And forming part of plant and tree, Or else, embalm'd, like Egypt's kings, I would survive all meaner things; See time destroying all but me. Upon yon mountain's highest peak, The freshest breezes will be mine; The stars then here will shine more bright; Dudley, Sept. 8. R. HIC KLING. AN ANONYMOUS COMMUNICATION, With regard to the death of Thomas Woolston, B.D. MR. TAYLOR thinks he has read that Woolston died of a gaol fever. I have not got the large three-guinea edition of Lemprière's Dictionary, but in the abridged edition, it is merely said that Woolston "continued to the end of life within the rules of the King's Bench, and died 1733, of an epidemic disorder, after an illness of four days." L'Advocat's Dictionary, and also the Dictionnaire Historique Universel says, that Woolston died "of an epidemical cold, which prevailed almost throughout Europe at that time." Chaufepié says, that Woolston "died on Saturday the 27th January, 1732-3, about nine o'clock in the evening, being carried off, at the end of four days, partly by an epidemical malady which prevailed at that time, and partly by an obstruction in the chest." Chalmers only says, that Woolston died, "after an illness of four days." The Biographie Universelle says, "he remained in prison till his death, which happened on the 21st of January, 1731." But there are, (if I mistake not,) three errors in this short statement. The principal one is, that probably since November 1730, Woolston had been living in the rules of the King's Bench; and this fact alone, renders it utterly improbable, that Woolston should have died of a gaol fever. It is sufficient for the glory of that great and good man, that he met death with admirable patience, resig nation, and fortitude. THE CHALLENGE. (Continued from p. 300.) [I Do not like this subject into which Mr. Imray has fallen. It is unworthy of the poet; and nothing but doggerel can be written upon it.-R. C.] THE gods deplored their mutual loss, With looks and swords of flaming light. At which the shudd'ring human pair, Grows now-or who would cease to be? Snake, tree, Eve, Adam, fruit, and fall, Now chose the brothers from their hoard, Thus ev'n the universe doth seem The Lion roar'd, (as now!) not fearing, I'll not be pester'd with them; no! The devil take me if I do! 'Tis true, I might have niade them better, But is my will to brook a fetter? Nor did I quite exactly see, What rascals those I made would be; But still, I must preserve me seed Of each abominable breed, There's Noah, a tolerable man, (To be continued.) LETTER 32.-FROM THE REV. ROBERT TAYLOR. MORAL OF DEBT. DEAR MR. CARLILE,-My Drakard's Stamford News, which is obligingly sent to me every week as a contribution to my support, and solace in this house of bondage, informs me that "various articles have recently appeared in the Morning Herald, upon the subject of Imprisonment for Debt, which have had the effect of drawing public attention to the state of the prisons in London; and Mr. Peel has interfered to remedy some of the abuses complained of. It seems not unlikely (it is added) that this next session, steps will be taken to abolish imprisonment for debt altogether, especially upon mesne process, that is, before judgment." The Stamford Editor, whose remarks are always devoted to promote the best interests of mankind, remarks,— "though we differ from Mr. Peel and the Duke of Wellington on almost every other measure of their ministry, if they contribute to the alteration of this system, which may be called the white slavery of England, we shall think they will have deserved well of their country." And I should think so too; but my experience of Mr. Peel's ungenerous and illiberal conduct, forbids my hope that either he, or any man or men of his shallow calibre and bell-metal composition, should ever seriously intend, much less effectuate any design of usefulness to mankind. The subject of the moral science of debt cannot too often be brought before the contemplation of those, whose ignorance and conceit too readily leads them to consider being on the winning side of commercial speculations, a sufficient evidence of their moral propriety and fairness. That a man should be imprisoned, or liable to imprisonment for debt of any sort, will, upon a little consideration of the principle of imprisonment, and of the moral of debt, appear to be one of the grossest conceivable absurdities in reason, a mistake in policy, and a crime in conduct. What is the principle of imprisonment but punishment? What just application of punishment can there be, where there has been no crime? We can form no rational notion of Justice, but as being that "eternal and everlasting law of Righteousness, with which alone is no variableness nor shadow of turning," which is, in sentiment, what the straight line is in science-the line of perfect rectitude, from which the least divergence is as fatal as the greatest, and to which the qualifications of more or less, are no more applicable, than they would be to the right or wrong of an arithmetical calculation. He who goes about to obtain two shillings, for that which is only worth one, is in principle a thief; but if, to acquire that one shilling, or one penny more than was due, he club himself with others, so as to make a greater degree No. 12.-VOL. 2. 2 B of force, than that which can be pitted in resistance of his demand, he is in principle, a bandit and a murderer. The principle which lets him stand acquitted at the bar of his own judgment, on himself, for the minor tort, would palliate and justify any extent of wrong soever, leaving power only to be the measure of his actions, and authorising him to be as great a scoundrel as he may find it convenient to be. The honourable principle of just and legitimate commerce, however, than which nothing can be more honourable, is immune from all association with moral tort or obliquity, by its never-to-be-compromised or qualified test, that the estimation of value be the inviolable prerogative of the exchangee and hereby, that which is of little or no value to the one party, being held of considerable value by the other, becomes in that consideration a real property, justly commanding and entitled to the full amount of the estimation which the wishes and needs of the purchaser have put on it. This principle of commerce, meets all the requisitions of the case of debt, and demonstrates the commercial dishonour, as well as the moral injustice of imprisoning a man for any debt whatever. Since in that case, the vender reverses the rule of commercial equity, and helps himself out of the chapman's bag; making his own cupidity and desires the measure of value, instead of the satisfaction given to the vendee. Thus far, is the principle of imprisoning for debt demonstrably uncommercial. Its moral injustice is demonstrable, distinctively, upon these three positions: 1st. It is a falsification of value. 3rd. It is a violence. These three predicaments concur in every case of arrest for debt, and whatever may be the blame justly due to the improvident or unprincipled debtor, must for ever put it out of the right of any man who hath once caused a key to be turned on another for debt merely, to consider himself either as an honest man or a worthy member of society. It is on this consideration, (at least for the honour of commerce I hope it is) that between merchants trading together in different states, the idea of violent proceedings in the case of debt, never so much as comes in contemplation; while the fact speaks in volumes of conviction-no debts are so faithfully and honourably paid, no commerce so respectable, and no men more honourable, than merchants. 1. Imprisonment for debt is a falsification of value.-Because, it puts things on a score of equal value, which the common sense and feeling of all mankind attest to be, not of equal value; and therefore cannot be committed without fraud and falsehood. "Tis true, the improvident, the adventurous debtor, (for he who hath obtained credit under false pretences is not a debtor but a thief) hath done some wrong, and caused detriment to his creditor; but shall his creditor therefore acquire a right to do a |