H. OF R.] Sub-Treasury Bill. possess an implied power to incorporate a national bank, to show, at least, that the convention did not intentionally withhold the said power from Congress. Now, sir, if this cannot be done, but, on the contrary, if it can be proved that the subject in question was agitated in the convention which framed the constitution; that propositions were there made to invest Congress with power to charter a bank, and that all propositions having that object in view were rejected by the convention, it necessarily follows that Congress possess no such power, whether expressed or implied, the decision of the Supreme Court to the contrary notwithstanding. I then take this ground: that, inasmuch as there is no express constitutional authority given to Congress to charter a bank, and as the framers of the constitution repeatedly and deliberately rejected all propositions to vest in Congress power to grant acts of incorporation of whatever description, Congress, therefore, are as virtually and morally prohibited from granting a bank charter (in its national capacity) as if the constitution contained an express prohibitory clause with regard to it. I repeat that this is my ground; and if I can show that the framers of the constitution did not intend to vest in Congress power to grant acts of incorporation of any kind, but designedly withheld such power, then the constitutional right to charter a bank does not, and cannot, belong to Congress. In order to show what were the views entertained on the subject of a national bank, as well as of every other species of incorporation, by the framers of the constitution, it will be necessary to consult the journal of the convention, as well as the statements of several of the delegates after the convention But, previous to introducing these authorities, I will state-what is already known to the committee-that there were two parties in the convention, who held opposing views relative to the form and character of the government proposed to be established. The one advocated a supreme national or consolidated, the other a federal form of government. The latter eventually triumphed. The friends of a supreme government, after being defeated in all their direct efforts, endeavored to accomplish their purpose by indirect means, as fully appears by the following extract from "Taylor's New Views of the Constitution:" rose. "August 18. It was proposed to empower the Legislature of the United States, (the word national is now dropt,) 'to grant charters of incorporation in cases where the public good may require them, and the authority of a single State may be incompetent; to establish a university; to encourage, by proper premiums and provisions, the advancement of useful knowledge and discoveries; to establish seminaries for the promotion of literature and the arts and sciences; to grant charters of incorporation; to establish institutions, rewards, and immunities, for the promotion of agriculture, commerce, and manufactures; and to regulate stages on the post-roads,' which, with other propositions, were referred to the committee of July 23d. 66 September 14. Question. To grant letters of incorporation for canals, et cetera; negatived. To establish a university; negatived.' "Their rejection was a necessary consequence of substituting a federal for the national Government, zealously contended for, from the 29th of May to the 14th of September. It was obvious that powers to establish corporations, prescribe the mode of education, patronise local improvements, and bestow rewards and immunities for the promotion of agriculture, commerce, and manufactures, would certainly swallow up a federal, and introduce a national government. When, therefore, a federal system obtained the preference, it would have been inconsistent with the high degree of intelligence possessed by the members of the convention, to have permitted their determination to be defeated by these indirect attempts. This intelligence was assailed by the soothing but insidious restriction, that the powers to incorporate, grant exclusive privileges, and exer [Oct. 13, 1837. cise every species of patronage, were only to be exercised in cases where the public good may require it.' The same soothing but insidious argument is now addressed to the intelligence of the public, to justify an exercise of the very powers which the intelligence of the convention withheld from a federal government; and whether the promise of public good has been fallacious or fulfilled by the monopolies of currency, of manufactures, and, the extension of federal patronage, the public can decide. Yet, whatever may have been their temporary effect, it is obvious that the enlightened framers of the constitution considered the condition of public good, as an enlargement and not a restriction of power; and that it would defeat all the limitations of the constitution, by which a federal government could be formed or sustained. It was a pretext which would fit every encroachment or usurpation; and no powers could be more indefinite and sovereign than those of granting exclusive privileges, bestowing rewards and immunities upon the three comprehensive interests of society, agriculture, commerce, and manufactures, and patronising capitalists, paupers, knowledge, and ignorance. Such a nest of powers, though exhibited as sleeping in the bed of public good, bore so strong a resemblance to the old bed of justice in France, which was the repository of evil as well as good, that they were all rejected. It was evident that they would be sufficient to re-hatch the strangled national form of government; and the convention having finally preferred the federal form, thought that no good to the public could result from such powers, which would recompense it for the evils it would sustain from the subversion of that form. The convention saw, that if Congress could exercise such powers for the public good, it might, upon the same ground, usurp any powers whatsoever, and, in rejecting the propositions, decided between investing that body with a general or limited federal authority. Hence the power to regulate commerce was not intended to revive the rejected propositions to empower Congress to bestow rewards upon agriculture, commerce, and manufactures. Hence the rejected proposition, to empower Congress to direct the exercise of the judicial power, cannot enable it to extend the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. And, for the same reason, a power to make war cannot revive the rejected power to make canals, or to perform any of those et ceteras, whatever they were, referred to by the journal. If these sweeping and indefinite sovereign powers, or all powers thought by those who exercise them to be necessary for the public good, with an et cetera besides, though proposed and rejected, do yet pass to Congress under the constitution, then the battle between the national and federal parties in the convention terminated quite contrary to the usual course of things; the vanquished were victorious, and the victorious were vanquished; and if they were now alive, one party would be as much surprised to discover, that it had carried the consolidating propositions which it had lost, as the other, that it had lost the federal principles which it carried. The spectacle of the slain rising up alive, and the living falling down dead, could not have been expected by either. "No powers can be more sovereign and arbitrary, than those of deciding and doing whatever may administer to the public good, and of pilfering private property by privileges, partialities, premiums, monopolies, rewards, and immunities; nor more capable of reaching any end. Had the rejection of such powers been unnecessary for the security of a federal form of government, the convention might have still been justifiable for the act, as deeming them tyrannical, fraudulent, and oppressive. Did the convention reject them in fact, and replant them in masquerade? I discern no evidence in the journal to excite such a suspicion. Colonel Hamilton, far from discerning the supposed ingenuity of sinking a national form of government in a lake of obscurity, to be fished up by a long line of constructions, when it might be safer to avow the intentions, seems to have quitted the convention in despair, soon after the failure of his project. Mr. Randolph, undoubtedly influenced by having lost his plan also, refused to sign the constitution. And though Mr. Madison and Colonel Hamilton both signed it, and Mr. Randolph supported it in the Virginia convention, they must have been influenced by the patriotic motive of effecting some good, though they could not accomplish all which they attempted. These are strong reasons to prove that the gentlemen who contended for a supreme national government, and of whose propositions for that purpose not one was adopted by the convention, did not imagine they had succeeded.” It appears that the indirect and insidious means (which were intended to be exercised through the medium of incorporations and exclusive privileges) of the consolidationists, to establish a supreme national government, shared the same fate in the convention as did their more open and direct efforts. But, sir, let us proceed to examine the evidence, on the point in question, in the order in which it stands on the journal of the convention : On the 29th of May, the third day after the convention had | formed a quorum, Mr. Pinckney, delegate from South Carolina, submitted the plan of a constitution, in which he proposed to bestow on Congress the power, "to borrow money," &c., &c. After various propositions, plans, and resolutions, had been sufficiently debated, "It was moved and seconded that the proceedings of the convention for the establishment of a national government, except what respects the supreme executive, be referred to a committee for the purpose of reporting a constitution, conformably to the proceedings aforesaid; which passed unanimously in the affirmative." [H. OF R. the report on this system as made by the committee of detail. When we came to this part of the report, a motion was made to strike out the words to emit bills of credit;' against the motion we urged, that it would be improper to deprive the Congress of that power; that it would be a novelty unprecedented to establish a government which should not have such authority. That it was impossible to look forward into futurity so far as to decide that events might not happen that should render the exercise of such a power absolutely necessary; and that we doubted, whether if a war should take place it would be possible for this country to defend itself, without having recourse to paper credit, in which ease there would be a necessity of becoming a prey to our enemies, or violating the constitution of our Government; and that, considering the administration of the Government would be principally in the hands of the wealthy, there could be little reason to fear an abuse of the power by an unnecessary or injurious exercise of it. But, sir, a majority of the convention, being wise beyond every event, and being willing to risk any political evil rather than admit the idea of a paper emission, in any possible case, refused to trust this authority to a government, to which they were lavishing the most unlimited powers of taxation, and to the mercy of which they were willing blindly to trust the liberty and property of the citizens of every State in the union; and they erased that clause from the system."-Elliot's Debates, vol. 1, p. 413. "By the tenth section every State is prohibited from emitting bills of credit. As it was reported by the committee of detail, the States were only prohibited from emitting them without the consent of Congress: but the conOn the 24th of July, the committee, consisting of five, vention was so smitten with the paper money dread, that were chosen, and on the 6th of August, the committee re- they insisted the prohibition should be absolute. It was ported the "draught of a constitution," and among other my opinion, sir, that the States ought not to be totally depowers proposed to be given to Congress, were the follow-prived of the right to emit bills of credit, and that as we ing: "To lay and collect taxes, to borrow money, and emit on the credit of the United States." On the 16th of August, when this "draught of a constitution" was under discussion, and particularly the power last above mentioned, "It was moved and seconded to strike out the words and emit bills' out of the eighth clause of the first section of the seventh article; which passed in the affirmative. "YEAS, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, 9. NAYS, New Jersey, Maryland, 2." The convention, after having denied to Congress the power to emit bills of credit-which power had been possessed by the confederation-deemed proper to extend a like prohibition to the State governments; this subject was decided on the 28th day of August, when the 12th article was under consideration: "It was moved and seconded to insert the words 'nor emit bills of credit,' after the word 'money,' which passed in the affirmative.' On the 18th of August, as has already been shown, two different propositions were made to authorize Congress to grant acts of incorporation, and were both rejected. On the 14th of September, the power to create corporations was again proposed to be vested in Congress, but was again, and for the third and last time rejected. (Sec journal.) Thus far the journal of the convention. I would now ask the attention of the committee to the statements made by the members of the convention. Luther Martin, a delegate from the State of Maryland, in bis disclosures to the Legislature of that State, makes the following remarks: "By our original articles of confederation, the Congress have power to borrow money and emit bills of credit on the credit of the United States; agreeable to which was had not given an authority to the General Government for that purpose, it was the more necessary to retain it in the States. I considered that this State, and some others, have formerly received great benefit from paper emissions, and that if public and private credit should once more be restored, such emissions may hereafter be equally advantageous; and further, that it is impossible to foresee that events may not take place which shall render paper money of absolute necessity; and it was my opinion if this power was not to be exercised by a State without the permission of the General Government, it ought to be satisfactory even to those who were the most haunted by the apprehensions of paper money; I therefore thought it my duty to vote against this part of the system. "The same section also puts it out of the power of the States to make any thing but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts, or to pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts."-Ib. p. 422. "March the 11th, 1798.-When the bank bill was under discussion in the House of Representatives, Judge Wilson came in, and was standing by Baldwin. Baldwin reminded him of the following fact which passed in the grand convention.' Among the enumerated powers given to Congress, was one to erect corporations. It was, on debate, struck out. Several particular powers were then proposed. Among others, Robert Morris proposed to give Congress a power to establish a national bank. Gouverneur Monis opposed it, observing that it was extremely doubtful whether the constitution they were framing could ever be passed at all by the people of America; that to give it its best chance, however, they should make it as palatable as possible, and put nothing into it not very essential, which might raise up enemies; that his colleague [Robert Morris] well knew that a bank' was in their State (Pennsylvania) the very watch-word of party; that a bank had been the great bone of contention between the H. OF R.] Sub-Treasury Bill. two parties of the State, from the establishment of their constitution, having been erected, put down, erected again, as either party preponderated; that, therefore, to insert this power, would instantly enlist against the whole instrument, the whole of the anti-bank party in Pennsylvania. Whereupon, it was rejected, as was every other special power, except that of giving copy-rights to authors, and patents to inventors; the general power of incorporating being whittled down to this shred. Wilson agreed to the fact."-Jefferson's Memoirs. Now, sir, let us consider, for a moment, the several statements made by the delegates to the convention, and of Mr. Jefferson, in connexion with the evidence contained in the journal, and see if an array of testimony be not presented in opposition to the unfounded and impudent assumption that it was the intention of the convention to authorize Congress to "emit bills of credit"-that is decisive and overwhelming. It appears by the disclosures of Luther Martin, as well as by the original journal, that propositions were repeatedly made in the convention, to authorize Congress to emit "bills of credit," and that all propositions to that effect were most signally rejected! It is expressly stated by the attorney general of Maryland, that a majority of the convention "were willing to risk any political evil, rather than admit the idea of a paper emission in any possible case;" and that they (the convention)" erased that clause from the system." And again, when speaking of the extension of the prohibition to the States, he remarks: that "the convention were so smitten with the paper money dread, that they insisted the prohibition should be absolute!" So that both Congress and the States, as we have already seen, are prohibited by the constitution from "emitting bills of credit;" or from issuing paper money, "in any possible case." It is contended by Mr. Gallatin, in his "Considerations on the Currency," &c., that bank bills and bills of credit are one and the same thing. He remarks: "the constitution of the United States prohibits every State from issuing bills of credit: now, the bills emitted by a bank," he adds, "are to all intents and purposes hills of credit." And hence he concludes, that the State which creates such bank, violates the constitution. If the bills issued by State banks, are to all intents and purposes "bills of credit," in the constitutional sense, as Mr. Gallatin contendsand I am not disposed to dispute the point with him at present-then would bills issued by a United States bank, also be bills of credit. If a State, therefore, by issuing bills of credit, or by incorporating a bank for that purpose, violates the constitution, Congress by doing the same thing, equally violates that instrument; because, as has already been shown, the power to "emit bills of credit" was withheld from Congress as well as from the States. The reason why a prohibitory clause was not incorporated into the constitution in relation to the United States, as well as to the State governments, is obvious. By the articles of confederation, Congress were expressly authorized to emit bills of credit." This power had been exercised by Congress, and the evil effects resulting from it, in the shape of continental money, were in evidence before the members of the convention at the time of framing the constitution. The framers of the constitution, admonished by the history of the past, wisely and patriotically endeavored to guard their country from a similar evil in future, by excluding from the new constitution, the power which had been conferred on Congress by the articles of confederation, as well as by prohibiting the exercise of that power to the State governments. Congress are, by the constitution, not only deprived of the power of "emitting bills of credit," or of "issuing paper money in any possible case,' but expressly limited in the exercise of their power, with regard to the currency, to the coining of gold and silver, and to the regulation of [OCT. 13, 1837. the value of foreign coin. And when Congress have done this, they have done all that the constitution requires or permits them to do on the subject of the currency. Having shown that the power to "emit bills of credit" is not delegated to Congress, and that such was the "dread of paper money" entertained by the convention, that they withheld from Congress the power to issue, or cause to be issued, such money in any possible case," I might dismiss this part of the subject without further remark; but as it is my wish to put an end to all doubt and cavil, I will, even at the hazard of using tedious repetitions, again refer to the important fact, that it was repeatedly propoposed in convention to vest Congress with power to grant charters of incorporation, and that all such propositions were rejected in every instance, and under every modification. This position has been fully established by the journal of the convention, as has been already shown, as well as by the statements of able and honorable members of that body. Mr. Madison, in his reply to General Hamilton's arguments in favor of a national bank, informs us that "a power to grant charters of incorporation had been proposed in the convention, and rejected." Messrs. Baldwin and Wilson, both distinguished members of the federal convention, have informed us, through Mr. Jefferson, that among the enumerated powers ("proposed to be) given to Congress, was one to erect corporations," and that "it was, on deliberation, struck out. And further, that "Robert Morris proposed to give Congress power to establish a national bank," and that the proposition was opposed by Gouveneur Morris, on the ground that it would be unpopular with the people. This proposition was also rejected by the convention. Well, sir, we are at length enabled satisfactorily to determine whether a power to grant charters of incorporation be a substantive or incidental power. That it was not regarded as an incidental power by those members of the convention who were the advocates of incorporations, is evident from the fact that they proposed to class it with the enumerated and substantive powers. And that it was not considered as incidental by those members who. opposed it, is equally manifest from the reasons urged by them in debate against it. They opposed it, not on the ground that it could be derived by implication, but on the broad democratic principle that it was incompatible with the character of the government which they had been delegated to establish, and because its exercise would be dangerous to the liberties of the people. The position assumed by the judiciary, therefore, that the power to charter a national bank is an incidental power, is condemned and contradicted by the unanimous sense of the convention. The convention, by deliberately withholding from Congress the power to grant charters of incorporation for both general and special purposes, thereby clearly and indisputably discountenanced and condemned the principle. Yes, sir, it was the principle of exclusive privileges and of chartered monopolies to which they were opposed, and which they promptly, sternly rejected, as often as introduced, and in whatsoever shape presented. And will it be pretended that the authors of the constitution, after having thus repeatedly and unqualifiedly disapproved and repudiated the principle, still recognised and approved it in the shape of a bank charter in its most dangerous, revolting, and malignant aspect? Who is prepared to accuse the authors of the constitution with such palpable inconsistency, or culpable duplicity? Sir, I am compelled to believe that the man who affirms that the framers of the constitution, after having rejected all propositions to grant charters of incorporation, whether for general or special purposes, intended, at the same time, to authorize Congress to charter a national bauk, holds in light estimation, either the character of that body, or his own honor. Mr. Chairman, I will, in a few words, conclude my remarks on this branch of the subject. It is admitted on all hands that ours is a Government of specific and limited powers. In the language of the constitution, "The pow ers not delegated to the United States by the constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." The power to grant charters of incorporation was not delegated to Congress, nor intended to be so, by the convention which formed the constitution, and, consequently, cannot be exercised without violating that instrument. And, with a perfect knowledge of this fact, with a full and perfect understanding that the convention purposely withheld from Congress the power to "emit bills of credit," or paper money, "in any possible case;" that they also prohibited the granting of charters of incorporation of every kind and description; I cannot, I say, with all the information before me, consent to vote in favor of any incorporation, and especially a bank charter, which stands doubly condemned by the framers of the constitution. No, sir: were I to do so, with the evidence before me, I should consider that I had sinned against light and knowledge-sinned past recovering and past forgiveness, and should ever regard myself as a perjured man-perjured both in the eyes of God and of my country. But, sir, the American people are opposed to a national bank. The knowledge of this fact-and no man can plead ignorance with regard to it-I should suppose would be a sufficient reason why the people's representatives should oppose it. For my own part, sir, were I to support any measure which has been so generally and emphatically condemned by the people, I should consider that I had grossly outraged public opinion, insulted the majesty of the people, disregarded their express wishes, and betrayed their best interests. And, sir, I cannot conceive how any honorable gentleman, who claims to be a republican-who professes to entertain a due regard for public opinion, and a willingness to act in obedience to the expressed will of the majority-can possibly yield his support to a measure that has been so recently, so repeatedly, and so signally condemned by that majority. Shall I be told that the people would take this new institution into favor, provided it were established, and that they would cherish and sustain it hereafter? Let not gentlemen lay the flattering unction to their souls." No, sir, the history of the late bank is too fresh in their recollections. The people of this country are too prudent and too wise not to be admonished and profited by the teachings of the past. They are too jealous of their rights-too much enamored of liberty, to regard with favor a monster that might, at its pleasure, violate those rights and crush that liberty. And gentlemen who act upon the supposition that the American people will ever become the friends and willing supporters of an institution so hostile to the spirit of freedom, err as widely as would have erred the friends of the infant Bacchus, had they commended him to the arms of Juno for succor and protection. But, sir, we are told by the board of trade, and others friendly to a national bank, that the general welfare of the country requires at our hands the establishment of such an institution. For one, sir, I am disposed to doubt the correctness of this proposition. I am strongly inclined to the opinion that these modest patriots are not quite so well qualified as they they imagine, to decide what would or what would not promote the public good. I have yet to learn that those gentlemen are more deeply skilled in the science of government and of political economy, and that they cherish a warmer regard for the publie weal, than those of other pursuits and of a different political faith. I have yet to learn that they are benevolent and patriotic beyond their generation, or that they have been anointed with the oil of wisdom above their fellows. Sir, whence comes their authority to decide what measures shall or shall not be adopted in reference to the general welfare? When, [H. OF R. and how were they constituted and appointed conservators and guardians of the public interests, that they thus ape the language of supremacy, and assume the tone of oracular wisdom? Have not the great mass of the people had sufficient experience, with regard to a national bank? havethey not felt its benefits and its evils, its advantages and disadvantages; and have they not condemned it—I had almost said with the voice of unanimity? And shall they be deemed incompetent to judge of the utility, character, and tendency of such an institution? Sir, by what other criterion than that of public sentiment, clearly expressed and fairly ascertained, shall we judge of a public measure? Shall we adopt the views and opinions of the few to the exclusion of the many? Shall we not allow the great majority to determine what is as well as what is not for their welfare? And have not that majority solemnly decreed, in a voice that is still ringing in our ears, that a national bank is not a national benefit, but a national evil; that it is not a public blessing, but a public curse? If we regard public sentiment, therefore, as a proper test of this measure, we must necessarily decide against it. We are bound to believe that it would not be productive of public good, as represented by the petitioners-but of public mischief, as declared by a majority of the people. It will not be disputed, but that any class of citizens have a right to ask, at the hands of Government, the adoption of such measures, or the enactment of such laws, as may, in their opinion, subserve their interests: provided always, that such measures, or laws, do not conflict with other interests of the State, or revolt the "stomach of the public sense." A national bank does both; and has, consequently, no claims to the favorable regard of Congress. Sir, let us consider for a moment whether we can look with safety or propriety, for wise, patriotic, disinterested, or salutary counsel from the source whence the petitions and demands for a national bank proceed. Do we find the patriotic, the clear-headed, and honest-hearted yeomanry and mechanics of the country clamoring for a national bank? No, sir. No-the productive and laboring classes appreciate their political welfare too highly to desire such an institution. The great majority of bank advocates are to be found among the non-producers-the traffickers and speculators of the country" children of lofty hopes and low desires,' most of whom are peculiarly affected by the present pressure of the times. And would it be the part of wisdom to give heed to counsel emanating from such sources ? Can it be reasonably expected that men relying solely upon bank facilities-men suddenly disappointed in their high expectations of immediate wealth and consequent influence, would be the most competent to direct the action of Government and control the destinies of the nation, at such a conjuncture? No, sir, their habits of life-of thinking—their peculiar situation--the circumstances which influence their judgments and impel them to action-allall conspire to disqualify them for the task. We know, sir, that it is more natural for men in affliction-whether physical or political-to have recourse to palliatives—to immediate and temporary expedients, than to deliberate on the means necessary to secure permanent relief. When Mr. Moone had concluded his speech, Mr. CUSHING spoke in reply to a part of Mr. PICKEN'S remarks respecting a crusade of an insurrectionary character among the white slaves of the North; a movement which he deprecated-and a natural alliance between the democracy of the North and the aristocracy of the South, which he argued to show was against the principles of both. If such an alliance should exist, it must be as of masters and servants, which the North would never hear of. Mr. CAMBRELENG said that an apology was certainly due to the members of the committee for throwing himself upon their indulgence at so late an hour, worn out as they all were by daily and nightly sessions. He had hitherto abstained from debate, anxiously desiring the early passage of the important measures reported; and he should not now have addressed the committee, but for the strange character of the proceeding of the House during the present session, 'called, as it was, under extraordinary circumstances. The banks had suspended specie payments; the Government, with a surplus of forty-two millions and a half, found its Treasury embarrassed; and there was every reason to expect that it would soon be without means to meet its current expenditures. Trade was also paralyzed, by a revulsion more violent than any that had hitherto checked the onward course of the prosperity of this country. Called together, Mr. Chairman, under such circumstances, I had supposed that whatever might be our opinions of past events, or of our mutual errors, we should come here prepared, without regard to party, to provide a common remedy for a common calamity. I had thought that we should be unanimously disposed to relieve our Treasury from its embarrassment, in a mode calculated to aid most extensively in giving renewed activity to our internal circulation, and in reviving trade. Judge, then, of my surprise to see every measure recommended by the President not only opposed, but its passage retarded by every movement that could embarrass the proceedings of this House. So far from aiding us in our measures, the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. CUSHING] told us that he would not "raise his finger to relieve the Treasury from its embarrassments." [Mr. CUSHING explained.] I am happy, sir, that the gentleman is penitent. I understood him as the reporters did; [Mr. C. said his remark had not been correctly reported.] But the gentleman from Kentucky, [Mr. MENEFEE,] a gentleman who, from his debut here promises to be an ornament to this House, indeed he is already so-that gentleman went farther still, and rejoiced at the embarrassments of our Treasury. The spirit of party must be violent indeed, when it makes war upon the Treasury of our own Government, instituted for the common benefit. Had gentlemen come forward, as the country expected they would do; had they united with us, and passed our bills a month ago, they would have afforded immediate and general relief to every part of the Union. Instead of that, what have we seen? Opposition to every measure of relief. When we proposed to relieve the Treasury from its engagement to deposite nine millions with the States, we were told of the millions due from the merchants and the banks. The bouds were not to be postponed to relieve our debtors from the necessity of purchasing specie at a premium, and to aid the banks in an early resumption of specie payments. Our Southwestern banks were to be called upon to pay their balances, by distressing their debtors, and at a crisis when specie in that part of the Union was at twenty, thirty, and forty per cent. premium. All this was to be done, at a moment when trade was paralyzed, and credit destroyed, for the purpose of depositing nine millions with the States! The issue of ten millions of Treasury notes, too-a measure calculated to give general relief in the present condition of our internal exchanges and circulation-that measure was resisted. The interests of the Treasury, and of the country, were to be set aside, in order to furnish a stock to our capitalists, or to enable the Bank of the United States to purchase its bonds at its own price! And now, when it is proposed to separate the Treasury from the banking institutions of the country, to dissolve that fatal union which has contributed so largely to disturb their operations, and to shatter the fortunes of trade, a proposition is made to reunite them by stronger bonds, and to perpetuate their mutual embarrassments. Relief has not been the order of the day with gentlemen. They had no measure to propose to calm the agitations of trade, to revive confidence, and to give a new impulse to (OCT. 13, 1837. the prosperity of the country. Their movements were of another character. Agitation was the order of the day; and, at the moment when the country anticipated prompt relief, we have found ourselves in the midst of another panic session. The gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. SERGEANT] has told us of the awful winter" approaching, and we have heard from all quarters the old war cry of a national bank or a revolution. The removal of the deposites, the specie circular, and all the stale subjects of debate for five years past, have been revived. Preparation is evidently made for a third campaign for a bank of the United States-that sovereign remedy for all the calamities brought upon the country by the mal-administration of our late President. Was Sir, although these subjects are stale, it is useful to consider them at a time when we may justly appreciate them, and in connexion with the inquiry into the causes of the recent revulsion and the general suspension of specie payments. As to the specie circular, I shall soon dismiss that. What was its operation? It increased the specie in the Western deposite banks, in thirteen months, some three millions and a half. And whence was this amount drawn? From the parts of the Atlantic and the Gulf, into which there were at the same time flowing more than ten millions of coin, and bullion beyond the amount exported. the deposite in the Western banks special? No; every dollar of it might have been returned. It might have been drawn by the banks on the Atlantic and the Gulf; and would have been drawn, had they not been, at the same time, receiving three times the amount from abroad. Such, sir, is the whole currency operation of the specie circularthat measure which seems, in the estimation of gentlemen, to have been the terrible author of all the calamities of the commercial world. According to their argument, it followed the swift current of the Ohio and Mississippi to New Orleans, and swept away the most eminent houses in that city. It took the course of the Gulf stream, and gave a shock to every city on the Atlantic. It prostrated more than a hundred of the most enterprising merchants of New York; crossed the Atlantic, shook the royal exchange, and continued its disastrous course throughout all Europe. But, sir, the most remarkable performance of this tremendous measure we did not hear of for some months after it was issued. Before it visited the two continents on our side, it actually passed through the globe, and produced an earthquake in the Celestial Empire. In this revulsion, the Hong merchant was the first victim. Mr. Chairman, the question is unworthy of argument-it is fit only for ridicule. I was glad to hear the learned and travelled gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. LEGARE] who addressed the committee this morning do justice to the specie circular, and admit that but for that, Heaven knows "where we should have gone." Sir, if that specie circular, and the London bankers' circular-a measure ill-timed, sudden, and overwhelming--if both of these circulars had been issued twelve months earlier, it would have saved, on both sides of the Atlantic, many a merchant from bankruptcy and thousand of families from poverty and want. Equally unsubstantial is the charge against the late administration for drawing specie from Europe. If gentlemen would reflect upon the operation of the measures of Congress and of Parliament, adopted upon no party grounds, and upon the effect of a constant influx of capital from the old to the new world, they would find no difficulty in accounting for our heavy importations of specie for some years past. They will find the foundation laid by the act of Parliament of 1833, and our coin law of 1834. The former made Bank of England notes a lawful tender; dispensed, in some measure, with the use for gold, and encouraged its exportation; while the latter raised the price of gold above the European standard, and facilitated its importation into this country. The act of 1834 was the first meas |