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certain to be an abuse of it as logic—that is, there will be a supposition more or less express and distinct, but always without reason given for it, that it, the logic, is to supply us with the end as well as the means. This is precisely what I understand as the proceeding of M. Comte, and it seems to me the proceeding, to some degree, of all those who, like Mr Mill, put moral phenomena in the universe simply by the side of physical. Suppose 'sociology', a science of the logic, and treated as such by Mr Mill, tells us that it is a fact or law of human history that at a certain stage of civilization man passes through a metaphysical stage in which he talks of the ideal of the good and right, and then passes out of this into another, the positivist, in which he looks at all this as figment-on what principle are we, individual men, to infer from this that we are therefore to look upon it so? The logic of the moral sciences is to guide us in sciences of the fact-what men do do—what are the laws by which they do act—what they ought to do, what we ought to think, belongs to the supposed teleology. By what right, and on what principle of logic, so to call it, does the sociology settle the teleology?

This greater importance of the teleology in reference to the moral sciences, above that of the metaphysics in reference to the physical sciences, is what I meant when I said that in the former, art came before science. In another way we may put it thus the moral world is man's creation: the phenomenal world is not. All the uses to which we put our physical knowledge, all our inventions and applications, are a small thing compared with the vast amount of that physical knowledge, and a main reason why they are so large as they are is that we have pursued the physical knowledge to a considerable degree for its own sake, and independent of them-science first, art afterwards. But sociology and ethology (Mr Mill's)-independent of the consideration how far societies and individuals have been right in what we find, by these sciences, they do do and have done-are matters of quite a different sort of importance-they will not at all stand in this way as simple sciences of fact, even if we can conceive them so. The truth is, that the conception of them is not clear-History and Teleology are mixed in the conception of each science-sciences of this kind are not truly

analogous to phenomenal and physical science: so far as they are really carried out according to the conception (I speak of course mainly of sociology and of the other only as a supposed parallel of it) they will be a bad mixture of history and speculation, the former rendered inaccurate by the latter, the latter not recognizing its proper position, and trammelled by the former, instead of hand-in-hand with it.

Since adding to his later editions what I have been noticing, Mr Mill has published his 'Utilitarianism.' On this I say just so much, in illustration of the present matter, that it seems to me to show how logic, that is, a principle of decision among conflicting claims to truth, is wanted for the Teleology, more than for the subordinate science. Without saying here the least whether Mr Mill is right or not in considering 'human happiness' to be the great end or ideal, I look only, and that for a moment, at the principles upon which he considers himself to be justified in saying so. Roughly, these seem to me to be, that with human happiness thus taken morality can be made an inductive science, and that happiness is what men do desire. Suppose both these things to be so, I ask myself, do they establish what Mr Mill wants, that human happiness is that to which men ought to direct all their effort, or their highest effort? that it is the proper end, the end to be chosen in preference to other conceivable ends? Have we in this a real Teleology, or merely the same thing which I have just noticed in M. Comte? Are fact and ideal rightly put together? I do not the least here want to press upon Mr Mill, being quite willing to go on, Can anybody make a Teleology, or put fact and ideal properly together? Does not this carry us back to the hopeless discussions of Ethics long, long ago? Perhaps it may: all my point is, that here are the real difficulties of Ethics, and that Mr Mill's sociology and ethology will only solve subordinate ones.

CHAPTER X.

DR WHEWELL'S PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE.

I COME now to Dr Whewell's series of works, originally constituting in conjunction 'The Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences', which he has since amplified and made into three works, the 'History of Scientific Ideas', the 'Philosophy of Discovery', and the 'Novum Organon Renovatum'.

As I understand the arrangement, the first of the three above-mentioned works or portions may be considered as the philosophy of the History of Science, which history Dr Whewell had first investigated, and exhibited in detail, as a basis (certainly much the fittest basis) for all speculation about the advance of the science, or Real Logic.

The last two of the three works may be considered as upon Scientific Method, the former being a History of such Method, i.e. of the views which have been entertained about it, and of the manner in which men actually have proceeded in advancing, or trying to advance, knowledge: the last being the Philosophy of this History (so to call it) which of course is the exhibition of the proper method, the Real Logic itself, for which all the rest is foundation and preparation: the actual Novum Organon Renovatum'.

We have then two histories, or a double Rationale, of Human Thought: the one of Human Thought about the universe, which is the history of the progress in Science itself: the other of Human Thought about Real Logic (as I have called it), that is, about the way in which knowledge ought to be pursued and advanced.

We each one of us learn, and the human race learns, and between the two processes there must be some, and may be a very great, analogy. Real Logic, as I have described it, belongs

to both. So far as there is analogy, the history of learning by the race must be that of learning by the individual, ‘writ large'; and must aid the understanding of the latter in the same kind of way in which Plato expected (rightly or wrongly) that politics would help the understanding of morals. And the growth of knowledge in the individual, on the other hand, is something conveniently at hand for us continually to notice, and within a compass possible for us to notice: it may, on its side, greatly help our understanding of the other. In fact, however, in the manner which I have noticed, this learning by the individual is not a thing of which the rationale has been traced out very accurately; as happens with things near at hand to us, we do not know much about it.

Dr Whewell's starting point is then in many respects the same as that of those Philosophers of the Human Mind, who describe, according as they conceived it, the growth of individual thought and experience. As by that practice of the limbs and senses which results in greater sharpness and skill in the use of them, coupled with activity of mind and of reason, we learn individually to see and think of things about us in the manner in which we all of us do, so the race-by that continual use of sense in fresh and fresh observation, which is experience, and the continued improvement of sense, so to call it, by the invention of instruments, all this also coupled with continual activity of mind, in reasoning, speculating, and discussing— has learnt (as represented by its instructed and scientific intellects) to see and think of things in the way in which it now does, and which we describe as its present stage of knowledge or scientific attainment.

Dr Whewell's book, though not starting like Mr Mill's from the science of Logic, yet starts with what I describe as a more logical point of view. That is, his book is a view, substantially, of change in human thought: not a view, as I have described Mr Mill's to be, of the objective world such as we may be supposed, standing by, to see or know it. The history of the growth of human thought about the universe forms a subject of consideration in some respects analogous to the past history of the universe itself, and to some minds it may be quite as interesting. It is a history not likely to have sug

gested itself as a special subject of consideration before our time: and in our time, what has made it do so has been without doubt one science in especial, astronomy. The ideas of human scientific progress would probably not have been what they are, or even like what they are, if it had not been for that science, assumed, with more or less reason, as a type of the others.

This change of human thought about the universe is a matter of fact, quite as much as the universe itself is, and it is a matter of fact which is a more convenient starting point for a Real Logic than a description (or anything of the nature of a description) of the universe itself and the facts of it, because the manner in which we must describe the universe is a varying manner according to this change of thought about it, and it ought to come last in our logic, rather than first. In spite of Mr Mill's desire to escape from notions to things, his Real Logic, it seems to me, is more notional than Dr Whewell's. There seems to me to be in Dr Whewell's book more of what I might call an open air effect, more of contact with living thoughts of men and with nature and actual fact. A description of the universe, or what amounts to such, set before a view of the logic of our knowing it, can hardly avoid either being notional, or else anticipating what should come afterwards, and, so far as the logic may really act practically, hindering the growth of knowledge. Mr Mill's old logic of substances and attributes, and his newer logic of co-existences and uniformities, are safe from the latter of these dangers, but still they seem to me (it may be prejudice) less in harmony with actual phenomenal nature before us, and with the way in which men have fruitfully and profitably speculated about it, than Dr Whewell's language and way of speaking. This is what I should mean by describing the latter as more real, less notional, than the former.

The view, such as Dr Whewell has given it, of the growth of knowledge in the human race, is invaluable, not only in respect✓ of our understanding this knowledge in the race, and the best way of our pushing it further, but in respect of the comparison between the growth of knowledge in the race and in the individual. I have said on a former occasion, that the growth of

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