does not understand the first principles of his subject. If he will find out why St. Peter neither baptized nor absolved Nero, he will have found out why he did not depose him. Until a Christian world existed, there was no apta materia for the supreme judicial power of the Church in temporal things. Therefore St. Paul laid down as a rule of law that he had nothing to do in judging those that were without the unity of the Church.

But when a Christian world came into existence, the civil society of man became subject to the spiritual direction of the Church. So long, however, as individuals only subjected themselves, one by one, to its authority, the conditions necessary for the exercise of its office were not fully present. The Church guided men, one by one, to their eternal end; but as yet the collective society of nations was not subject to its guidance. It is only when nations and kingdoms become socially subject to the supreme doctrinal and judicial authority of the Church, that the conditions of its exercise are verified. When the senate and people of the Roman Empire were only half Christian, the Church still refrained from acts which would have affected the whole body of the State. When the whole had become Christian, the whole became subject to the Divine Law, of which the Roman Pontiff was the supreme expositor and executive (pp. 82, 83).

The Christian law of faith and morals passed into the public law of Christendom. Then arose the Christian jurisprudence, in which the Roman Pontiff was recognized as the supreme Judge of Princes and of People, with a twofold coercion spiritual by his own authority, and temporal by the secular arm. These two acted as one. Excommunication and deposition were so united in the jurisprudence of Christendom, that he who pronounced the sentence of excommunication pronounced also the sentence of deposition; as before the repeal of our Test Acts, if a member of the Church of England became Catholic, or even Nonconformist, he was ipso facto incapable of sitting in Parliament or holding office of State. And by the first of William III. the heir to the Crown, if he become Catholic or marry a Catholic, ipso facto forfeits the succession. Nothing is more certain upon the face of history, and no one has proved more abundantly than Dr. Döllinger, that in every case of deposition as of Philip le Bel, Henry IV. of Germany, Frederick II., and the like, the sentence of the Electors, Princes, States and people, and the public opinion and voice of nations, had already pronounced sentence of rejection upon those tyrants before the Pontiffs pronounced the sentence of excommunication and deposition. It was only by the faith and free will of nations that they became socially subject to this jurisprudence; it was by their free will that it was maintained in vigour; and it was in conformity with their free will that it was exercised by the Pontiffs (pp. 84, 85).

On a matter of this kind, the writer's special position adds quite singular weight to his words. One who took so prominent a part in the Vatican Council-one who, on the very morrow of his expressing the doctrines we have cited, has been raised to the highest honour which the Supreme Pontiff can confer-carries with him the greatest possible weight, in authentically interpreting the mind of the Holy See. But

apart from this altogether, the Cardinal's arguments and citations have that force, which Mr. Gladstone in vain tries to enervate. These "first two chapters," says the "Civiltà,” (March 20th, p. 739) " are worthy of great consideration for the manner in which the relations are set forth between the Church and a schismatical state." And our best way of showing their power will be to examine, one by one, Mr. Gladstone's attempted replies.

(1) The Cardinal-as also indeed F. Newman-had laid great stress on Pius IX.'s famous reply to the Academia on the deposing power. But in that very speech, replies Mr. Gladstone (p. 72), the Pope declares, not that he was, but that he is "the supreme judge of Christendom " ; and Mr. Gladstone puts this word "is" into capitals, that it may have due emphasis. Certainly the Cardinal never thought of denying that the Pope is, by divine right and therefore in every age, "the supreme judge of Christendom"; i.e. the supreme judge over Catholic peoples, in all matters primarily temporal which bear on faith and morality. But then at this period we may truly say that there is no "Christendom." It is plain on the surface (to use Mgr. Capel's phrase, quoted by Mr. Gladstone in p. 73) that such a right as we have mentioned must be "in abeyance," so long as there are no Catholic peoples over whom it can be exercised. And no one will say that now there is any nation, which retains (as a nation), or approaches to retaining, that pervasive endemic faith-penetrating to the very core the people's whole moral convictions which characterized the Europe of the middle ages. M. Périn does not hesitate to say, that the mediaval peoples lived by the Catholic Faith as the body lives by the soul." What (alas!) can be a greater contrast with this, than the national sentiment of any country whatever in the nineteenth century? We think Mr. Gladstone has done much service in p. 74, by setting forth plainly in Cardinal Manning's words the full Catholic doctrine, which holds where a nation is genuinely Catholic. But he seems to forget that, when the Cardinal speaks of "Christian princes," the context shows that he is speaking,-not of King Alfonso or the Austrian Emperor-but of the sovereigns who have reigned in times past over this or that nation, unanimously and profoundly Catholic.

(2) But, argues Mr. Gladstone (pp. 45, 73), the deposing power is asserted by the "Unam sanctam," "which is admitted on all hands to be ex cathedrâ." Now in the first place we might affirm with undeniable truth, that the deposing power is neither mentioned nor implied in the "Unam sanctam."

But

we do not wish to insist on this; because we frankly confess that the principles, laid down in that Bull, may not unreasonably be thought to warrant the deposing power as their legitimate consequence. But once more we would beg Mr. Gladstone's attention to one critical fact, on which our own whole controversy with him in this matter hinges. No one can read the "Unam sanctam" with any care, and fail to see that Boniface VIII. was exclusively referring to the condition of Christendom amidst which he lived. The Cardinal prints the Bull at length (pp. 182, 4), and we trust our readers will study it. Its very first words sound the key-note of the whole pronouncement: "One Holy Catholic Apostolic Church." The Pope was contemplating civil societies in no other respect, than as integrating (if we may so express ourselves) the Catholic Church; he was contemplating the Christendom of his time, in its corporately organized aspect. What means-he asked himself has Christ given, in order that the thorough unity of this Christendom may be preserved, against the schismatical aggression and anti-Catholic spirit of such tyrants as Philip le Bel? The answer to this question is set forth in the Bull, and is most intelligible. The Holy See is the divinely appointed centre of unity, for states as for individuals. All alike are to be retained in the fulness of Catholic faith and communion, by submission to the Holy See in all which (in the judgment of that See) concerns faith and morals. We drew out an analysis of the Bull in our last number (p. 206); and we maintain with the utmost confidence, that no syllable of the doctrine therein infallibly defined has any direct bearing whatever on the relations between any existing State and the Holy See. And when we say "no direct bearing," what we mean is this. The Bull infallibly defines, how the divinely appointed relation between Church and State would be exhibited in accordance with such divine appointment, under the circumstances of that period. It defines neither less nor more than this. Important inferences can, no doubt, be drawn from this definition, as regards the legitimate relation between Church and State under existing circumstances. But all this is (as we have said) a matter of inference, and is neither directly nor indirectly contained in Boniface VIII.'s enouncement. We should further add, as we stated in our last number, that we can see no reason whatever for regarding the Bull as a definition of faith. It condemns implicitly all tenets opposed to its teaching, as theologically false; but we can see no reason whatever for thinking, that the Pope intended to condemn those tenets as heretical. Infallibility extends, not only to the Deposit, but to such non-revealed

truths as are intimately bound up therewith. The Pope defined infallibly then-not that the doctrine which he lays down was actually taught by the Apostles-but only that it was a true inference from what they taught, if taken in connection with the circumstances of Boniface VIII.'s time.

Having so far explained our meaning, we may proceed, without fear of misconception, to a further statement. A great deal has been said about a difference of theme which is supposed by some to exist, between the general body of the Bull and its final clause. We submit that there is no such difference at all. The final clause is this: "Porro subesse Romano Pontifici omni humanæ creaturæ declaramus, dicimus, definimus et pronunciamus omnino esse de necessitate salutis." And it has been maintained by Mgr. Fessler and others, that this clause enforces the submission of individuals to the Roman Pontiff, but not of civil rulers as such. Yet the term "humanæ creaturæ " is a singular one; and it seems somewhat spiritless and forced to regard it as a mere synonym for "homini." On the other hand the term occurs in the Vulgate once, and (we believe) only once; and there indisputably it includes "the civil ruler" with very special prominence : "Subjecti igitur estote omni humanæ creaturæ propter Deum; sive regi quasi præcellenti, sive ducibus tanquam ab eo missis ad vindictam malefactorum laudem verò bonorum" (1 Pet. ii. 13, 14).* For ourselves, we should be disposed thus to paraphrase the final clause: "Moreover, we define that the aforesaid principles are of strict obligation; that obedience is due to the Pope by Christ's Law, not only on the part of men as individuals, but on the part of civil rulers as such, according to the exposition hereinbefore set forth." On the other hand, it is absolutely certain that Boniface VIII. was not speaking of all civil rulers, who have ever existed or shall ever exist for no one ever dreamed of his meaning to include such rulers as Nero or, again, Constantine. The whole context shows (as we have argued) that he was speaking exclusively of kings and peoples, as they existed before his eyes; as they would ever exist under the normal condition of Christianity; as they form (in the way in which they then formed) an integral part of the "One Holy Catholic and Apostolic Church," which he began with commemorating.

:

It is sometimes objected against this view of the Bull, that Leo X., when confirming it in the Fifth Lateran Council,

It is only fair, however, to mention such passages as "predicate Evangelium omni creaturæ," Mark xvi. 15; and Evangelium prædicatum est in universâ creaturâ quæ sub cœlo est," Col. i. 23.

explained the words "omni humanæ creature" as synonymous with "omnibus Christi fidelibus." But no possible linguistic theory can make "Christi fidelibus" a verbal version of "humanæ creaturæ "; and we must look elsewhere therefore, for an explanation of Leo X.'s language. We would put the matter thus. When Boniface VIII. said that every human creature is, by divine law, subject to the Pope,he necessarily meant to say, (1) that every human creature is bound to become one of Christ's faithful; and (2) that baptized Christians are subject to the Pope in such or such a way. Quite relevantly therefore did Leo X. confirm the "Unam sanctam" as teaching this last-named doctrine.* But this does not touch the question, whether Leo X. speaks of "Christ's faithful" merely as individuals, or inclusively in their capacity of civil functionaries. His words do not, by themselves, at all precisely indicate that he intended the latter but still less do they decisively indicate the reverse; and the obvious presumption is, that he intended to approve the Bull as a whole. Moreover, in the very sentence in which he approves it, he proceeds at once to claim authority over civil magistrates as such. 'Forbidding," he he says, "in virtue of holy obedience" not only cardinals, patriarchs, &c., but also "dukes, counts, princes, barons, parliaments, royal officials, judges, advocates," &c. &c. "to use " the Praginatic Sanction "in any acts judicial or extrajudicial, or even allege it, or judge according to it. . . . or keep it in their houses or other places whether private or public," &c. &c. We can see nothing then in Leo X.'s "Pastor Eternus," which throws any difficulty in the way of our conclusion on the teaching of the "Unam sanctam."

66

But we must repeat what we said in our last number (p. 202), that no Catholic, as such, is obliged to accept the Bull in the sense we have given it. Considering that Mgr. Fessler's treatise on infallibility has been passed by a committee of theologians, and complimented by the Holy Father,we may not suppose that any position, prominently advocated in his volume, violates any existing Catholic obligation. How far hereafter theologians may be expected to arrive at

These are Leo X.'s words: "Et cùm de necessitate salutis existat omnes Christi fideles Romano Pontifici subesse, prout divinæ Scripturæ et sanctorum Patrum testimonio edocemur, ac Constitutione fel. mem. Bonifacii Papa VIII. quæ incipit 'Unam sanctam' declaratur ; pro eorundem fidelium animarum salute, ac Romani Pontificis et hujus sanctæ Sedis supremâ auctoritate, et Ecclesiæ sponsæ suæ unitate et potestate, Constitutionem ipsam, sacro approbante Concilio, innovamus et approbamus." Observe the word which we have italicised