned philosopher who had been abroad, in giving an account of the curious observations he had made in his travels, should say, that he had seen an animal, which he calls by a certain name, that begat and brought forth himself, and yet had a sire and dam distinct from himself; that he had an appetite and was hungry before he had a being; that his master, who led and governed him at pleasure, was always led and governed by him, and driven by him where he pleased; that when the animal moved, he always took a step before the first step; that he went with his head first, and yet always went tail foremost, and this though he had neither head nor tail; it would be no imprudence," says Edwards, "to tell such a traveller, although a man of profound learning, that he had never seen such an animal as he described; that he had no idea of it, and never could have."

2. That testimony may be conclusive, it is necessary that there should be a competent number of witnesses. What this number is, I will not now undertake to decide. Our Saviour, in framing rules for his church, requires that " in the mouth of two or three witnesses, every word may be established." Matt. 18:16. Moses enjoins the same law on the Israelites, especially in cases of capital offence. "At the mouth of two or three witnesses, shall he that is worthy of death be put to death." Deut. 17: 6. Our civil courts think themselves authorized to act, I believe, on something less than this amount of testimony. It is sufficient for my present purpose to say, that testimony, in order to be conclusive, must be ample. The number of witnesses must be such, that those who hear them can have no good reason to object or hesitate on account of their fewness.

3. That testimony may be conclusive, the witnesses must have had the means, and the capacity, of forming a correct judgment in reference to the things about which they testify. They must be original witnesses, deriving their knowledge, not from others, but from their own observations. They must be able to speak, not what they have heard, but what they know. And they must be of sufficient age and understanding to form a judgment of the things about which they speak. Thus, on ordinary subjects, the testimony of a child would have less. weight than that of a man. Or if the question were one of science, or of art, the testimony of an ignorant person would have little weight, compared with that of one who was familiar

ly acquainted with the particular subject of inquiry. A person, for example, unacquainted with law, would be incompetent to testify on points of law. He might not even understand the terms in which questions were propounded to him. A person unacquainted with chemical analyses and combinations would be incompetent to testify on questions of this nature. The general rule is (and it is a very obvious one) that in order to a valid testimony, witnesses must have had the means, and must be intellectually capable, of coming to a knowledge, or forming a judgment of the particular points on which they testify.

4. It is necessary to a conclusive testimony, that the witnesses should possess, each of them, an unexceptionable moral character. The value of testimony, in every case, depends very materially on the character of him who utters it. Who believes a notorious liar, even if he chances to speak the truth? And with about the same pertinency it may be asked, Who confides in the testimony of an individual, whose character is stained. with any vice? For in order to be the perpetrator of vice, in any of its forms, a person must, of necessity, have broken down his conscience. He must have divested himself of moral principle, and perhaps also of the feebler restraints of pride and shame. And now he is in a state to perpetrate anything-to fall into any new vice or crime to which he may be strongly tempted. He would sell his Saviour for less than what Judas received for him. His word he would barter for a song. more prominent vices usually hang in clusters. It is rare that we see one of them long standing out upon the character of a man alone. Hence, to be in a situation to bear a strong, unquestionable testimony, a person must possess an unstained, an unimpeachable moral character. And hence, with the utmost propriety it is determined by our laws, that certain defects of moral character utterly disqualify a person to bear testimony in a court of justice.

The

5. In order to give an unquestionable testimony, not only must a person's general character be good, but he must be understood, at the time, to be disinterested. He must be under the influence of no strong, impelling motives to mis-state the facts of which he speaks, or to falsify his testimony. Men act from motives. They can no more act without them, than they can without faculties or members. And we are always influenced by motives just in proportion to the force with which, at the time, they strike us, or the strength with which they bear

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upon our minds. Now a person may possess, in general, a fair moral character. He may be so far under the influence of high moral principles, as to be effectually restrained in ordinary cir cumstances, from falsifying his word, or perpetrating any vice. And yet, when placed in new and peculiar circumstances, where strong motives of interest are brought to bear upon him, his course may waver-his moral strength may fail. To favor himself or those whom he loves, he may consent, for once, to conceal or mis-state the truth. It is on this account that our laws have determined, that certain relations or circumstances of interest disqualify a person altogether to give testimony. It is on this account that testimony is always suspected, just in proportion to the degree of interest which the witness is supposed to have in the question at issue.

6. It is necessary, in order to a convincing testimony, that it should be given in plain, direct terms. Studied, evasive, equivocal language is always suspicious. It indicates that the person using it has some sinister object in view. He has some purpose in mind, aside from that of telling the plain, honest truth. Besides, evasive, equivocal language cannot be easily and certainly understood. It may mean this or that; and no one can determine, without an explanation, what it does mean. The rule we are considering is therefore one of obvious propriety and importance. The language of testimony should be plain and explicit; and the more so the better. It should be, not only such as can be understood, but such as cannot well be misunderstood.

7. When several witnesses give testimony to the same facts, it is necessary that their statements should be, on all essential points, concurrent. This does not imply, that they must all tell precisely the same story, or that they must agree in every minute particular. Such an agreement would be rather suspicious, than otherwise. It would furnish ground for the conjecture, that there had been concert between the witnesses, and that a story had been fabricated. But convincing testimony must be so far concurrent, that no part of it shall be self-contradictory. And more than this, it must concur in establishing the main facts or points of a case. There may be slight variations of statement, one witness omitting what another relates; or one dwelling more fully and circumstantially upon some particular points than another. Such variations are to be expected in honest witnesses; and they are an indication of honesty, rather than otherwise. But there must be a substantial agree

ment. Their testimony must be mutually corroborative, and must go to establish the main points of the case for which it is introduced.

8. It adds not a little to the weight of testimony, when the facts alleged are of such a nature, that the witnesses, if they have falsified, are open to detection. So obviously just is this rule, that any case which fails to come under it does not admit, on this very account, of being substantiated in the most satisfactory manner by testimony. For example, suppose two or three individuals should profess to have intercourse with the spiritual world, and from time to time should relate very seriously the wonders which they had seen there. They have no external proofs to urge in support of their statements. These rest on their simple testimony; but this testimony, is uniform and consistent, and is entitled to all the weight which their general character for truth and honesty can give it; still, if they have falsified, their fellow men have no means of detecting them, they cannot look into the spiritual world, and cannot tell whether the witnesses have spoken the truth or not. Compare this now with another case. I receive a letter, subscribed by two or three credible witnesses, informing me that an absent friend is sick, and urging me to visit him immediately. Every one perceives that the testimony in this latter case is vastly stronger and more satisfactory than in the former. Why? The number of witnesses is the same; and the characters which they sustain for integrity and honesty may be equal. But in the latter case, the witnesses, if they have falsified, are open to detection. And they certainly will be detected; they knew they should be, when they wrote. Hence, they had stronger inducements than the witnesses in the former case could have, to speak the truth.

9. Convincing testimony will be, not contradicted, but confirmed, at least so far as might be reasonably expected, by other evidence. Wherever this rule fails to apply, the testimony, however good in other respects, is rendered suspicious, if it be not destroyed. For example, suppose a navigator to return from the Pacific Ocean, and assert that he had discovered a large and important island. He gives the latitude and longitude of the place, and describes its peculiarities, its productions, and inhabitants. His whole crew agree with him in the statement, and thus we have their united testimony to the fact in question. But suppose, on examination, that they have brought nothing away with them from the discovered island. They

have none of its peculiarities in their possession, they have nothing to exhibit in evidence that they have ever been there. Suppose, also, that shortly after, another navigator returns, who passed over the same latitude and longitude-the same spot exactly, and saw no island. Suppose this last is followed by a third, who passed over the same spot, and bears the same testimony. He saw no island. What now are we to think of the testimony of the first? It is in great measure, if not utterly, destroyed. By failing of the requisite confirmation, it is rendered of no account, and its author is justly regarded as a falsifier. There are various ways in which testimony, if true, may be confirmed; and in which, in most cases, it will be confirmed. It may be confirmed by circumstantial evidence, as well as positive; by proofs direct and indirect. And in order to be convincing, it must be confirmed, at least so far as, from the nature of the case, might reasonably be expected.

10. I mention but another law of testimony, which is, that it be followed up by a correspondent, consistent course of action. The author of it must live and act as though his testimony was true. This position may be illustrated by a familiar example. In the year 1492, Columbus returned from his first voyage to America, and testified to Ferdinand and Isabella that he had discovered a new world. His whole company united with him in this testimony. But suppose that, instead of acting as though what they said was true, they had appeared and acted just as if it was not true. They exhibit nothing in evidence that they have discovered another continent. They can give no concurrent, consistent description of this continent, or of any portion of it. They are unwilling to return, and make another voyage. They are unwilling that others should go upon their track, and verify the testimony which they have given. In view of a course of conduct such as this, who would have yielded to Columbus the least credit? Who would not have denounced him, as a gross deceiver? The truth is, we expect consistency in honest men. We feel that we have a right to expect it. And where we do not perceive it in a witness, or at least some reasonable portion of it, we lose all confidence in his testimony. Unless strongly corroborated by other evidence, we reject it as worthless.

I have thus stated, under several particulars, what I conceive to be the laws of testimony. I have noticed the conditions, the circumstances, under which the evidence of testimony be