of the constitution, combined with the opinion he entertained of the principles of his noble friend at the head of the administration, destroyed all belief in the rumour. He could not suppose it possible that his noble friend would for one moment entertain an opinion so fraught with alarm, and so incapable of excuse upon any pretence of utility or convenience. No, he was sure his noble friend had too much reverence for the ancient mo

narchical parliamentary constitution of the country, to meditate such an innovation as might lead to the most perilous consequences to consequences, indeed, which, from the recently disturbed state of the public mind, he could not, he must confess, contemplate without dismay.-But to return to the panegyric which the Speech contained upon the constitution, they might hope that it did not imply any hostile reference to the Catholic cause. The noble marquis finally recapitulated the several heads of his argument with regard to the war in Spain, the Swedish diversion, the co-operation with Russia, the rupture with America, the calm and deliberate discussion necessary previous to the decision of the East India question, and the adjustment of the Catholic claims, and concluded with expressing his opinion, that increased exertion must be made to strengthen our army in the peninsula, or it would be cruel towards ourselves, and our allies to continue the contest-to persevere in an useless effusion of blood and expenditure of money. For without additional strength, he was persuaded that the object of the war could not be attained, and that the continuance of the struggle, instead of being advantageous to this country, to Spain, or to the continent, would have a directly different operation. Having expressed these opinions, it was not his intention to propose any amendment; but he trusted that such attention would be paid to the suggestions he had thrown out as their validity might demand from his Majesty's ministers, whose system if longer pursued it would be impossible to endure.

The Earl of Liverpool rose in reply to the statements and reasoning of the noble marquis, from whom he differed in some as he agreed with him in other of the opinions he had just expressed. In none did he more cordially concur than in that which went to the situa tion of the country, which ought to be fairly, plainly, and clearly before parlia

ment. He vindicated the conduct of ministers, who were ready to submit the whole of their proceedings and policy to the strictest scrutiny, whether referring to the civil or military government of the country-whether referring to disaster or to triumph-whether furnishing matter for congratulation, or events to deplore. With respect to the conduct of the war, he had read enough of the history of wars to enable him to pronounce, that those who therein looked for unmixed success and exemption from every species of reverse or exemption from misfortune, built, indeed, upon an unstable foundation, and rested on hopes which must turn out to be chimerical. But he trusted that where misfortune occurred, the mind of parliament and the public was too considerate and just, not to distinguish between that which was attributable to the contingencies of war and which resulted from inevitable circumstances, and that for which ministers or their agents might be deemed fairly responsible. The war in the peninsula, he repeated the opinion which he expressed at the outset-the war in Spain he regarded as a new era in the history of modern wars, because in that case the people were most active in repelling their invaders. Unlike the people of Germany and Italy, who were passive spectators of the conflict produced by French invasion, the Spaniards were most forward to contend for the independence and old establishments of their country, therefore their cause held out an encouraging prospect and a good example, which the people of Russia were now so nobly emulating. It was this exhibition of a high national spirit which originally induced him to become an advocate for those measures of assistance which the Spaniards had received from this country. Indeed if this country had not afforded that aid, it would, in his judgment, have betrayed an indif ference, not only to every high sentiment of liberty, but every, even the most common notions of policy. But while his object was to assist Spain, to afford to the Spanish people and to Europe the means of profiting by the circumstances which appeared so promising, he was certainly not so sanguine as many others who concurred with him as to the policy of grant. ing the assistance. Whatever the result might be he thought it the duty of England to make an attempt in favour of Spain. The real question therefore was, whether the exertions of Britain were

have been a real service: but like all the rest of the system, it was imperfect exactly at that moment when it was most required to be perfect; something was done, but not all; and what was done was of no use. The first division arrived in the course of June, but it was so small that it could effect nothing. Suchet, meanwhile, wrote to Joseph that he could not proceed with his whole corps, but that he sent him a reinforcement, and which reinforcement, it afterwards proved, had the effect of subverting every great object of the campaign. Suchet had nothing to apprehend from the Sicilian expedition in the force to which it at that period amounted. Some time afterwards, however-about the end of July-arrived the remainder. They appeared on the coast of Catalonia, and he was very much afraid, though he was far from intending to impute blame to any of the commanders concerned in that expedition, that all they did was to excite the Catalonians to a demonstration of attachment to the British and Spanish cause, which led, in the result, to dreadful executions among them. It had left also, on the minds of the Catalonians, sentiments of suspicion, alienation, and hatred, which it would be difficult, he apprehended, to eradicate. It was thought advisable, that this expedition should operate either at Barcelona or Tarragona, or some part intermediate: but at last they arrived where no human being could have anticipated their presence, and then became utterly extinct as to any efficient purpose to the prosecution ofthe war. He had been told there were various ways of accounting for this indecision at one time it was thought this place would be the best at which to disembark; and then another, till at last the very worst place of all was adopted. He had often heard that it was the greatest trial of a powerful mind, to decide between two conflicting difficulties: he was sure it was the test of a weak mind, to be placed between two advantages, and not know which to choose. The feature of the present case, however, was, that both the advantages were lost, and only this disadvantage gained, that a warlike and lofty province of Spain had been, as far as it was possible such true Spanish patriots could be, alienated from the Spanish cause by the vacillation and indecision of their allies. And what had been the ultimate result of all those proceedings? They had been told in the Speech, indeed, that the result was nothing more

than the consequence of the concentration of the French armies, as if lord Welling ton's retreat was merely a military manœuvre and then followed the monstrous proposition, that it was favourable to the interests and resources of the Spanish nation. He hoped some explanation would be given of that assertion; for it was most injurious both to this country and to Spain. Before he could subscribe to it he must learn to think in direct contradiction to every sentiment he had ever felt, and to every principle he had ever known, either from reading or experience. Had the south of Spain been deli vered? Did the minister mean to say that, in point of fact, the south of Spain was not now under the dominion of France? He was perfectly satisfied that his noble friend, than whom he knew no man more sincerely honest, had never seen a Spanish army, as it had been his (the marquis's) misfortune to do. If he had, he would have known that the army of Ballasteros was utterly incapable of making any stand against two such armies as those of Soult and Suchet; and that Ballasteros, instead of resigning his command, would have found the materials of it vanished in an instant, when opposed to the troops of the two French generals already mentioned.

In moving from Burgos, lord Wellington found himself pursued by a force much superior to that under his command, and without meaning to make any desponding statements, he would ask, this being the end of the campaign, what real progress had been made towards the great object of the contest? With regard to what was to be the object of the war in Spain, three schemes had been successively devised; two were only talked of, and the third was practised. The first was grounded on an idea that it would be imprudent to embark as a principal in the contest, unless some other power, by its co-operation, diverted the forces of France from being all concentrated towards that one point, the subjugation of Spain. From that policy he had always differed upon principle-but this fact was at least deducible from it, that our resources were considered by those who maintained the opinion to be insufficient to carry on the war as principals upon an adequate scale, and that we must therefore await a more favourable opportunity. His view of it had been, that we should engage as principals, and that in order to afford a chance of diver

talked of expedition. What sort of explanation ministers had it in their power to give upon this subject, he could not pretend to conjecture; but it appeared most extraordinary, that after the meeting and discussion he had just mentioned, ministers should not have been enabled to judge of the real disposition of the crown prince of Sweden, or that they should not have taken measures to ascertain whether any change had taken place in that disposition before the useless dispatch of the transports. With respect to Russia, while he was fully disposed to concur in the panegyric pronounced upon the magnanimity displayed by that power, he would ask, what assistance had our ministers afforded to encourage the display or to aid the operation of that magnanimity? This he was at a loss to know, except the sending the Russians about 50,000 arms, with lords Cathcart and Walpole, who were no doubt important instruments to aid a great empire in extricating itself from its difficulties and repelling a formidable foe, were to be viewed in this light.

Upon the subject of America he thought it necessary to say a few words; and first he had no hesitation in asserting, that a more unjust attack was never made upon the peace of any nation than that of the American government upon this country, nor could any cause be imagined more completely just than that which this country had to oppose to America. But he must confess that he heard with surprise the passage in the Speech from the throne, which sanctioned the opinion that ministers still hoped for pacification with America in consequence of something done previous to their declaration of war; he meant with surprise, in consequence of the grounds upon which this hope was understood to rest. Nothing appeared more preposterous than the calculation that the repeal of the Orders in Council would serve to pacify America; for these orders were never in fact the point at issue. Of the conduct of this government through out its discussions with that of America, he was pretty accurately informed, and he was fully prepared to defend it, especially that part of the discussion in which he was personally concerned. But he would maintain, as he had uniformly stated, that the dispute with America did not originate or rest upon the Orders in Council, but referred to higher questions, to topics deeply affecting our great maritime rights, to points, indeed, of such importance, that (VOL. XXIV.)

according to his fullest conviction, the British government could not concede to the pretensions of America without throwing into her hands the trident of the main. It would not avail ministers to repeat the assertions of those who expressed such sanguine opinions as to the probable result of the repeal of the Orders in Council, for these assertions furnished no answer to his view of the subject. They might indeed be adduced in reference to some noble lords near him, from whom ministers borrowed this measure of repeal. Yes, they abandoned their own opinion upon that question, and adopted that of their adversaries, which no doubt furnished a strong proof of their vigour, firmness, and perseverance. But even with reference to those adversaries, ministers could not now rest upon formerly expressed opinions or predictions as to the consequence to be expected from a repeal of the Orders in Council; because, although they agreed to the measure upon the advice of their adversaries, they acted upon it in an opposite spirit. They were dilatory, and apparently reluctant in the adoption of this measure of repeal, and they ought, up various grounds, to have seen its utter inefficiency to pacify America. They ought, in fact, to have expected and been fully prepared for war with America; they ought, as statesmen, to have known that the American government had been long infected with a deadly hatred towards this country, and (if he might be allowed an unusual application of a word) with a deadly affection towards France. It was absurd to suppose that governments were not as likely as individuals to be influenced by passion-that they were not more apt to act from the impulse of their own vices or corruptions than from a consideration of the interest of those over whom they presided. Therefore no statesman should or would conclude, that because it was contrary to the interest of the American people to engage in war with this country, the American government would shrink from such a measure. Indeed, in this instance no such conclusion could be deemed in the slightest degree excusable, for the disposition of the American government was quite evident, and therefore common policy should have urged ministers to prepare fully for the event, and they should have made adequate exertion either to pacify, to intimidate, or to punish America. No means should have been unprovided effectually (D)