I have now to give a short account of the nature of the philosophy which these 'rough notes' exhibit or involve.

It perhaps may be said, that there are three main heads or kinds of philosophy in England at present, each of which it seems to me has appendant error: and it is against these errors that a great deal of what I say is directed.

Of these three kinds of philosophy, as I call them, the first which I will mention is the Philosophy of the Human Mind' or Psychology, and there appears to me to attach itself to a great deal of that a very mistaken view, which I have called generally the wrong psychology or mis-psychology.

For the particular nature of this error I must refer to what follows, and will only briefly now say about it, that it consists, substantially, in the attempt to analyze our consciousness while nevertheless we suppose ourselves, who have the consciousness, to be particular local beings in the midst of an universe of things or objects similar to what we ourselves are. My feeling about the whole 'Philosophy of the Human Mind is this: that at present it is attacked, and with reason, from two opposite sides; that its philosophy will not satisfy philosophers, nor its physiology physiologists; and that it will have to divide itself, for utility and productiveness, into two lines of thought, very different, rarely likely to be pursued by the same people, each very likely to be despised by those who sympathize with the other, but quite consistent the one with the other, and really of such a nature, that the more purely and independently each takes its own way, the better is it likely to be not only for itself, but also for the other.

I am myself very much of opinion that the old

vein of the Philosophy of the Human Mind, or noöpsychology, is worked out, and that whatever there was to be got from it (not much, I think, ever) is got already.

But it seems to me that the way is singularly open and inviting now for a good physio-psychology, as I should call it, by which however I mean something possibly very different from what several who have already treated that subject would mean.

Such a study is a mental and moral human anatomy, and a mental and moral comparative anatomy: but I do not believe that these, or either of them, can ever be pursued with good result unless the pursuers of them dismiss from their minds what I should call philosophy-either looking upon it as a different line of thought, or else ignoring it-in any case not thinking that it is their science which will answer the higher questions of the human mind, or tell us what we ought to do.

I have always had a very strong opinion that the later psychology, or Philosophy of the Human Mind, has neglected a large province of consideration which really belonged to it, in its failing to take notice of, and to try to bring into relation with human intelligence, the various intelligence of our humbler fellow-creatures in the universe, the lower animals: mind belongs to them as well as to us. Mental human anatomy, which is of two kinds, the anatomy of the body pursued as far as it can be in the direction of the mind, and the observation of the results of the action of mind in connexion with this-such psychology always has considered in its province, though lately it has been pursued with special fruit: we want now more of mental comparative anatomy, or the study of the varieties of animal intelligence, above alluded to.

But for all this we must disengage psychology from the philosophy which it has mingled with itself, and which in all probability it will try still to mingle with itself. Hitherto the result of its doing so has been in the main that confusion of thought on which I have dwelt at length in the following pages. Now probably its effort will be to furnish a philosophy (less confused indeed) from itself better understood than before, and it will tell us that we must be satisfied with that philosophy. In my view, this course will effectually ruin itself.

Philosophy, by which I mean the study of thought and feeling not as we see them variously associated with corporeal organization, and producing various results in the universe, but as we understand, think, feel them of ourselves and from within, is something to me of an entirely different nature, and leads to entirely different fields of speculation from the physiopsychology which I have been speaking of. I think that those who have the truest view of the one will also have the truest of the other. It does not seem to me that anything, for instance, as to our moral action waits for a better physio-psychology, except in that subordinate degree in which such action is likely to be altered and benefited by any increase of our knowledge of any kind. In my view, the question of the relation of our mind to our corporeal organization, and the question of the distribution of mind more or less like ours through various organizations, are the two questions of physics far the most interesting: but they are physics after all. Whatever may be found out about them seems to me to have quite a subordinate bearing upon the great questions of the nature of knowledge and of moral sentiments and obligations. These

belong to what I have called philosophy, which rises high above the other, or if we prefer the language, underlies it as its foundation: how, I shall discuss in the following pages.

I think then that the Philosophy of the Human Mind' is now in the way to divide itself into different branches, all, it seems to me, hopeful and promising result the manner in which its method has hitherto been faulty is one of the matters of my discussion.

The second kind of philosophy which we have among us is the true and real philosophy, this which I have described as one line of those into which the Philosophy of the Human Mind is likely to divide itself: but it seems to have an appendant error of great importance, which I have described in the ensuing pages as 'notionalism' and 'relativism', terms in a great measure, though perhaps not quite, equivalent.

I will only briefly describe this here as the realizing (and any realizing must be mis-realizing, wrongly realizing) our logical terms. We get from this what we may call a philosophy of 'notions', and knowledge, instead of bringing us into real contact with the thing we know, appears as something between us and it, either altering its real reality to accommodate it to us, or forming some screen or barrier between us and it, or some way disguising it—but on this I shall have to speak in abundance.

I shall have to consider, against a good deal of the third kind of philosophy which I have yet to speak of, that the mind is really active, and that its proper creations, so to call them, are realities; but, also, against such views as I have just mentioned, that its logical creations are for a temporary purpose only, and that the greatest care must be taken not to realize them:

that a merely logical philosophy is worse than none, and much worse than that which I am now going to mention.

The third kind of philosophy, though it is not properly philosophy, and is only good in its own place when it does not claim to be so, is that manner of looking at the universe to which belongs the physiopsychology of which I lately spoke: and what I said about that applies to the many other sciences into which this study of the universe divides itself. The error belonging to it consists in its claiming to be philosophy, or claiming to be all that need be considered. This error I have called ultra-phenomenalism or misphenomenalism, and I have given the reasons for my language: it is the same manner of thought as is very frequently called 'positivism'.

A real philosophy without notionalism, and a real, honest, thorough, study of nature without the feeling that we are to find our philosophy and morality, more than very subordinately, there-these are the two things which I should like to see co-existing, and which I should think not only might co-exist, but would each be the better for the existence of the other: and for both alike is needed a good logic, in which we are neither on the one side afraid of logical suppositions and abstractions, nor on the other hand disposed to rest in them as if the right dealing with them was the knowledge, and they all the furniture our mind needed: and with all these a good history of advance of human thought and feeling, upon which depends what I have in these pages called 'Real' Logic: all these things seem to me to belong the one to the other: the warfare constantly carried on between the partizans of one and another seems quite uncalled for, and unreasonable. Of them all, the 'philosophy' which I