and obtained its immediate advantages; and in the ensuing weeks the country was edified by the unusual sight of extreme political opponents amicably sharing platforms, amid the enthusiastic plaudits of mixed audiences.

It is true that a jarring note had been struck by the insinuations of the Daily News' and the Daily Chronicle,' that, notwithstanding all that had passed, the Home Rule and Welsh Church Bills were to go upon the Statute Book; but any uneasiness caused by these ill-timed exhibitions of partisanship was allayed by the knowledge of the friendly character of the private negotiations then proceeding between the Prime Minister and the leader of the Opposition. Undoubtedly the situation was complicated. A truce, as Mr Bonar Law has reminded us, implies delay; and delay, in view of the exigencies of the Parliament Act, jeopardised the Home Rule Bill. This difficulty, inherent in the truce, must have been present in Mr Asquith's mind from the first. The Unionists were willing and anxious to meet it fairly. Failing an agreed settlement, they had provided in the House of Lords a Bill which would give the Government all the powers and all the advantages under the Parliament Act that they possessed in the current session. In the House of Commons, the Opposition Leader undertook to agree to a Bill postponing the General Election, so that the Government would be certain that the whole question would be decided with all the powers of the Parliament Act, and by the same majority in the House of Commons as they had then.

As it turned out, all these laborious and well-meaning efforts at an equitable agreement might have been spared, for the object of Ministers was not equitable settlement but party advantage. On September 11, the Leader of the Opposition received, with absolute amazement,' as he has told us, a communication from the Prime Minister to the effect that the Government intended to place upon the Statute Book the Home Rule Bill and the Welsh Church Bill as they stood. On Monday the 14th, similar information was imparted to a silent House of Commons; and, on the following day, the Prime Minister produced his apology for these extraordinary proceedings.

Mr Asquith stands unrivalled as a master of lucid

exposition; and his empty and clouded discourse upon this historic occasion will go down to posterity as a measure of the confusion of mind and perhaps the sense of shame under which it was uttered. His announcement, that a new Amending Bill would be put forward next year in place of that which it had been promised should become law simultaneously with Home Rule, was received with some derision; but perhaps the most remarkable feature of the speech was its deliberate avoidance of any reference to the cardinal fact dominating the Government's position before the truce. As Mr Asquith knew and his hearers knew, it was the menace of domestic strife alone which had prevented progress in July; and it was the removal of that menace under the greater one of a European war, which now freed his path from every obstacle but the easily surmounted one of his own pledge. To put it shortly, he did by means of the war what he could not have done without the war.

Silence-less of indifference than of reserved judgment-has, with a few exceptions, been the Unionist response to these stolen Radical triumphs; and, so far as possible, we desire at the present moment to respect it. One thing, however, must be said. Mr Asquith has deliberately broken faith with his political opponents, but he has done more than that. It is a time, as he has himself told us, of unparalleled gravity, and. we may add, of unparalleled suffering. At such a time men turn instinctively to the abiding realities, among which we count trust between man and man—the root of civilised society. The political truce was, after all, only part of a general spirit of unity manifesting itself throughout the country. That unity derived its force, we believe, from a renewed consciousness of the true national ideal. The indisputable justice of the war, upon which we had embarked, roused not only spontaneous enthusiasm in all classes, but a determination that on our side at least the war should be carried on in a manner worthy of the cause. Mr Churchill has claimed that our forces, whatever their task, will fight like gentlemen. It is a proud boast, but no one doubts that it will be made good, because no one doubts that at heart the nation still cherishes that ideal to which Napoleon paid tribute when he described our British representative in the Treaty of

Amiens as a man, not indeed of first-rate abilities, but of 'great probity, sincerity, who never broke his word. .. a man of honour-a true Englishman.' It is against this ideal that the present Prime Minister has struck a blow which, unless it is disowned by the nation, must react with deadly effect, not only upon the tradition hitherto governing those who hold high office in this country but upon our whole system of government.

6

So far there is little to show what Ireland herself thinks of Mr Redmond's victory in the House of Commons. Mr Redmond has re-christened Home Rule-or given it decent burial-under the name of political autonomy.' He has also ordered the Committee of the National Volunteers to dismiss a section of its members for disloyal manifestations, a proceeding in accordance with an unvarying tradition of Nationalist public life. Otherwise there has been no sign of great enthusiasm, nor is it easy to see why there should be. The Home Rule Act has changed nothing and solved nothing. The difficulty was never to put the Bill upon the Statute Book, but to put it in operation, or, as Ulster has it, to make the Act a fact. That difficulty remains and after the war will have to be dealt with. The Unionist party's pledge to defend the rights of Ulster stands and will be redeemed. But, until the war-cloud lifts, it is useless to discuss in detail a situation whose features are obscured by it. One fact, however, stands out boldly. It is abundantly clear that it is the Parliament Act, with its exclusive concentration of power in the Cabinet, which has left us exposed to the unbroken shock of contending factions. What that leads or may lead to we had a glimpse of in the events of last March. At any moment during the protracted crisis a simple appeal to the people would have saved us from its intolerable tension. At all costs the prerogative of the Veto, which has been stolen by the Cabinet, must eventually be restored to its rightful owners.

Art. 12.-ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE WAR.

THE financial phenomena of the past two months cannot have failed to impress upon the minds of the people of the United Kingdom the fact that the war of 1914 is destined to exercise a profound and permanent influence upon the economic life of every inhabitant of these Islands and of almost every country in the world. There is no parallel in history to the strain which will be placed upon the international financial system before and after the conclusion of this stupendous conflict. At the present time there are at least 20,000,000 men under arms, or in course of mobilisation, and the daily expenditure on this vast host cannot be less than 10,000,000l. The very flower of the industrial manhood of Europe has been withdrawn from the production of foodstuffs and manufactures, and actively engaged in the greatest campaign of destruction of human life and wealth that the world has ever witnessed. The aggregate population of the eight belligerents amounts to 432,000,000; and, if we add their colonial possessions, the aggregate population directly concerned exceeds 883,000,000. The foreign trade of the British Empire and the other seven Powers involved amounted in 1912 to over 4,854,000,0007.; and they owned in the same year 32,000,000 tons of shipping, out of the world's total of 47,000,000 tons.

The last great European war of the unlimited liability type was the Franco-German conflict of 1870; and, although the developments that have taken place in the domain of international finance during the 44 years that have elapsed have been of a far-reaching character, a study of the financial effects of that war will afford valuable guidance as to some of the possible economic consequences of the present conflict. Those of the South African and Russo-Japanese wars may also be brought into the comparison.

The Franco-German war lasted eight months. War was declared on July 15, 1870, and peace was concluded in March of the following year. The total losses of the French in killed, wounded, and prisoners, were 21,500 officers and 702,000 men. Sir Robert Giffen estimated

the total direct cost of the war to France was about 544,000,000l., the principal items being as follows:

And if to this we add the money value of the two provinces ceded to Germany, say, 64,000,000l., and the other indirect losses (estimated by Sir Robert Giffen at 112,000,000l.) we arrive at a total loss of 720,000,000l.

Sir Robert Giffen estimated that the national income of France in 1869 amounted to 600,000,000l., and that her annual savings amounted to 60,000,000l. On this basis, therefore, the direct and indirect losses occasioned by the war were equivalent to more than one year's national income or to twelve years' savings.

The capital sums required to finance the war were obtained mainly from the issue of the following loans:

The effect of the war on the foreign trade of France was not at first very great. In 1869 the imports were 125,300,000l., and the exports 123,000,000l. In 1870 the imports were 111,200,000l., and the exports 114,400,000l. By 1872 the foreign trade showed a great expansion, and the imports of that year were valued at 137,800,000l., and the exports at 147,100,000l. It is instructive to note that during the war period the principal shrinkage of imports occurred in raw materials. On the other hand, the principal decrease of exports occurred in manufactured articles. The average Bank-rate was, in 1869, 24 per cent.; 1870, 4.65 per cent. ; and in 1871, 5.71 per cent. Between 1871 and 1873 the rate fluctuated between 5 per cent. and